The Rotting Dutchman of Lumut : Malaysia's Submarines That Never Were

Submarine Hospice?

Many of us have heard of the scandal associated with the Malaysian Scorpene-class submarine purchase, one which involved huge sums of money and resulted in the murder of the Mongolian socialite and interpreter Altantuya Shaariibuu . But there was another side story about Malaysia's quest for submarines, one that pre-dated the Scorpene deal, that not so many remembered or even knew about. This is a sad tale of the last days of two distinguished Dutch submarines, HNLMS Zwaardvis and HNLMS Tijgerhaai, brought to a location far from home and left to the elements, and eventually scrapped. It is also story about the demise of the Dutch submarine construction industry and a cautionary tale of how defence procurements should not be mismanaged.




The Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai underway during their heyday. Photo via Wikicommons.
 

The Zwaardvis-class diesel-electric submarine of
the Royal Netherlands Navy. Photo : Wikipaedia

Dutch Submarine Construction

The Dutch were involved in submarine construction activities since 1904 when they started the construction of the submarine Onderzeese Boot 1, based on the designs from the American company Holland Torpedo Boat Co. It was to be a single boat class, eventually sold to the Dutch Navy and commissioned as the HNLMS O1. From such humble beginnings more than a century ago, the submarine building industry gradually matured and gained momentum during the years preceding World War II. The Dutch were even credited for inventing the submarine snorkel which allowed diesel submarines to run their engines to recharge their batteries while remaining submerged to reduce the risk of detection by the enemy. Unfortunately, this technology fell into German hands and saw application in the Kriegsmarine's U-Boats especially towards the final years of the war.

As the Dutch shipyards suffered extensive damage during World War Two, construction of indigenous Dutch designed submarines did not restart until the fifties with the Dolfijn-class SSK of which four boats were produced. The next generation of Dutch submarines were the Zwaardvis-class which were laid down in 1966 and commissioned in 1972. Two were built for the Dutch Navy and another two for the Taiwanese Navy in the mid-eighties. The current and final batch of submarines are the Walrus-class which had been commissioned in the early nineties and are still in active service. After that, the Dutch submarine industry collapsed as the Dutch government did not have sufficient orders for the builders and desperately needed foreign exports orders failed to materialize.

The Zwaardvis-class was to play a crucial part in the unfolding saga of the demise of the Dutch submarine construction industry.

The Zwaardvis-class SSK

The Zwaardvis-class boats are conventional diesel-electric hunter-killer submarines ( SSK ). They were based on the designs of the Barbel-class of the United States Navy with an albacore or tear-drop shaped hull. The Barbel-class was the last of the SSKs built for the USN before it developed into an all-nuclear submarine force. Two boats were built for the Dutch Navy, the Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai.

USS Barbel SS-580, ordered in 1955, on her last day of service
24th Oct 1988. USN Photo via Wikicommons

In the Dutch language, Zwaardvis means swordfish and Tijgerhaai means tiger shark. Just like their namesake, the Zwaardvis-class boats are large ocean-going fleet-submarine type vessels displacing some 2408 tons surfaced and 2640 tons submerged, measuring 66.9m long and 8.4m wide. Powered by three diesel engines and an electric motor, these boats have a maximum speed of 13 knots surfaced and 20 knots submerged and an endurance of 10000nm at 9 knots. Maximum diving depth is classified but probably 200m or more. They are armed with 6 x 533mm bow torpedo tubes and carry a total of 20 torpedoes. They have a complement of 67 including 8 officers.

Built at by Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij ( RDM ) in Rotterdam, which used to be one of the largest ship builders in the Netherlands, these submarines were laid down in 1966, launched in 1970 / 1971 and commissioned in 1972. HNLMS Zwaardvis and HNLMS Tijgerhaai were to serve an uneventful career with the Dutch Navy for twenty-two years before being decommissioned in 1994 and 1995 respectively. This relatively early withdrawal from active service is probably a result of the end of the Cold War with budgetary cuts in military spending in many NATO countries. It would also mean that those hulls have some more years to go, though they might require some upgrading before being put back into service.

The Zwaardvis-class cannot be discussed without the mention that in 1982 the Taiwanese Navy, more correctly known as the Republic of China Navy ( ROCN ), placed an order for two boats which were modified variants. They were built by Wilton-Fijenoord it its Schiedam yard. These were launched in 1986 and were delivered to Taiwan in 1987. They are officially known as the Chien Lung-class ( 劍龍 級 ) meaning sword dragon ( not to be confused with the Japanese Soryu-class submarine SS-504 Kenryu which also means sword dragon ). Sometimes also referred to as the Hai Lung-class ( Sea Dragon ), these are still in active service in the ROCN today and by the looks of it, will be for a long time more to come.

After procuring the Hai Lung boats, Taiwan had actually the requirement for another eight submarines. However the Netherlands suffered from a huge diplomatic and trade fallout with China after the sale of the submarines to Taiwan and the follow-on request was denied for fear of angering China again.




SS-793 Hai Lung of the Taiwanese Navy is a modified Zwaardvis-class SSK. Photo : Wikipaedia

Used Boats For Sale

Even before the Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai were decommissioned, the Dutch shipbuilding industry was already in serious trouble with over capacity and too few orders. Many went into receivership while others were broken up with profitable divisions being sold off or merged with other shipyards. RDM was no exception. Faced with bankruptcy in 1983, it was heavily restructured with the closure of its off-shore department and the repair business transferred to Wilton-Fijenoord. The remaining naval as well as the heavy tools and machinery division formed a new company RDM Nederlands BV which was government owned. For a short period in the late eighties, the construction of the four Walrus-class submarines for the Dutch Navy helped but trouble brewed again with no other follow-on orders.

By late 1991, the Dutch government divested its interest and sold RDM Nederlands to the Royal Begemann Group controlled by a businessman by the name of van der Nieuwenhuyzen who also did not manage to turn the company profitable. By 1994 the company was downsized and reorganized to RDM Technology BV and RDM Submarine BV and eventually both were taken private by van der Nieuwenhuyzen in 1996.

When the time came for the Zwaardvis boats to retire, the Dutch government tried without success to offer them to Indonesia which was once a Dutch colony but gained independence after the end of World War II. The asking price for the submarine was reportedly USD55million, a steal considering the fact that these were blue water capable designs which had a relatively short service span. By some estimates, the hulls may have another 15 years of usable life in them, perfect for a small navy that needed to start building up a submarine force from scratch. Without any buyers in sight, the submarines were decommissioned and eventually sold to RDM Submarines for an undisclosed sum in 1996.

RDM Submarines had at that time an advanced attack submarine design known as the MORAY - Multi Operational Requirement Affected Yield which was based heavily on the Walrus-class SSK, the Netherland's follow-on class after the Zwaardvis-class. It had a modular design and could be adapted for the different needs of various navies. An air-independent propulsion system could be optionally installed if the customer so wishes. The strategy for RDM Submarines was to bundle the Moray with the two used Zwaardvis boats to small navies who are keen to acquire submarine capabilities. The older boats would be used for training straight away while the new builds were under construction. By the time the advanced Morays were commissioned, the crew would have been absolutely ready for them. The Moray-class submarines were offered to the Indonesians in 1996 but they preferred the German Type 209. They were then offered to Egypt presumably through the US as part of the foreign military aid package but it did not materialize. Portugal was the next on the list that did not select the Moray. It was a good design on paper but the trouble was the Dutch government had no need for it at that time and without an existing functioning build no other navy was prepared to take the risk to order it.

In April 2000 rumours emerged about a possible deal with Malaysia for the two old boats to be used as training submarines. Jane's Defence Weekly subsequently reported that Malaysia is negotiating for a five year lease contract with RDM Submarines for the two Zwaardvis boats. By Oct 2000, the two submarines were loaded onto the heavy dock vessel Smit Explorer and were shipped to Lumut, Malaysia where they were supposed to be refurbished by PSC Naval Dockyard, RDM Submarine's selected partner, and then offered to the Royal Malaysian Navy as training vessels. All this happened before Malaysia had even made any formal agreements with RDM Submarines regarding the two boats but presumably the Dutch company must have been quite confident of clinching the deal to have shipped the submarines all the way to Malaysia. Conversely, RDM could have shipped them to Malaysia to have them refurbished there and to have them available for trials to increase its chances of leasing them or selling them to the Malaysian Navy.

The two submarines arrived at Lumut sometime in mid-December 2000 and were tied up at PSC-Naval's wharf where nothing much was done for a long time. Indeed by 2001 Malaysia had already indicated that they would be buying new submarines and the Dutch boats were not going to be part of the deal. Their presence in Lumut lead some Malaysians to believe that their country had already acquired and operated submarines. Some even swear that they sometimes see only one submarine moored at Lumut implying that one or the other boat must have been active and out at sea. In reality, the two boats never went anywhere and were not upgraded or refurbished. Malaysia never did lease or buy the Zwaardvis submarines, and by 2002 made the decision to acquire a pair of the French Scorpene submarine with an older Agosta 70B thrown in as a training boat. The first Scorpene submarine only arrived in Malaysia in early September 2009.




The Ex-HNLMS Zwaardvis and Tijgerhaai moored at
Lumut Naval Base in Malaysia. Photo : RDM Submarines



RMN's Scorpene-class SSK. Photo : LIMA

Stranded In Lumut   

For the next 3 to 4 years, the Zwaardvis submarines remained stranded in Lumut with their owners still in search of a buyer. But as time passed, the condition of the disused boats could only deteriorate, especially in the harsh tropical environment like Lumut, and the boats became less and less saleable. Without any successful submarine sale, new or used, the viability of RDM Submarines as a company also became more and more tenuous.

By 2005, a PSC-Naval Dockyard spokesperson claimed that the submarines could no longer move under their own power. The Dutch government had also became increasing worried that in-lieu of the maintenance and berthing fees owed to PSC-Naval Dockyard which could accumulate to substantial amounts over a period of 5 years, the submarines might be seized and sold off to unsavory third parties who might then have unauthorized access to sensitive equipment or technology. It demanded that RDM Submarines make arrangements to ship the submarines back to the Netherlands or else to have them scrapped.

When those demands were not met, the Dutch government even took RDM Submarines to court, but it all amounted to nothing as RDM was then in its death throes and was in no financial position to implement anything. In the end, the Dutch government had to pay for the submarines to be scrapped, which probably happened in 2006.




Google Earth Image dating back to 27th Sep 2005 showing
two submarines moored at PSC-Naval Dockyard's wharf at Lumut.



Lumut today : Submarines long gone.
Boustead Naval Yard ( formally PSC Naval Dockyard )
to the west and RMN Lumut Naval Base to the east.

Lumut Naval Base as it appears today. Photo : RMN Tweet




A Sad Way To Die

It was a tragic and wasteful end to the two Zwaardvis submarines as when they were being retired in the mid-nineties, they could still have served useful lives as training boats or even remained operational after a mid-life upgrade. If they had remained in the Netherlands, perhaps they could also have a chance of being preserved as a museum boat, or to be used as a target for SINKEX live firing exercises, or to be sunk as artificial reefs, anything useful apart from just being sold as scrap metal.

After being left rotting at the wharves of PSC-Naval in Lumut for years, the eventual scrapping of the Zwaardvis boats also signaled the end of the submarine construction industry for the Netherlands. Such capability and the skilled work force tied to the industry would be extremely difficult if not impossible to reacquire once lost.

Had the Dutch government defied Chinese pressure and gone ahead to sell Taiwan the additional eight modified Zwaardvis submarines which the ROCN desperately needed, things might be very different today. RDM Submarines might just have stayed in the black long enough to secure other deals to allow the Dutch to maintain its strategic capability in submarine construction, maybe even long enough to participate in the Walrus-class replacement program. However, that was not the case. RDM Submarines was long gone. The Moray-class submarine whose fate was once so closely linked to the Zwaardvis boats would forever remain a paper design and to this day was never ever constructed or sold.

Now should you happen to chance upon a glowing apparition off the seas of Lumut on a dark and stormy night, emerging from the depths and taking to the skies, you'll know it's got to be either the Zwaardvis or the Tijgerhaai, still prowling the oceans as they always did, still conducting their eternal combat patrols .......




Flying Dutchman rendition of SS-581.

 

Australia Selects Shortfin Barracuda, Hands DCNS A$50 Billion On A Platter



The DCNS Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A SSK. Image : DCNS Australia

SEA1000 Future Submarine Program

Merci! That's the least the French could say. Ouch! That's the pain that would come from parting with A$50 billion, after the initial euphoria is over. And Oh ****! would be the response with the realization of the enormity of the task ahead.

Australia's quest to replace its current fleet of six Collins-class conventional diesel electric attack submarine is officially known as the SEA1000 Future Submarine Program. It aims to provide the Royal Australia Navy with " an affordable, regionally dominant, conventional submarine capability, sustainable into the foreseeable future ", so that it can safeguard its sea lines of communication and its economy which is worth A$1.6 trillion annually.

The Aussies wanted them BIG and they wanted them quick. Twelve boats are needed in total. They have to be constructed locally in Australia and they had to have American combat and weapon systems. As there were no off-the-shelf options that can fulfill Australia's unique operational requirements, they began looking for an international partner to design and build their next generation boats, the details of which can be found here. After a long drawn competitive evaluation process, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced last week that the French Shortfin Barracuda designed by DCNS had been selected, thus ending months of speculation by defense analysts as well as the general public alike.

DCNS Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A

The Shortfin Barracuda is actually a conventionally powered variant of the Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine ( SSN ), specially customized for Australia. It is brilliantly named after the Australian Barracuda or Shortfin Barracuda whose scientific name is Sphyraena novaehollandiae.

French national ship builder DCNS needs no further introduction. Malaysia's Gowind-class frigates and Scorpene-class SSK, Singapore's Formidable-class stealth frigates, and the Mistral-class BPC so coveted by Mr Putin, were all constructed by this innovative company.

The Barracuda-class submarine currently under construction for the French Navy is France's second generation nuclear attack submarine meant to replace their six Rubis-Amethyste-class SSNs. It displaces 5300 tons submerged and 4765 tons surfaced and measures about 100m in length. Its nuclear reactor provides an unlimited range, requiring refueling and complex overhaul ( RCOH ) only once in ten years. Its endurance is about 70 days, the limiting factor being the amount of food it can carry for its crew. It is extremely stealthy and quiet, featuring pump jet propulsion instead of propellers. It can be armed with a variety of weapons including torpedoes, mines, SM39 block 2 Exocet anti-ship missiles and SCALP Naval land attack cruise missiles. First-in-class FS Suffren is scheduled for launch in 2017 and the six boats cost the French government €9.9billion.


The Shortfin Barracuda debuted as the SMX-Ocean SSK at Euronaval 2014 and quickly evolved into its current form as the world's most advanced conventional submarine customized for Australia's needs. It will be slightly shorter than the Barracuda SSN at 97m and also smaller, displacing some 4500 tons when surfaced and " more than 4000 tons ", probably closer to 5000 tons, submerged. Powered by diesel engines and advanced fuel cell air-independent propulsion system, it can remain underwater for up to 3 weeks and has a range of 18000nm ( 33300km ) at 10 knots and an endurance of 80 days at sea. Maximum diving depth is 350m or deeper and its maximum speed will be 20knots. It will have a complement of 60 officers and ratings, plus it can carry another 20 special forces personnel.

It will have " the most powerful sonar ever produced for a conventional submarine " and the same pump-jet propulsion system and the same enhanced stealth features inherited from its nuclear cousin. Pump-jet technology is said to make propellers obsolete, as they can be a thousand times quieter and achieve much higher speeds before cavitation ( bubbling phenomenon ) occurs. It also allows for high maneuverability with the addition of a steerable nozzle, creating vectored thrust. However, it can be less efficient than propellers at low speeds. Other notable features include an X-rudder like the Japanese Soryu boats where the four blades can twist and turn in different permutations and provides superior maneuverability especially in shallow waters, retractable hydroplanes which reduces drag and noise, non-hull penetrating optronic masts and special hull hatches for easy upgrading in the future.

Its combat system and weapon systems will be American, as the Aussies value interoperability with their closest ally the United States. So we can expect an improved version of the AN/BYG-1 combat system, Mk48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System ( CBASS ) heavy torpedoes jointly developed by the US and Australia, UGM-84 submarine launched harpoon missiles, UGM-109E Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, Mk60 CAPTOR mines, Mk67 submarine launched mobile mines and such. Swimmer delivery hatches, unmanned underwater vehicles ( UUV ) will probably be part of the package as well.

At A$50 billion, it is Australia's single biggest defence procurement to date, though this spending will be spread out over the next thirty years or so. At least two thirds of this money will be allocated for future upgrades, sustainment, operations and in-service support of the submarines which means the initial builds would cost A$20 billion or less.

Here's a video of the Shortfin Barracuda from DCNS.






The Shortfin Barracuda : Australia's Future Submarine. Image : DCNS

The Shortfin Barracuda with tiny hydroplanes extended. Image : DCNS

X-rudders and pump-jet propulsion. Image : DCNS

The original SMX-Ocean SSK and the Barracuda SSN side by side. Image DCNS

Why The French Won

The Swedes were eliminated early in the race, due largely to the fact that they had not built a single submarine independently for the past two decades, and perhaps also because they were the designers of Collins-class submarines which were giving the RAN so much trouble.

Of the three that made it to the competitive evaluation process phase, the Germans were dropped for concerns that they had not built anything more than 2000 tons so far, even though they were the most prolific boat builders, supplying more than 160 modern SSKs to navies worldwide.

The Japanese Soryu-class submarine was not chosen purportedly because it lacked the range that the Aussies desired. The berthing compartment is also too small for the Australian sailor who typically have a taller stature compared with their Japanese counterparts, this even after a 6 to 8m hull lengthening modification.

The French design, on the other hand is not only super stealthy but also technologically the most advanced, and most importantly has the range equal to or exceeding those of the existing Collins-class boats. DCNS had also the expertise in building submarines up to 14000 tons in the form of nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) or boomers, like the four Triomphant-class boats currently in service with the French Navy.

 

You can see for yourself why the Shortfin Barracuda could have been so appealing to the Aussies through the above video made by DCNS on the operational capabilities of the SMX-Ocean some months ago.

Constructing the Shortfin Barracuda

All the construction of the Shortfin Barracuda submarines will be done in Australian naval shipbuilder ASC's Adelaide shipyard with the help of DCNS. The project can generate 2900 jobs locally and will no doubt be a great boost to the South Australian economy for many years to come. Because submarines are among the most complicated machines that humans have ever designed, the task ahead for ASC is huge and they know it, describing the construction of the Collins-class SSK as an unprecedented feat of engineering, design and logistics in Australia. Work had to be co-ordinated with 150 major contractors and hundreds of smaller suppliers and many modules were constructed off-site and then shipped to Australia for integration at ASC. Some 33000 drawings and 5000 work orders had to be issued before work could even begin and each submarine required 250000 man-hours over 60 months to assemble. The Shortfin Barracuda is light-years ahead of the Collins in terms of complexity and the question now is whether ASC is up to the job. DCNS Australia describes the task as mammoth and at least twice as big as the Collins project.

For A$50 billion, France has promised the Australians full transfer of stealth technology utilized in their SSN and SSBN submarines, the crown jewels of their submarine designs that they have never shared with anybody else before. Even though the submarines are to be constructed in Australia, another 4000 jobs will be created in France itself in support of the Shortfin Barracuda project.

Looking ahead, contract signing will probably take place in 2017, construction will start between 2022 to 2024 and the first submarine will probably launched in 2028 and be commissioned by 2030. The Shortfin Barracuda is expected to remain cutting edge in terms of operational capabilities until 2060 and will probably in active service until 2070. If the Collins boats were to be retired starting from 2025 as planned, there will be a capability gap which the RAN has to address. The most likely solution will be to have some sort of life extension program to postpone the decommissioning of the Collins-class, but then again, I'm not sure if that's tantamount to flogging a dead horse.

The Shortfin Barracuda firing a presumably Mk48 Mod 7 CBASS torpedo. Image : DCNS

Winners and Losers

Apart from France, South Australian politicians and the naval shipbuilding industry of Australia are big winners as they successfully canvassed for the submarines to be completely constructed in Australia, never mind the competency of the local work force or the available infrastructure. The construction and more importantly the sustainment of the submarine fleet meant that a constant flow of jobs and money into South Australia will be almost a guarantee for the next fifty years.

The Royal Australian Navy could be big winners with the chance of a lifetime to once and for all rectify all the misgivings of the Collins and acquire an underwater capability way beyond their current level and maintain it that way for decades to come, but only if the submarine construction goes smoothly. Chances of that happening is almost close to zero, if historical events could be used as a gauge. Not only had ASC bungled the Collins construction and their subsequent upgrading and sustainment, they have, as part of a consortium, continued to mess up the until now the most expensive defence procurement - the A$8 billion SEA4000 Air Warfare Destroyer project. The Hobart-class AWD are 3 years late with an estimated A$1.2 billion in cost overruns. Its going to be difficult even just to be cautiously optimistic.

Japan was the early favorite in the race for SEA1000, with Shinzo Abe and Tony Abbott being good pals and the inking of a contact for joint development of submarine technology in 2014. Even the Americans also favoured the Japanese since they too have a direct stake in this mega-project as the provider and integrator of the combat and weapons system and would have to work with whoever the Australian chose. An American-Australian-Japanese alliance would also be a good thing to check Chinese ambition in the South China Sea. However, lack of experience with international arms deals and the subsequent ousting of Tony Abbott as prime minister probably doomed the Japanese effort. Japan did not agree to support full construction of the submarines in Australia until very late in the game, after France and Germany had indicated their willingness to do so. Their team of negotiators sent to Australia was said to be comprising of a mix of business executives and Ministry of Defence bureaucrats who had never worked with each other before. Of course the oriental way of business conduct, where a handshake alone would seal a deal, where trust and honour is valued above all else, might be perceived very differently in western cultures.

It is not surprising that Japan was rather peeved to learn that the deal had gone to their competitor when they had invested so much time and effort and that just slightly more than a year ago, they were the front runners. Turnbull will have a great time trying to pacify them and manage the fallout. While the two countries pledged to continue their co-operation in defence research the relationship will never be the same. Hopefully Japan will learn from this experience and turn failure into success in future deals.

Best Submarine at the Best Price?

That was what Tony Abbott promised the Australians but that's not what they are going to get. The entire project had been hijacked by the politicians who have their own agendas to field and don't give a damn what happens a decade or two in the future when they will probably no longer hold office. Building the submarines in Australia is widely reported to carry with it a 30% to 40% premium as opposed to constructing them in their country of origin. The risk of delays and cost overruns is extremely likely given the size and complexity of the project as well as the quality of the local work force. Even if the French design had been chosen on merits of technological advancement, the Aussies could have at least let the French handle the construction in France. What's the use of the best submarine in the world if it can't be put to sea half the time and the other half of the time is spent combating defects?

A procuring a submarine fleet is a long term investment, a strategic partnership that will bind the two countries, in this case France and Australia, for the next 50 years. Good or bad the Aussies would have been stuck with the deal for the next half a century. These submarines are not disposable if anything goes wrong since they are highly customized for Australia's needs and probably nobody else can afford them anyway. The Australian Navy will really have to keep its fingers crossed. As the quest for better submarines continues, we can only wish the RAN Bon Voyage!