In the good old days not too long ago, naval vessels were designed, constructed and deployed for specific tasks. A minelayer would do pretty nothing else but lay mines, a corvette would be primarily for escort duties while frigates were responsible for anti-submarine operations and so on and so forth. It was not uncommon for a navy to own multiple asset types corresponding to the various aspects of naval warfare.
However, the increasing complexity of modern day naval operations coupled with escalating procurement costs and shrinking defense budgets have paved the way for the emergence of the multi-role vessel, a multi-tasking ship that can take on various missions on demand.
For the Republic of Singapore Navy ( RSN ), this trend has already been demonstrated in its Formidable-Class stealth frigates which were equipped for anti-surface, anti-submarine and anti-air warfare. The newer Independence-Class littoral mission vessels ( LMV ) took the multi-role concept even further with their modular mission configurable designs and the innate ability to deploy unmanned systems.
With its long serving Victory-Class missile corvettes ( MCV ) close to their end-of-life, the RSN had announced that they will be replaced by a new vessel type known as the Multi-Role Combat Vessel ( MRCV ) by the year 2030. Little had been revealed from the official channels apart from the fact that the MRCV can be mission configured for anything from high-end warfare to security operations and even humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It will be a mothership of sorts for an entire range of airborne, surface and underwater unmanned systems. Its design takes into consideration the short innovation cycles in unmanned systems and it will be able to take on new capabilities easily as new technology emerges. MINDEF's infographic illustration of the MRCV seem to suggest a frigate-like vessel with stealth features equipped with vertical-launch system and a helicopter deck.
At the recently concluded IMDEX Asia 2019, at least two possible MRCV candidates have emerged, the Crossover 131 Combatant from Damen Shipyards Group and the Vanguard 130 from ST Engineering. These designs offer a first glimpse of how the future MCV replacements might look like and if I read the lines correctly, they scream "destroyers".
Vanguard 130
In conjunction with IMDEX 2019 Singapore's ST Engineering unveiled a new family of surface combatants known as the Vanguard series comprising of five different classes that share common hull forms. From the company brochures : The design concept centers on a single design that can be applied across multiple classes with modular capabilities. It also allows commonalities such as scalable hull forms, machinery and equipment, system and layout designs, standards for outfitting and installation, to be applied across the various vessel classes which can translate to higher cost efficiencies.
Ships from the Vanguard series can be configured as the Vanguard 80 Patrol Vessel, the Vanguard 95 Naval Research and Support Vessel, the Vanguard 105 Offshore Patrol Vessel, the Vanguard 120 Frigate and finally the Vanguard 130 Multi-role Combatant.
Under this multi-role capability profile, the Vanguard series aims to offer highly operable platforms in high states for the stowage and operation of unmanned systems and vehicles for enhanced reach and visibility.
A quick look at the five members of the Vanguard series would tell you it's the Vanguard 130 Multi-role Combatant, the biggest and most capable ship in the series that fits the MRCV description most. At 130 meters it will already be significantly larger than the Formidable-class frigate and it has to be in order to accommodate all those unmanned systems and perhaps even landing crafts and when required, additional personnel such as special forces. A company spokesman mentioned in an interview by Naval News that the Vanguard 130 will be in the 5000 ton range.
Source : ST engineering
The Vanguard series. Source : ST engineering
The Damen Crossover 131 Combatant. Source : Damen
Crossover 131 Combatant
The Crossover series of multi-role vessels has been offered by Damen Shipyards Group since 2014. They are very similar in concept with the Vanguard series focusing on producing highly customizable multi-mission capable naval vessels that can at the same time be self-sustaining, self-reliant, and has a high degree of survivability even in high threat environments. Damen claims that its experience in the clever application of a mix of commercial and naval standards and specifications results in the required naval quality and systems characteristics in its end products but yet support costs can be kept low through competitive pricing and the use of commercial off-the-shelf solutions whenever possible.
The entire family comprises of the Crossover 115 Security, the Crossover 123 Fast Security, the Crossover 131 Logistic, the Crossover 131 Amphibious, the Crossover 131 Combatant and the Crossover 139 Fast Combatant. The version that Damen intended to offer for the MRCA competition is the Crossover 131 Combatant. It has a length of 131 meters, a displacement of 5300 tons, a maximum speed of 28 knots, a compliment of between 108 -125 men and the capability to accommodate an additional 128 personnel.
MRCV Likely Key Features
From bits and pieces of information and images here and there, we can now have some idea of how the MRCV might end up resembling. These are of course speculative at best. The project is not even at the RFI stage yet.
5000 ton class
Conventional hull form with helicopter deck for a medium-lift helicopter
Mission deck / well deck for launching landing crafts
Stealth features
Advanced sensor suites - integrated mast with phase array radar, electro-optical sensors
Advanced ship management systems
Advanced weapons suites - ASuW, ASW, AAW
High efficiency in unmanned systems deployment
Multi-mission capable with swappable modules
What kinds of unmanned vehicles are likely to be deployed from the MRCV? ST Engineering's stable of UUV and USV will give us some ideas.
The Mercury Autonomous Underwater Vehicle can map the seabed
for mine detection. Source : ST Engineering
Venus Unmanned Surface Vehicle. Source : ST Engineering
SAAB Skeldar V-200 VTOL UAV. Source : SAAB
Boeing / Insitu Scaneagle UAV which is already equipping the Victory-class MCV.
Source : Boeing
MRCV or DDG
The mission capabilities and dimensions of both the Vanguard 130 and the Crossover 131 Combatant do make them fit the description of a destroyer closer than those of a frigate. In reality though it can be near impossible to distinguish a small destroyer from a large frigate based on features alone.
Calling the next generation Victory-class replacement the Multi-Role Combat Vessel is an accurate functional description and there is absolutely nothing wrong with that. It could however hide the fact that the RSN is quietly upgrading its capabilities in a huge way. This is not at all surprising given the fact that Singapore's neighbours have been expanding their naval fleets in an even bigger manner. For example Indonesia has commissioned two Sigma 10514 stealth frigates within the past 5 years with four more planned. It has also recently placed an order for three more Nagapasa-class submarines from South Korea, on top of the first three that has been delivered or launched. The Malaysian Navy meanwhile will be receiving their Littoral Combat Ships and their Littoral Mission Ships beginning from 2019.
There exists many instances of other navies misrepresenting ship classes to downplay the true capabilities. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force classifying the Izumo-class helicopter carrier a helicopter destroyer ( DDH ) is a prime example. Perhaps Singapore is just trying not to fuel the flames of a regional naval arms race further.
And why might the RSN need destroyers? Well to protect the future Joint Multi-Mission Ship, of course. Aircraft / helicopter carriers never operate alone, and I am certain the MRCV will have an important role in a carrier battle group. Tell me I am wrong.
From Alley Karasukojima : Two Soryu-class submarines belonging to
Submarine Squadron 5, 1st Submarine Flotilla at Kure Naval Base.
Alley Karasukojima
There is a unique place in Japan where anyone could visit and view the submarines and ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ( JMSDF ) at close range and for free. It is known as Alley Karasukojima Park ( アレイからすこじま公園 Arei Karasukojima Koen ) and it is located in Kure City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
Often listed as a seaside park, Alley Karasukojima is nothing more than a narrow strip of wharf-side walkway with a few trees and flower beds and with a car park that is rather far away and uphill. Unremarkable as it sounds, it is the view from here that will blow the mind of any naval enthusiast away. Standing by the water's edge, the visitor will be directly facing the piers where the warships and the submarines of the JMSDF are docked. The coming and going of the naval vessels and all dockside activities can be observed without restrictions anytime of the day or night.
Panoramic view of Alley Karasukojima
Historical Background
Kure has always been an important part of Japanese naval history being designated as the second of four naval districts ( 鎮守府 Chinjufu ) as far back as 1889. Its location along the shores of the Seto Inland Sea conferred strategic importance in the sea control of western Japan. The establishment of the Kure Naval Arsenal in the following year would eventually make Kure one of Japan's most important shipbuilding sites for capital warships including the Yamato. In modern times Kure continues to be a major JMSDF base and also hosts the headquarters of the Kure Naval District whose area of jurisdiction stretches from the western half of Kyushu to the Kii Peninsula of Kansai.
What we know today as the Alley Karasukojima Park was once the sea fronting the headquarters and arms manufacturing plant of the Kure Naval Arsenal. A seawall made of rocks was constructed there in the year 1895.
There was a small island there known as Karasukojima ( 烏小島 ) or Bird Island with a perimeter measuring just 40 meters and it was used as a training ground for torpedo launching during the Taisho Period ( 1912 - 1926 ). Karasukojima eventually disappeared due to land filling.
Following World War II, the area was used by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force up to 1956. In 1985 the city of Kure developed the site as a park and combining with the English word alley, named it after the little island that was once there.
Located in the immediate vicinity of HQ 1st Submarine Flotilla JMSDF, this park is the best venue to observe Japanese submarines up close. There are also old brick houses built in 1897 during the Meiji Period on the opposite side of the street along the sea front with historical significance. They once housed the electrical department of the Kure Naval Arsenal but are now used as warehouses by private logistics firms. Together with the old embankments, these brick houses and related structures at the Alley had been awarded heritage status by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers ( JSCE ) in 2009. An old crane which was once used to load torpedoes currently still stands and is one of the most recognizable features of the park.
Civil Engineering Heritage Award : Granite embankment and torpedo loading crane.
Photo : JSCE
Visiting Alley Karasukojima
I visited Alley Karasukojima Park on the afternoon of 6th Dec 2018 which happened to be a very cold and rainy day, not the best time for a good view but that was all the time I could afford. It is probably best to drive yourself to this location as there are no train stations nearby. The park is served by public buses though and taxis are always an option.
A public car park is available for visitors but it is located some 300m from the park up a small hill. It is impossible to miss as there is a prominent sign featuring a submarine fixed to the gate grills. The car parks immediately across the road next to the park are owned by the convenient store and wharf side café and are reserved for their customers.
The Café, Convenient Store and Meiji Era brick buildings in the background.
Parking is free for visitors to Alley Karasukojima.
Once at the sea front, I could see many submarines and surface vessels berthed at the piers and the naval personnel walking along the docks. Some can be identified by their pennant numbers like the training support ship Tenryu ( ATS-4203 ) which carries the BQM-34AJ and BQM-74E target drones. Not being able to read the pennant numbers through the rain and sometimes by obstruction from line of sight, the submarines I could still identify by their class based on the shape of stern planes. The X-shaped ones being the newer Soryu-class SSK while the vertical ones denotes an older Oyashio-class SSK. Other ships seen at the piers included the submarine rescue ship ASR-403 Chihaya, Destroyers DD-105 Inazuma and DD-158 Umigiri, and Japan's future aircraft carrier DDH-184 Kaga. Here are some of the photographs taken on that day.
The Alley is just a narrow strip of real estate between the road and the sea.
The ships and submarines can already be spotted from across the road.
The visitor can walk right to the water's edge next to the pier.
Close-up view of Training Support Ship ATS-4203 Tenryu
from Alley Karasukojima.
Naval personnel on the pier with destroyers DD-105 Inazuma
and DD-158 Umigiri in the background.
The capital ship furthest away is probably DDH-184 Kaga.
A couple of Oyashio-class submarines with the
submarine rescue ship ASR-403 Chihaya on the left.
A closer view of ASR-403 Chihaya with the Oyashios.
ATS-4203, ASR-403 and Oyashios.
Two Soryu-class with X-form stern planes.
The two Soryu-class submarines with DD-105 and DD-158
The torpedo hoist that miraculously survived the WWII bombing raids on Kure.
Photo : Wikipedia
The Alley is accessible 24/7. Night scene with
ASR-403 Chihaya and Oyashios circa 2008. Wikipedia
So, two Soryu-class SSK, two Oyashio-class SSK, ASR-403 Chihaya submarine rescue tender, DD-105 Inazuma, DD-158 Umigiri and DDH-184 Kaga, all spotted in one location. I almost wished I had a longer zoom lens. 300mm it seems may still be somewhat lacking. It might have been better if the weather was clear and sunny.
I also learnt that on most Sundays, the JMSDF conducts ship open house events for the public. Different ships will be made available for public viewing on different weekends. For example ATS-4203 Tenryu open house is scheduled for 13th Jan 2019. Check the JMSDF Kure Regional Forces website for more details ( Japanese only ).
Kure Kaiji Curry based on the recipe
from SS-596 Kuroshio
And while you are there, you might as well check out the café across the road from the Alley for some authentic Kure Kaiji curry ( 海自カレー ). Kaiji is the abbreviation for JMSDF in Japanese. These are curry dishes based on recipes taken from the galley of the various naval ships and submarines home ported in Kure. The Minatocho Kohiten Café ( 港町珈琲店 Wharf District Coffeeshop ) serves Hiroshima-styled soft beef curry from the recipe of the submarine Kuroshio for only JPY1058 ( about US$10 ), inclusive of salad and drink. There is even an official website for Kure Kaiji Curry, no kidding .... but it is in Japanese though.
If you happen to visit Hiroshima, why not make a detour to Kure?
The Harpoon is a sea-skimming anti-ship missile seen here being fired
from the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer DDG-56
USS John S McCain. Photo : USN
HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate of the Royal Navy fires its Harpoon missile
in an undated photo. Source : RN
Running Out Of Missiles
In November 2016, the Royal Navy ( RN ) made it to the news headlines for the wrong reason - its frigates and destroyers will soon be running out of anti-ship missiles ( AShM ), all because of lack of funds complicated by poor planning, and perhaps as a consequence of having feeble-willed Sea Lords at the helm. The fleet is scheduled to have its helicopter-launched Sea Skua AShM going out of service in March 2017 AND have its Harpoon ship-to-ship missile withdrawn from service at the end of 2018 without any planned replacement. The untimely retirement of the Harpoon and the Sea Skua will cause the RN to have a capability gap in over-the-horizon anti-ship warfare between 2018 and 2020. The warships will regain some form of long range strike capability only in late 2020 with the planned introduction of the Anglo-French Sea Venom / ANL lightweight AShM on the Wildcat HMA.2 helicopters.
Now wait a minute. Did anyone mention THE Royal Navy? I would have very much wanted to believe that it was an April Fool's joke of some sort, only it ain't April. Nobody would have been surprised if this debacle had involved a third rate navy of some Banana Republic. But it had to be the RN, of all navies? This piece of news might have been incredible and shocking initially because we had come to know the RN as one of the most powerful navies in modern history. However, look more closely and anyone would have realized that the once mighty RN had been in constant decline for the past century, yes, century, not decade. The writing had already been on the wall for a long time. That the RN would soon be running out of missiles for its workhorse frigates and destroyers could mark the beginning of a terminal demise, a race to the bottom from which it might never ever fully recover.
Read on to discover how the RN got itself into this latest mess which by the way is not its first and unlikely to be its last.
A Brief History Of The Royal Navy
The Royal Navy could trace its lineage of more than a thousand years back to the reign of King Alfred the Great ( AD 871 - 899 ) and earlier, although in those early beginnings it was not an organized force with dedicated fighting ships and men. More likely the flotilla was made up of a ragtag of requisitioned merchant vessels whenever the need arose, such as when the Danes invaded or raided the Anglo-Saxon lands. The ships carried militiamen, farmers and peasants called into military service by law and much of the naval battles were ramming attempts followed by savage hand-to-hand fighting when the soldiers board the enemy ship. King Alfred was credited for reorganizing the military and restructuring the taxation system which would ultimately devote funds for ship building, thereby creating a small standing fleet of longships that plied the rivers, estuaries and the coastal waters of Englaland. From such humble beginnings the RN gradually transformed itself into a professional maritime fighting force, built upon centuries old traditions and technological innovations.
The Battle of Trafalgar depicted by English marine painter Clarkson Frederick Stanfield.
Admiral Lord Nelson won a most decisive victory against the combined
Franco-Spanish armada, destroying 22 enemy ships without losing a single
vessel himself. He unfortunately died during the encounter, shot by
a French musketeer. Source : Wikipedia
Vice Admiral Horatio Lord Nelson, by Lemuel Francis Abbott.
Nelson would no doubt have flipped in his grave had he learnt
about the current state of affairs of the Royal Navy. Image : Wikipedia
It was the world's most powerful navy for much of the past 200 years, from the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 to the Battle of Jutland in 1916. It was said that for a hundred years after the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy maintained a presence in every ocean in the world and its dominance ensured freedom of navigation and trade. A powerful navy was a necessity during the colonial era as Britain depended heavily on maritime trade for much of its prosperity and even survival. Its supreme dominance helped shape the British Empire and its colonies and only came to an end during World War Two, overtaken by the United States Navy (USN).
Even to this day, the RN is still the second largest navy of the NATO alliance, complete with aircraft carriers ( under construction ), helicopter carriers, amphibious landing ships, nuclear-powered attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines and the works. The price to pay for maintaining its nuclear deterrence force and aircraft carriers was that its destroyer and frigate force had shrunken to a historical low. The RN could only count six modern but problem plagued Type 45 air defense destroyers and thirteen ageing Type 23 ASW frigates at its disposal.
Logo of the Royal Navy. Source : Wikipedia
Why Missiles Matter
Unless you are stuck in a time warp somewhere in the first half of the twentieth century, you would have realized that guided missiles have long since replaced large caliber guns as the primary long range strike weapon of choice for warships. In that bygone era, the main guns of battleships had barrel diameters of 14 inch, 16 inch and ultimately 18.1 inch ( 460mm ). The larger the caliber, the longer the range of the gun. The biggest guns could fire projectiles that weigh more than a ton out to a maximum range of 42km, though the effective range is a little less at 25km.
It was the reach of the big naval guns that determined which opponent would fire the first salvos during a surface encounter. And you would have a better chance of victory if you could achieve that way before you in turn come into the range of your enemy's guns.
However, the caliber of naval guns could not defy the laws of physics and keep increasing forever. Bigger caliber shells generate higher over-pressures when detonated which in turn would require a thicker barrel to withstand that pressure. Gun barrels are made of steel and steel has a high density, meaning it is heavy, in fact very heavy. Heavy barrels would require even heavier gun mounts which needed even bigger ships and bigger shipyards for their construction. And then there would be the cost factor.
Each gun mount of the Japanese battleship Yamato with triple 18.1 inch barrels was said to weigh 2510 tons, about the same weight as an entire destroyer of that era. And the Yamato, a 72000 ton monster of a battleship, sported three such gun mounts.
Clearly, naval architects would have to look elsewhere other than cannons and guns if they wanted to increase the strike range of their warships. That breakthrough arrived in the form of jet propulsion and rocket propulsion technologies that came of age during World War II. Though not exactly new especially with gunpowder having been invented by the Chinese in the 9th century and presumably used as a rocket propellant subsequently, the emerging sensor and guidance technology of WWII saw application in the earliest generation of guided missiles and rockets like Nazi Germany's V-1 cruise missile and V-2 rocket.
By the sixties, fueled by the Cold War, missile technology had rapidly matured permeated every branch of the military including the navies of many nations. With their superior range, accuracy and lethal payload, they quickly rendered the big guns obsolete in anti-surface warfare ( ASuW ). The effectiveness of anti-ship missiles as ship-killers was first demonstrated in 1967 when the Egyptian Navy Komar-class missile gunboats sunk their much bigger opponent the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat with three Soviet made SS-N-2 Styx AShM.
Ever since that first operational success, the role of guided missiles as the premier long range precision anti-ship weapon of choice was further affirmed during the Falklands War in 1982 when a single Argentinian air-launched AM-39 Exocet AShM sunk the Royal Navy Type 42 destroyer the HMS Sheffield.
Today, while warships of many types are still equipped with guns, these weapons have seen their prominence diminished and their caliber much reduced. The largest guns found on modern day man-of-war generally do not exceed 5 inches in caliber ( 127mm ). They still have limited use especially against low value targets that are not worth expending a missile on, for shore bombardment in support of an amphibious landing and some rapid firing types may also have anti-aircraft capabilities. Of course they can also be used to fire ceremonial rounds and the occasional warning shot across the bow against rogue elements if necessary.
The Type 23 Duke-class Frigates
The main class of warship affected by the RN's missile fiasco is the Type 23 frigate, also known as the Duke-class frigate as, you guessed it, the entire class is largely named after British dukes. Frigates form the backbone of the navy as they are the multi-role platform that are involved in anything from submarine hunting to patrolling and escorting duties and even in providing limited area air defense against hostile aircrafts and missiles. In recent years, many were also increasing tasked to conduct peace-keeping and maritime security operations as well.
The Type 23 was conceptualized at the height of the Cold War in the late seventies as a light anti-submarine frigate against the Soviet nuclear submarines operating in the North Atlantic. They were intended to replace the ageing Leander-class and the newer Type 21 frigates to be the new guardians of the famed GIUK Gap, the strategic underwater choke point for any Soviet Northern Fleet submarine trying to breakout into the Atlantic Ocean from their home bases around Severomorsk.
The Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap. Source : Wikipedia
In its original configuration, the Type 23 was to have a towed array sonar and carry an ASW helicopter to attack enemy submarines that it had detected. It would not be mounting any defensive armaments and was supposed to instead rely on the Sea Wolf missile system from its replenishment oiler for protection! In addition, it was intended that the Type 23 frigate would only have refueling and rearming capabilities for its helicopter and had to rely on the same oiler to provide servicing facilities.
It was with great fortune that the Falklands War broke out in 1982 before the plans for the Type 23 were finalized. The RN would have otherwise ended up with an entire class of lame ASW frigates that cannot operate independently even in low threat environments. Lessons learnt from that conflict included among other things the deadliness of aerial attacks even with unguided iron bombs, the astonishing ship-killing capabilities of modern guided anti-ship missiles and the need for an effective point defense system for self-protection. It was back to the drawing boards ( literally, since computer aided design technology was not available then ) and the future frigate grew in size, complexity as well as cost.
The Type 23 frigates were to eventually have new technology incorporated into their design like the radar cross section reducing stealth technology, extensive automation to reduce manpower requirements and enhanced damage control capabilities. Instead of relying on their oiler to provide an air defense umbrella, they would have their very own Sea Wolf surface-to-air missiles, a total of 32 missiles packed in a new vertical launch system ( VLS ) at the forecastle just aft of the main gun. That was in conjunction with additional tracking capabilities against low flying aircraft and sea-skimming AShM. A single 4.5 inch ( 127mm ) medium caliber main gun would be mounted to provide naval gunfire support. Smaller caliber guns like the 30mm autocannons and general purpose machine guns would also be mounted in greater numbers for self defense against small boats and aircraft. A set of Harpoon AShM in two quadruple launchers mounted just aft of the Sea Wolf VLS would provide long range strike capabilities against surface targets. A combined diesel-electric and gas ( CODLAG ) propulsion system would provide for very quite running during ASW operations and yet have the economy of an extended range and the power for a high speed dash whenever the need arose. The frigate would also have a flight deck and an enclosed hangar that was self-contained. The embarked Lynx or Merlin ASW helicopter would be armed with the Sea Skua AShM or torpedoes.
Originally projected to cost GBP75million each in 1980, the evolved Type 23 frigate would cost the British tax-payer GBP135million for the first of class HMS Norfolk and that did not include the cost of the organic ASW helicopter. Subsequent ships would cost slightly less. Eventually, a total of 16 Type 23 frigates were constructed and the RN got itself a very capable general purpose frigate that had at least a good chance of surviving the modern naval battle. ( Note : three Type 23 frigates had been paid-off and were sold to Chile due again to cost-cutting measures implemented by the MOD leaving the RN with the current remaining fleet of thirteen Type 23 frigates )
Type 23 frigate HMS Argyll underway at speed. Source : Royal Navy
HMS Argyll executing a hard-a-starboard. Notice the V-shaped quad Harpoon
launchers just behind the rather squarish looking VLS
at the forecastle. Source : Royal Navy
In May 2015 the RN made the decision to replace the GWS 26 Mod 1 Sea Wolf surface-to-air missile of the Type 23 frigates with the naval variant of the Common Anti-Air Modular Missile ( CAMM ), also known as the Sea Ceptor. The Sea Ceptor has a range of more than 25km which is almost thrice that of the Sea Wolf. It could be packed four to the space occupied by one Sea Wolf missile in the VLS. The missile system utilizes much of the existing infrastructure of the Sea Wolf system but a much more powerful Type 997 Artisan 3D radar is required. HMS Argyll was the first frigate to be upgraded in late 2015.
Ultimately, these tired workhorses of the RN which have been in service for almost three decades now will be replaced by eight Type 26 ASW frigates a.k.a. Global Combat Ship some time after 2021 and perhaps by the lighter and cheaper Type 31 General Purpose Frigate in the far future.
You can watch videos of the Sea Ceptor by MBDA and the Type 26 Global Combat Ship by BAE Systems below :
The Type 45 Daring-class Destroyer
This is the other class of warship which are equipped with the Harpoon missile in the RN. There are six of these Anti-Air Warfare ( AAW ) destroyers serving in the RN whose primary role is to provide area defense for the fleet against hostile aircrafts and AShM. They were meant to replace the fourteen ( twelve, if not including HMS Sheffield and HMS Coventry which were sunk during the Falklands War ) Type 42 Sheffield-class destroyers. The first in class HMS Daring was commissioned in 2009 while the last ship of the class HMS Duncan was commissioned in 2013 just as the last of the Type 42 was being decommissioned.
Central to the Type 45 AAW destroyer is the PAAMS ( Principal Anti Air Missile System ) or Sea Viper air-defence system which utilizes the SAMPSON active electronically scanned array ( AESA ) multifunction radar and the S1850M long range radar. They are armed with Aster-15 and Aster-30 surface-to-air missiles in a 48-cell Sylver Vertical Launch System. The Aster missile is essentially an anti-missile missile capable of intercepting inbound super-sonic anti-ship missiles as well as precision guided munitions.
The Type 45s are each equipped with a 127mm main gun, two Oerlikon 30mm guns, two Phalanx CIWS, two Miniguns and six general purpose machine guns. They have a large flight deck and an enclosed hangar and can carry up to two AgustaWestland AW-159 Wildcat or one Westland Merlin helicopter. The Wildcat can be armed with four Sea Skua AShM or two torpedoes while the Merlin carries no Sea Skua but four torpedoes.
As they are primarily air-defence destroyers, the Type 45s were originally not meant to be armed with any AShM. However, plans had been formulated to have the Harpoon anti-ship missile system retrofitted onto four out of the six Type 45 destroyers and the integration process had already been completed on three ships so far ( HMS Daring, HMS Diamond and HMS Duncan ).
Type 45 AAW destroyer HMS Diamond with Mk7 Sea King
from 857 NAS. Source RN
Type-45 DDG HMS Defender. Source : RN
To understand why only four ( maybe just three from now on ) of the six Type 45 Daring-class AAW destroyers were planned to be equipped with Harpoons, we need to go further back in history to look at a previous class of ASW frigate that had long since retired, the Type 22 Broadsword-class.
The RN's fourteen Type 22s were procured in three separate batches over a period spanning eleven years between 1974 and 1985. Each succession batch was an improvement over the previous one. The first ten Batch 1 and Batch 2 ships were ordered before the Falklands War and were equipped with the Exocet AShM. The last four Batch 3 frigates were ordered after the conflict and incorporated the more advanced Harpoon AShM.
The Type 22 Batch 3 frigates were all decommissioned in 2011, just shortly after the commissioning of the first Type 45 destroyer in 2009. It seemed that some admiralty brass retrospectively decided to salvage the Harpoon missile system from the decommissioned frigates and mount them on the Type 45 for added anti-surface warfare ( ASuW ) capabilities.
While I have generally do not have an issue with the reuse and recycling of old equipment especially if they are still in good functioning order, to install an obsolete AShM system on a brand new destroyer for the mission critical purpose of taking out the surface fleet of your enemy at stand-off range may not be the smartest move. The development of the Harpoon missile started as long ago as the mid sixties and was at the cutting edge of technology when it was first deployed in the eighties. However, after more than three decades and no matter how many improvements had been made to each successive variant including the latest Block II Harpoon, the entire family is facing obsolescence with the emergence of whole new generations of long range super-sonic anti-ship cruise missiles from Russia, India and China.
We shall now take a closer look at the RN's Harpoons and Sea Skua missiles.
The Royal Navy's Anti-Ship Missiles
The RN has only two types of AShM in its inventory - the Boeing Harpoon missile and the MBDA Sea Skua missile, both of which are ageing and obsolete.
The Harpoon Missile
The Harpoon is an all-weather, beyond-the-horizon, anti-ship missile that was developed and manufactured by McDonnell Douglas ( now Boeing ). It was first introduced into service in 1977. To date, there are several versions that could be launched from different platforms such as aircrafts, warships, submarines and costal batteries.
Both the Type 23 frigates and three out of the six Type 45 destroyer are equipped with the GWS60 Harpoon AShM, essentially a Boeing RGM-84D Block 1C Harpoon ship-to-ship missile. The Block 1C Harpoon is an early version that was introduced in 1985 and equipped the US military and its allies. It is hopelessly outdated by today even by the USN's own standards, superseded by newer variants like the littoral warfare capable RGM-84L Harpoon Block II. It would fair even poorer when compared with foreign modern AShM like the ramjet powered supersonic BrahMos ( 290km range ) or the future hypersonic BrahMos II.
Harpoons Away! Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Gettysburg
( CG-64 ) fires a Harpoon missile at the ex-USNS Saturn
during a SINKEX in the Atlantic Ocean 27th Oct 2010. Photo : USN
The Block 1C Harpoon has a maximum range of 130km and carries a 220kg high explosive - fragmentation warhead, considered a heavyweight in anti-ship missiles, enough to sink a frigate-sized warship. It has a long cylindrical body that measures 4.63m in length and 0.343m in diameter with a wingspan of 0.9m. It weighs 690kg and is propelled by a solid fuel rocket booster during launch and then followed by the Teledyne J402-CA-400 turbojet that enables it to cruise at the sub-sonic speed of Mach 0.9 at wave-top level. The missile depends on inertial navigation to reach its pre-designated target area and then switch to active radar homing for terminal guidance. Block 1C upgrade brought with it an increase in the missile's range and allows the operator to have programmable waypoints, selectable terminal flight profile ( whether to pop up from sea skimming during the final part of the flight path ) and improved electronic counter-countermeasures ( ECCM ).
The Harpoon missiles are packed in sealed canisters and stacked 2 x 2 in a quad-pack rack-mounted launcher known as the Mk 141 Guided Missile Launching System. Each ship usually has 2 quad launchers angled at about 45 degrees skywards and facing two opposing directions. In older and less stealthy ships like the Type 23 frigates, these canister launchers would be placed on the upper deck areas anywhere from the forecastle ( Type 23 ) to midship to the quarterdeck ( Ticonderoga-class CG ) areas. In modern stealth designs like the Formidable-class frigate of the Singapore Navy, the Harpoons are usually mounted midship out of sight behind high panels that shield the angular and protruding shape of the launcher from radar detection.
HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate of the Royal Navy fires its Harpoon missile
in an undated photo. Source : RN
The active radar homing terminal guidance of the Harpoon missile meant that it is best used against warships in the open ocean far from any surrounding land masses that could lead to the interference of radar clutter. It would not perform well in a littoral environment nor would it be effective around busy sea lanes with lots of innocent maritime traffic as the seeker could home in on the wrong target.
It is important to remember that imperfect and obsolete as it is, the Harpoon missile still packs a greater punch and has a further reach than Sea Skua missile and the 5 inch gun of the Type 23 and Type 45 warships. However, repeated cuts in defense budget of the United Kingdom in the past decade have ensured that there wasn't a Harpoon replacement program in sight even as the Harpoons were slowing rotting away. Apparently the decision to abandon the Harpoon missile has been made by the Ministry of Defense as far back as 2010. Its eventual replacement may only come a decade later in the form of a future vertically launched heavy-weight AShM onboard the Type 26 Global Combat Ship.
Rather than facing a ten year capability gap in long range anti-surface strike, the RN could have elected to continue the maintenance and usage of the Harpoon missile until such time its replacement is available. This would probably be the cheapest option. Other options include upgrading to newer variants of the Harpoon like the extended range Harpoon Block II+ ER or some other advanced AShMs like the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile. These upgrades can then be transferred to the Type 26 when the Type 23 frigates are decommissioned.
The Sea Skua Missile
The Sea Skua is a British light-weight, all-weather, short range, sub-sonic sea-skimming AShM that is primarily launched by the Westland Lynx helicopter although variants could be launched from warships and coastal batteries. It was developed by the British Aircraft Corporation in 1972 and entered service with the RN in 1982, just in time to participate in the Falklands Conflict where it performed well, scoring seven hits out of nine missiles fired. Two Argentinian patrol crafts the Alferez Sobral and Rio Iguazuwere severely damaged with loss of lives and an abandoned cargo ship the Rio Carcarana was sunk. During the 1991 Gulf War, all the Sea Skuas that were fired hit their Iraqi targets and were credited to have disabled or sunk a total of fifteen patrol vessels and landing crafts.
The Sea Skua missile weighs 145kg at launch and carries a 28kg blast-fragmentation warhead or a 9kg semi-armour piercing warhead. A total of four Sea Skua missiles could be carried by each Lynx naval helicopter. It has an officially acknowledged range of 25km though it is widely believed to have a much further effective range. The guidance system is semi-active radar homing. When launched, the missile could be programmed to fly, depending on the sea state, at four pre-determined altitudes above the waves with the assistance of a radar altimeter. As it races towards its target at a high sub-sonic speed of Mach 0.8, it performs a pop-up maneuver to acquire the target which would be illuminated by the Lynx helicopter's Ferranti Seaspray radar.
A Royal Malaysia Navy Super Lynx 300 with Sea Skua missiles circa 2004.
Photo : Andrew Simpson / JetPhotos.Net
An inert Sea Skua missile on the deck of a Kuwaiti warship
at a joint firing exercise with coalition forces during
Operation Enduring Freedom 12th Mar 2002. USN Photo.
Although the Sea Skua had an impressive operational history, its Achilles' heel was its relatively short range and its small warhead. As the range of modern ship-borne anti-air missiles increased over the years, so has the stand-off range for any naval helicopter to launch its AShM without getting itself into harm's way, meaning the range of its AShM has to be correspondingly increased. The Sea Skua is already obsolete in that sense. Its feather-weight warhead also meant that it could only be effectively used against warships of low tonnage or else multiple direct hits have to be scored to disable a bigger vessel. Therefore after an illustrious service of close to 35 years with the RN, the admiralty had decided to retire the Sea Skua missile by March 2017.
The unfortunate thing is that the Sea Skua's successor, the MBDA Sea Venom / ANL missile system is still in its final development and will not see service until at least sometime in late 2020, that is if things happened on schedule which is rarely the case.
MBDA Sea Venom, previously known as the FASGW(H)
- Future Anti-Surface Guided Weapon ( Heavy ) or the
Anti-Navire Léger (ANL) missile on the RN
AugustaWestland AW159 Wildcat HMA2 helicopter.
Image : MBDA
The Sea Venom or in this case the Anti-Navire Léger (ANL) missile
fired from what looks like a French Navy AS565 Panther helicopter.
Image : MBDA
The Immediate Future of the Royal Navy
Looking at what is currently happening to the once proud Royal Navy, without any fleet carriers, may not have F-35Bs to populate the carriers even when they are commissioned in the future, with frigate and destroyer numbers at an all time low, and with them about to lose all of their long range anti-surface strike capabilities, one cannot help but wonder what are the possible consequences that could arise out of this almost criminal neglect of the navy.
It is precisely because the RN is in such a poor state that social media campaign groups
like Savetheroyalnavy.org existed.
To start off with, the RN may not be able to fulfill its obligations to NATO as the guardian of the GIUK Gap to contain the Russian navy in the North Atlantic. Without long range heavy-weight AShM, the frigates and destroyers will simply be sitting ducks that can be taken out by their Russian counterparts from stand-off distances without having a chance to strike back. No doubt the newly installed Sea Ceptor anti-air missiles might protect the ships but they are purely defensive in nature and the enemy only has to be lucky for once and you are dead. And nobody could win a war by purely defensive moves!
The other issue with a weakened RN is its capability to uphold the United Kingdom's sovereign claim on the Falkland Islands. As we all know, the Argentinian government had never given up its claim on the Falkland Islands even after narrowing losing the Falklands War in 1982. Had they been able to sink one of the aircraft carriers or the Fearless-class amphibious assault ships instead of the Type 42 destroyers and Type 21 frigates, the war would have had a very different outcome.
Today, with the light carriers decommissioned and their Sea Harriers retired, Vulcan bombers long gone, and the shrunken surface fleet that will soon be stripped of their AShM, the UK will not be able to mount a similar expeditionary force to the South Atlantic should the Argentinians decide to cause trouble. All these cost cutting moves taken by the British MOD in the past decades could only be viewed as a lack of resolve to enforce Crown sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, just as the decision to decommission the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and the planned withdrawal of the Antarctic Survey Ship HMS Endurance from the South Atlantic did in the early eighties. Also, as the United States become increasingly inward looking with the new Trump Presidency, the UK may not necessarily get all the assistance they enjoyed previously from their once staunchest ally during the Falklands War, like the intense diplomatic brokering, the massive support within the Security Council of the United Nations, timely military intelligence and emergency ordnance resupply using borrowed NATO stockpiles.
If the lack of funds was the reason why the Harpoon and the Sea Skua systems are to be removed from service prematurely, I would suggest the UK MOD not to upgrade the Sea Wolf system of the Type 23 frigates and instead use the GBP 253 million or so that they have spent on the Sea Ceptor to maintain the older missile systems for another few years, until a suitable replacement can be put into service.
Sir Michael Fallon should seriously ask himself this before he retires the Harpoon and the Sea Skua : Would the Junta view the year 2019 or 2020 as the best time for another Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands? Does the UK wish the Falklands to be renamed the Islas MALVINAS, again, ever? Or never again? Tough choices indeed. God save the Queen ... and the Royal Navy.
