The Rotting Dutchman of Lumut : Malaysia's Submarines That Never Were

Submarine Hospice?

Many of us have heard of the scandal associated with the Malaysian Scorpene-class submarine purchase, one which involved huge sums of money and resulted in the murder of the Mongolian socialite and interpreter Altantuya Shaariibuu . But there was another side story about Malaysia's quest for submarines, one that pre-dated the Scorpene deal, that not so many remembered or even knew about. This is a sad tale of the last days of two distinguished Dutch submarines, HNLMS Zwaardvis and HNLMS Tijgerhaai, brought to a location far from home and left to the elements, and eventually scrapped. It is also story about the demise of the Dutch submarine construction industry and a cautionary tale of how defence procurements should not be mismanaged.




The Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai underway during their heyday. Photo via Wikicommons.
 

The Zwaardvis-class diesel-electric submarine of
the Royal Netherlands Navy. Photo : Wikipaedia

Dutch Submarine Construction

The Dutch were involved in submarine construction activities since 1904 when they started the construction of the submarine Onderzeese Boot 1, based on the designs from the American company Holland Torpedo Boat Co. It was to be a single boat class, eventually sold to the Dutch Navy and commissioned as the HNLMS O1. From such humble beginnings more than a century ago, the submarine building industry gradually matured and gained momentum during the years preceding World War II. The Dutch were even credited for inventing the submarine snorkel which allowed diesel submarines to run their engines to recharge their batteries while remaining submerged to reduce the risk of detection by the enemy. Unfortunately, this technology fell into German hands and saw application in the Kriegsmarine's U-Boats especially towards the final years of the war.

As the Dutch shipyards suffered extensive damage during World War Two, construction of indigenous Dutch designed submarines did not restart until the fifties with the Dolfijn-class SSK of which four boats were produced. The next generation of Dutch submarines were the Zwaardvis-class which were laid down in 1966 and commissioned in 1972. Two were built for the Dutch Navy and another two for the Taiwanese Navy in the mid-eighties. The current and final batch of submarines are the Walrus-class which had been commissioned in the early nineties and are still in active service. After that, the Dutch submarine industry collapsed as the Dutch government did not have sufficient orders for the builders and desperately needed foreign exports orders failed to materialize.

The Zwaardvis-class was to play a crucial part in the unfolding saga of the demise of the Dutch submarine construction industry.

The Zwaardvis-class SSK

The Zwaardvis-class boats are conventional diesel-electric hunter-killer submarines ( SSK ). They were based on the designs of the Barbel-class of the United States Navy with an albacore or tear-drop shaped hull. The Barbel-class was the last of the SSKs built for the USN before it developed into an all-nuclear submarine force. Two boats were built for the Dutch Navy, the Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai.

USS Barbel SS-580, ordered in 1955, on her last day of service
24th Oct 1988. USN Photo via Wikicommons

In the Dutch language, Zwaardvis means swordfish and Tijgerhaai means tiger shark. Just like their namesake, the Zwaardvis-class boats are large ocean-going fleet-submarine type vessels displacing some 2408 tons surfaced and 2640 tons submerged, measuring 66.9m long and 8.4m wide. Powered by three diesel engines and an electric motor, these boats have a maximum speed of 13 knots surfaced and 20 knots submerged and an endurance of 10000nm at 9 knots. Maximum diving depth is classified but probably 200m or more. They are armed with 6 x 533mm bow torpedo tubes and carry a total of 20 torpedoes. They have a complement of 67 including 8 officers.

Built at by Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij ( RDM ) in Rotterdam, which used to be one of the largest ship builders in the Netherlands, these submarines were laid down in 1966, launched in 1970 / 1971 and commissioned in 1972. HNLMS Zwaardvis and HNLMS Tijgerhaai were to serve an uneventful career with the Dutch Navy for twenty-two years before being decommissioned in 1994 and 1995 respectively. This relatively early withdrawal from active service is probably a result of the end of the Cold War with budgetary cuts in military spending in many NATO countries. It would also mean that those hulls have some more years to go, though they might require some upgrading before being put back into service.

The Zwaardvis-class cannot be discussed without the mention that in 1982 the Taiwanese Navy, more correctly known as the Republic of China Navy ( ROCN ), placed an order for two boats which were modified variants. They were built by Wilton-Fijenoord it its Schiedam yard. These were launched in 1986 and were delivered to Taiwan in 1987. They are officially known as the Chien Lung-class ( 劍龍 級 ) meaning sword dragon ( not to be confused with the Japanese Soryu-class submarine SS-504 Kenryu which also means sword dragon ). Sometimes also referred to as the Hai Lung-class ( Sea Dragon ), these are still in active service in the ROCN today and by the looks of it, will be for a long time more to come.

After procuring the Hai Lung boats, Taiwan had actually the requirement for another eight submarines. However the Netherlands suffered from a huge diplomatic and trade fallout with China after the sale of the submarines to Taiwan and the follow-on request was denied for fear of angering China again.




SS-793 Hai Lung of the Taiwanese Navy is a modified Zwaardvis-class SSK. Photo : Wikipaedia

Used Boats For Sale

Even before the Zwaardvis and the Tijgerhaai were decommissioned, the Dutch shipbuilding industry was already in serious trouble with over capacity and too few orders. Many went into receivership while others were broken up with profitable divisions being sold off or merged with other shipyards. RDM was no exception. Faced with bankruptcy in 1983, it was heavily restructured with the closure of its off-shore department and the repair business transferred to Wilton-Fijenoord. The remaining naval as well as the heavy tools and machinery division formed a new company RDM Nederlands BV which was government owned. For a short period in the late eighties, the construction of the four Walrus-class submarines for the Dutch Navy helped but trouble brewed again with no other follow-on orders.

By late 1991, the Dutch government divested its interest and sold RDM Nederlands to the Royal Begemann Group controlled by a businessman by the name of van der Nieuwenhuyzen who also did not manage to turn the company profitable. By 1994 the company was downsized and reorganized to RDM Technology BV and RDM Submarine BV and eventually both were taken private by van der Nieuwenhuyzen in 1996.

When the time came for the Zwaardvis boats to retire, the Dutch government tried without success to offer them to Indonesia which was once a Dutch colony but gained independence after the end of World War II. The asking price for the submarine was reportedly USD55million, a steal considering the fact that these were blue water capable designs which had a relatively short service span. By some estimates, the hulls may have another 15 years of usable life in them, perfect for a small navy that needed to start building up a submarine force from scratch. Without any buyers in sight, the submarines were decommissioned and eventually sold to RDM Submarines for an undisclosed sum in 1996.

RDM Submarines had at that time an advanced attack submarine design known as the MORAY - Multi Operational Requirement Affected Yield which was based heavily on the Walrus-class SSK, the Netherland's follow-on class after the Zwaardvis-class. It had a modular design and could be adapted for the different needs of various navies. An air-independent propulsion system could be optionally installed if the customer so wishes. The strategy for RDM Submarines was to bundle the Moray with the two used Zwaardvis boats to small navies who are keen to acquire submarine capabilities. The older boats would be used for training straight away while the new builds were under construction. By the time the advanced Morays were commissioned, the crew would have been absolutely ready for them. The Moray-class submarines were offered to the Indonesians in 1996 but they preferred the German Type 209. They were then offered to Egypt presumably through the US as part of the foreign military aid package but it did not materialize. Portugal was the next on the list that did not select the Moray. It was a good design on paper but the trouble was the Dutch government had no need for it at that time and without an existing functioning build no other navy was prepared to take the risk to order it.

In April 2000 rumours emerged about a possible deal with Malaysia for the two old boats to be used as training submarines. Jane's Defence Weekly subsequently reported that Malaysia is negotiating for a five year lease contract with RDM Submarines for the two Zwaardvis boats. By Oct 2000, the two submarines were loaded onto the heavy dock vessel Smit Explorer and were shipped to Lumut, Malaysia where they were supposed to be refurbished by PSC Naval Dockyard, RDM Submarine's selected partner, and then offered to the Royal Malaysian Navy as training vessels. All this happened before Malaysia had even made any formal agreements with RDM Submarines regarding the two boats but presumably the Dutch company must have been quite confident of clinching the deal to have shipped the submarines all the way to Malaysia. Conversely, RDM could have shipped them to Malaysia to have them refurbished there and to have them available for trials to increase its chances of leasing them or selling them to the Malaysian Navy.

The two submarines arrived at Lumut sometime in mid-December 2000 and were tied up at PSC-Naval's wharf where nothing much was done for a long time. Indeed by 2001 Malaysia had already indicated that they would be buying new submarines and the Dutch boats were not going to be part of the deal. Their presence in Lumut lead some Malaysians to believe that their country had already acquired and operated submarines. Some even swear that they sometimes see only one submarine moored at Lumut implying that one or the other boat must have been active and out at sea. In reality, the two boats never went anywhere and were not upgraded or refurbished. Malaysia never did lease or buy the Zwaardvis submarines, and by 2002 made the decision to acquire a pair of the French Scorpene submarine with an older Agosta 70B thrown in as a training boat. The first Scorpene submarine only arrived in Malaysia in early September 2009.




The Ex-HNLMS Zwaardvis and Tijgerhaai moored at
Lumut Naval Base in Malaysia. Photo : RDM Submarines



RMN's Scorpene-class SSK. Photo : LIMA

Stranded In Lumut   

For the next 3 to 4 years, the Zwaardvis submarines remained stranded in Lumut with their owners still in search of a buyer. But as time passed, the condition of the disused boats could only deteriorate, especially in the harsh tropical environment like Lumut, and the boats became less and less saleable. Without any successful submarine sale, new or used, the viability of RDM Submarines as a company also became more and more tenuous.

By 2005, a PSC-Naval Dockyard spokesperson claimed that the submarines could no longer move under their own power. The Dutch government had also became increasing worried that in-lieu of the maintenance and berthing fees owed to PSC-Naval Dockyard which could accumulate to substantial amounts over a period of 5 years, the submarines might be seized and sold off to unsavory third parties who might then have unauthorized access to sensitive equipment or technology. It demanded that RDM Submarines make arrangements to ship the submarines back to the Netherlands or else to have them scrapped.

When those demands were not met, the Dutch government even took RDM Submarines to court, but it all amounted to nothing as RDM was then in its death throes and was in no financial position to implement anything. In the end, the Dutch government had to pay for the submarines to be scrapped, which probably happened in 2006.




Google Earth Image dating back to 27th Sep 2005 showing
two submarines moored at PSC-Naval Dockyard's wharf at Lumut.



Lumut today : Submarines long gone.
Boustead Naval Yard ( formally PSC Naval Dockyard )
to the west and RMN Lumut Naval Base to the east.

Lumut Naval Base as it appears today. Photo : RMN Tweet




A Sad Way To Die

It was a tragic and wasteful end to the two Zwaardvis submarines as when they were being retired in the mid-nineties, they could still have served useful lives as training boats or even remained operational after a mid-life upgrade. If they had remained in the Netherlands, perhaps they could also have a chance of being preserved as a museum boat, or to be used as a target for SINKEX live firing exercises, or to be sunk as artificial reefs, anything useful apart from just being sold as scrap metal.

After being left rotting at the wharves of PSC-Naval in Lumut for years, the eventual scrapping of the Zwaardvis boats also signaled the end of the submarine construction industry for the Netherlands. Such capability and the skilled work force tied to the industry would be extremely difficult if not impossible to reacquire once lost.

Had the Dutch government defied Chinese pressure and gone ahead to sell Taiwan the additional eight modified Zwaardvis submarines which the ROCN desperately needed, things might be very different today. RDM Submarines might just have stayed in the black long enough to secure other deals to allow the Dutch to maintain its strategic capability in submarine construction, maybe even long enough to participate in the Walrus-class replacement program. However, that was not the case. RDM Submarines was long gone. The Moray-class submarine whose fate was once so closely linked to the Zwaardvis boats would forever remain a paper design and to this day was never ever constructed or sold.

Now should you happen to chance upon a glowing apparition off the seas of Lumut on a dark and stormy night, emerging from the depths and taking to the skies, you'll know it's got to be either the Zwaardvis or the Tijgerhaai, still prowling the oceans as they always did, still conducting their eternal combat patrols .......




Flying Dutchman rendition of SS-581.

 

Royal Thai Navy To Buy Chinese Submarines : Another Thaitanic Mistake? Updated

Introduction



The Navy Jack of Thailand. Source : Wikipedia

In July 1992, the Thai government commissioned the Spanish shipbuilder Empresa Nacional Bazan ( now Navantia ) to construct the helicopter carrier HTMS Chakri Naruebet. Its design was based on the Spanish Navy's light aircraft carrier the Principe de Asturias which came with a 12 degree ski-jump and it was supposed to operate a fleet of ex-Spanish 8 AV-8S Matador V/STOL and S-70 Seahawk helicopters.

Its originally envisaged roles as the flagship of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) included patrols and force projection around the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zones of Thailand, supporting amphibious operations, disaster relief and humanitarian missions etc. The cost of its construction was reported as USD 336 million then, and would be equivalent to approximately $580 million in today's currency.

Unfortunately for the RTN, the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 struck just as the Chakri Naruebet was commissioned. The Thais were left without any funds to operate the helicopter carrier or maintain its air wing of Matadors. For most of the time the ship never left its home port of Sattahip Naval Base. Occasionally it was used as a ferry to transport the Royal Family.



Royal Thai Navy's aircraft carrier Chakri Naruebet in a picture dated back to 2001. A AV-8S Matador can be seen on the flight deck. Source : Wikipedia

By 1999, there was only one Matador still operational, and they were eventually written off all together by 2006, leaving the helicopter carrier without any operational fixed-wing assets. The prestige of being the first Southeast Asian country to own an aircraft carrier brought with it a heavy financial burden that the Thais could ill afford then and now. There was no real need to have an aircraft carrier in the first place when a Land Ship Dock (LSD) type of vessel could serve a similar purpose of supporting amphibious ops and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) ops. In fact the RTN subsequently bought exactly such a vessel from ST Marine of Singapore, the Endurance-class LSD. The story of the Chakri Naruebet is cautionary tale of what not to do in the procurement of military hardware and to this day it has been a white elephant and has been nicknamed the Thaitanic, presumably because of its physical size and its huge price tag.




The Type-039A Yuan-class SSK of the People's Liberation Army Navy. At US$335 million each, a deal too good to miss?

Fast forward to 2015, in the past few days the internet has been abuzz with news that Thailand has more or less committed itself to buying three Chinese conventional diesel-electric submarines for USD 1.1 billion. Is this really such a good deal that Thailand cannot refuse or is it another mega-mistake in the making?

Do The Thais Need Submarines?

The naval brass would certainly like to convince anyone that they do need submarines. They NEEDED them and they needed them bad. So bad in fact, that in July 2014 they had setup their submarine squadron complete with submarine training school at Sattahip Naval Base without yet having acquired any submersible assets. The squadron is staffed by naval personnel who have previously been sent to Germany and South Korea for submarine training and has a Rheinmetall submarine command team trainer simulator. IHS Jane's reported that the facilities cost USD 23 million to set up.

To be fair to the Thais ( and to anyone else as well ), modern naval warfare is multi-dimensional and the undersea component forms an increasing important aspect which cannot be neglected or ignored. That alone is good enough reason for the RTN to aspire to own submarines.

Also, of the five original core members of ASEAN ( Association of Southeast Asian Nations ), Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, yes, even tiny Singapore, have already been operating submarines for decades. Only Thailand and the Philippines have yet to catch up.

On top of that Thailand also has an extremely long coastline to govern, from the western side facing the Andaman Sea to the eastern side around the Gulf of Thailand next to the resource rich but volatile South China Sea.

Of course we also know that the best platform to hunt a submarine is another submarine. So if I were a Thai naval brass I would definitely want to have subs. The short answer is YES. Whether the budget allows for it is another matter.

Can the Thais Afford Submarines?

This could be a much harder question to answer. They probably could if they budgeted their defense spending wisely. The military-run government had proposed a 2016 defence budget of USD 6.1 billion, equivalent to about 1.5% of GDP and constituting about 8% of all government spending. This represented an increase of 7% over the 2015 defence spending.

After much deliberation, the Thais had decided on the Chinese offer of three diesel-electric attack submarines for a grand total of USD 1.1 billion. This would constitute about a sixth of their annual defence spending, a significant portion by anyone's standards. They would have to seriously tighten their belts in other areas to afford this. But I wouldn't be surprised if the Chinese had also offered to finance the deal like what they usually do when trying to sell their high speed rail systems overseas. It would definitely be more palatable if the payment is spread in installments over a period of 7 to 10 years.

In retrospect, had the Thais not embarked on their disastrous Rice Subsidy Scheme from 2011 to 2014 which cost the Thai government an estimated USD 15.3 billion buying rice from farmers at above market rates, the RTN could have bought about 45 Chinese subs ( at $335 million each ) with that money.

Well maybe they don't ever required that many submarines, but how about 6 subs and a squadron of 12 Lockheed Martin F-35B V/STOL stealth fighters ( $200 million each ) for the Thaitanic, and best of all still have about $10 billion to spare ( minus a few dollars to thermal proof the deck, if necessary )? Mind boggling figures, I would say!

Are Three Submarines Sufficient?

Thailand has about 3200km of coast line split between the eastern seaboard of the Gulf of Thailand and the western seaboard facing the Andaman Sea. The two coasts are not directly connected as the Malayan Peninsula sits right at the southern end of the narrow Kra Isthmus and blocks direct maritime access between Thailand's two coastal regions. Unless a canal is dug linking the Andaman Sea to the Gulf of Thailand, to sail from Thailand's east coast to the west coast would require going around the Malayan Peninsula and Singapore, a round trip of some 1200 nautical miles that could take 3 or 4 days at an average transit speed of 12 knots.




Sattahip ( Gulf of Thiland ) to Phuket ( Andaman Sea ) Distance and Time

If Thailand acquires three submarines, they will likely all be based at Sattahip Naval Base, the RTN's headquarters as well as the submarine squadron's HQ. Assuming the usual availability rates of one boat on station, one in preparedness and one on maintenance, the RTN will at anytime only have one submarine on patrol and it has to be either in the Gulf of Thailand or in the Andaman Sea. This submarine cannot be at two different places at the same time. Should a crisis situation develop at the other Area of Operations it would be at least three to four days of sailing away. Clearly not desirable.

So ideally from the operational point of view the RTN should have six boats, three for the Gulf and three for Andaman. It is much cheaper this way compared to digging the fabled Kra Canal, with an estimated cost of USD 28 billion, the pipe dream of one too many Thai politician.

Choices, Choices

In June 2010, due to budgetary constrains, the German Navy unexpectedly decommissioned the last six of its Cold War era Type 206A diesel-electric submarines originally slated for retirement between 2011 and 2015. The following year, two of the submarines were then offered to the Thai Navy at a bargain price of USD 220 million. The Thais agreed in principle to buy the submarines but the subsequent political turmoil resulting from change of government meant that they ultimately let the offer lapse. The Type 206As were rather small, displacing about 500 tonnes submerged, but modernised machines with littoral and special forces capabilities, two key features which made them ideal for the shallow waters around Thailand.




Revell Type-206A Box Art. A total of 18 Type-206 SSK were built in the early seventies for the West German Navy. 12 were subsequently modernized in the nineties and re-designated the Type-206A. All have since been retired from service by the Bundesmarine. Cost : $14.76 for the Revell plastic model kit and $220 million for a pair of the real deal.

Buying a pair of the used Type-206A would actually serve the RTN very well as they are compact and are not too complicated, the ideal training platform for a fledgling submarine squadron to quickly accumulate operational experience. They are also much more budget friendly compared to the other options available to the RTN. After this stint the RTN may eventually consider upgrading to bigger and more modern submarines, perhaps even new-builds. Sadly this option is no longer available.

Then there was the Korean offer of two Type 209-1200 SSKs for about USD 1.3 billion. As we know, South Korea has an advanced, world-leading ship building industry and they have capitalized on that advantage to licence build the Type-209 SSK from HDW ( now ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems ) not just for their own navy but also for export. In fact they were awarded a contract to construct three Type-209-1400 SSKs for the Indonesian Navy in 2011 for USD 1.07 billion. The Korean Type-209s are also known as the Chang Bogo-class. They are modernized versions of the original Type-209-1100 boats and have stretched hulls and indigenously developed torpedo countermeasure systems and may even accommodate an Air Independent Propulsion system in the 1500 tonne version. They are light-years more advanced than the second-hand Type-206As but also cost a lot more, so much more that the Thais decided that they could not afford them.

They also reportedly turned down South Korea's offer of two of their 20 year old Type-209s for 15 billion Baht or about USD 500 million. Old hulls like these need modenisation works ( obviously not for free ) and would probably last for another decade at most after which they would have to be retired and fresh funds would be needed for new boats.



Pacific Ocean (July 6, 2004) Republic of Korea Submarine Chang Bogo (SSK 61) heads out to sea during exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC). U. S. Navy photo

The Thais then knocked on the doors of the Swedes, eyeing the Gotland class SSK, but the Swedish Navy do not have anymore surplus boats to sell, after divesting two of their four Type-A17 Vastergotland-class to Singapore, they were left with 2 upgraded A17s and 3 Type-A19 Gotland-class SSK, barely enough to cover their backyard. Their new A26s were delayed by the tactics of ThyssenKrupp who at that time were at the helm of the national boat yard Kockums AB, further dashing any hopes of a Swede deal.

The Chinese Option

Thailand has been a fan of Chinese weaponry for quite sometime. The Royal Thai Army deploys Chinese armoured personnel carriers, multiple launch rocket systems, combat engineer vehicles, rocket propelled grenades and various types machine guns and assault rifles. The RTN similarly has in its inventory four Chinese Type-053 Jianghu III guided missile frigate ( the Chao Praya-class ), two modified Type-053 ( the Naresuan-class ), various Off-shore Patrol Vessels and an auxillary ship. So they are no stranger to Chinese technology and their idiosyncrasies.

The Chinese had actually offered the Thais their Type-039 Song-class SSK as far back as 2007 but the Thais favoured the German offer of the Type-206As then, only to renege on their decision later.



The original Type-039 Song-class SSK with its distinctive stepped conning tower. This or perhaps its improved version, the Type-039G was offered to the Thais in 2007.

With all the failed attempts to acquire submarines in the past, the Thai Navy has in 2015 redoubled their efforts with a new round of proposals from vendors. And it seems that the Chinese have hyped up their submarine offer, throwing in three of their newest Type-039A Yuan-class diesel-electric SSKs, probably with air-independent propulsion ( AIP ) for $1.1 billion in total. The price is said to be inclusive of a eight year weaponry and parts support package, and training. They even try to seduce the Thais with the promise of significant technology transfer.

Navy chief Adm Kraisorn Chansuvanich said that a 17 man naval committee comprising of unbiased, smart and modern officers tasked to select the submarine evaluated offers from six nations including those from Russia ( Project 636 Kilo-class ), Germany ( ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, Type 209-1400 Mod and Type-210 Mod ) , Sweden ( SAAB, A-26 ), China ( Type-039A ), Korea ( Hyundai, HDS-500RTN ) and France. They voted 14-3 in favour of the Chinese package because it was value for money, getting them three submarines where as the same budget will only get them two units from the other suppliers, without the weapons. It was also mentioned that the Chinese submarines were equipped with superior weaponry and technology, and that they were able to stay underwater longer compared to their rival bids. This I interpret as a hint that the Chinese offer will be fitted with AIP systems.

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Prawit Wonsuwon has firmly extended his support for the project on the back of real or perceived territorial treats saying that the submarine force is a deterrence and the future of Thailand's security. He would forward the procurement decision to the Cabinet for approval once the opportunity arises. With a junta government in power and a large part of the Cabinet members being made up of generals and admirals, we know that this approval procedure rubbish is just a formality. The submarine purchase is as good as a done deal. Had a democratically elected government been in power, the outcome might be entirely different as there are always some who question the justification for a submarine force in the light of the white elephant Thaitanic. In fact, General Prawit has been quoted to say that if the submarines were not bought by the current government, the navy might not get the chance to acquire them again. He knows, that sly fox!

The entire deal is worth THB 36 billion ( USD 1.1 billion ) and the procurement will proceed through a government to government agreement. It would require an unspecified amount of funding from Thailand's defense budget in the next 7 to 10 years. Once the Cabinet approves the budget, the submarines are expected to be commissioned over the next 6 to 7 years. So it's back to the simulator and Chinese language class till then.

The Type-039A Yuan-class SSK / Type-041 / S-26T

The Type-039A is the successor of original Type-039 Song-class diesel-electric submarine. It evolved from the Type-039 but has little resemblance to it and is frequently referred to as the Type-041 SSK. It is the first Chinese submarine with AIP and is supposed to be quiet and have advanced features like anechoic tiles. It has a teardrop shaped hull and a large sail suggesting of a design stemming from Russia's Kilo-class SSK which China also owns. The original People's Liberation Army Navy ( PLAN ) version has a length of 75m, a beam of 8m and a draft of 8.2m. Its displacement is 2300 tonnes surfaced and 3600 tonnes submerged. Its armaments include 6 x 533mm torpedo tubes which can fire Russian or Chinese torpedoes as well as the YJ-8X series of submarine launched anti-ship missiles. The endurance is said to be 6500 nautical miles at 12 knots. Maximum speed is 12 knots surfaced and 20 knots submerged. Maximum diving depth is in the region of 300 metres.

There is also an export version designated the S-20 first revealed at IDEX 2013 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The S-20 appears to be a scaled down version of the Type-039A displacing 1850 tonnes surfaced and 2300 tonnes submerged. It comes without an AIP system but can be an option should the client choose. And now it seems we have the S-26T version with AIP which was offered to Thailand.



The PLAN Type-039A diesel-electric SSK with AIP. Still in brown waters?

The Type-039As have been in service with the PLAN since the year 2006. 13 boats are currently in active service with a total of 20 planned. As with most Chinese military hardware, very little information about the Type-39A is publicly available even though it has been around for close to a decade. Confusion with nomenclature is the norm, and even the reliability of existing information is sometimes uncertain.



Waterline view of the Type-039A.



Booster stage of the YJ-82 submarine launched anti-ship missile as it pops out of the water immediately after launch.

Apart from Thailand, the Bangladeshi Navy is in negotiations for acquiring two Type-039As and the Pakistani government had in April this year approved the purchase of 8 Type-039A submarines from China, representing a huge export success. China has not been a significant submarine exporter in the past, selling a few units now and then mainly to close communists allies and pariah states that could not have obtained weapons from the international market otherwise, like North Korea.

Submarine ( Non-nuclear ) Construction In China

It had began with the assembly of the Whisky-class conventionally powered submarine with kits provided by the Soviets in the fifties. Starting from the late sixties, China progressed to licence build the next generation Romeo-class SSK, known locally as the Type-033. They then started producing the indigenously designed Type-035 Ming-class SSK in the seventies, though it is somewhat similar to the Romeo-class. Following their purchase of Russia's Kilo-class and improved Kilo-class SSK, the next generation Chinese SSKs, the Type-039 and Type-039A again have uncanny similarities with the Kilo. One cannot help but suspect that out of sight of the international rivals and clients there must be a lot of reverse engineering going on inside the state owned Chinese yards. And that's nothing new. The Chinese have a " indigenously designed " copy of almost everything they had previously owned, and even of things that they didn't own. Would you trust a pirate?




Sukhoi SU-27? Wrong. This is the Shenyang J-11 ( 歼-11 / Jian-11 ), the Chinese clone. Source : Wikipedia



The Real Deal : The Thomson-CSF ( now Thales ) Sea Crotale R440 SAM on the French frigate Tourville circa 1990. Source : Wikipedia



The Unaurhorised Copy : The Hongqi-7 or HQ-7 SAM on the PLAN Type-051B destroyer Shenzhen Source : Wikipedia

Chinese Workmanship

If you have worked or dealt with the Chinese before, you would have quickly noticed that the average Chinese worker cares little about workmanship and product quality. They are more concerned about meeting deadlines and getting their job done in as little time as possible, never mind if they are churning out rubbish in the process. Their idea about quality control is - as long as it works, it's good enough! They don't give a damn if it breaks down three days later. So if the guy making your shoe bag has this kind of attitude, do you think the worker at the state owned shipyards would fare any better??? Well maybe a little better, because a $5 shoe bag is not in the same league as a $335 million submarine, but you trust the communists?

The Thais should have known better as they found out the hard way with their China build Chao Praya-class frigates in the early nineties. These are actually the Chinese Type-053 Jiangkai III FFGs build to the then latest Type-053H2 standard. Although they cost only a quarter of what a frigate would normally cost if purchased from European or American suppliers, they came with multiple defects and deficiencies including exposed wirings that needed to be rewired, limited damage control capabilities with defects in the fire suppression system and problems with the water-tight locks. Considerable efforts was spent to rectify the defects.

Smart Choice Or Another Disaster In The Making?

The Chinese have alienated many of they traditional friends and trading partners in Southeast Asia by their increasingly aggressive pursuit of their territorial claims in the South China Sea, even to the extend of land reclamation and building airstrips at Fiery Cross Reef. They are desperate to improve ties with Thailand, one of the rare countries in Southeast Asia not directly involved in the territorial disputes with China. This they have certainly achieved by clinching the submarine deal.

Keeping in mind the potential problems with quality issues for Chinese products, would the Thais have done better by selecting submarines from other countries? After all, if you pay peanuts, you get monkeys! SAAB's A-26 submarines look particularly attractive at the SEK 8.2 billion ( USD 948 million ) price the Swedish government paid for two boats. These are the latest state-of-the-art Swedish submarines with AIP and European quality assurance. Thailand already has a good defense relation with the SAAB Group with their previous purchase of the JAS-39 Gripen fighter and the SAAB 340 AEW aircraft. Why not capitalize on this?

Hind sight is always 20/20 but I can't help but point out that had the Thai Navy bought a squadron of submarines instead of an aircraft carrier in 1992, they would by now have almost 2 decades of experience operating submarines. They really cannot afford to make another mistake like the Chakri Naruebet, because at $1.1 billion, the stakes are much higher this time.

Update

It seemed that on the very day that this article was published ( 15th Jul 2015 ), the Thai Government had already changed their minds about the purchase of the S-26T submarines from China. The postponement was announced following high levels of criticism questioning the rationale behind the acquisition and the quality of the submarines the government intended to procure. Defence Minister Prawit said that when the Thai Cabinet next convene to assess the procurement, he would not yet seek endorsement for the acquisition. A stronger mandate was necessary. " For now the navy must inform itself and educate itself on whether the submarines are worth it and how much they will add to the Thai navy. "

IHS Jane's Defence Weekly ( Vol 52 Issue 29 22 Jul 2015 Pg 7 ) carried this comment to its main headlines article Thailand Halts Purchase of Chinese Subs : " Critics of the plan, however, have questioned the need for the submarines given Thailand's lack of strategic assets in the disputed regions of the South China Sea; doubted the RTN's ability to operate the submarines effectively in the shallower waters of the Gulf of Thailand; and highlighted Thailand's poorly performing economy. Questions have also been raised about the quality of the Chinese submarines, which have yet to conclude any exports.", exactly the issues discussed in this blog.

This about turn barely two weeks after the initial announcement does not reflect well on the professionalism of Thai Defence Ministry and the RTN's top leadership. Shouldn't they have done all the necessary leg work to sound out the public opinion, secure the necessary funding and convince the skeptics that the project is doable before announcing it to the whole world? Nonetheless, loss of face aside, this could be a blessing in disguise as Thailand now has a chance to re-evaluate her requirements for a submarine squadron and re-think about buying from China, before the next round of acquisition talks begins sometime in the future.

Maybe the RTN is still unsure of what it wants, being so easily swayed by public opinion to abandon the submarine project, maybe it is just bad timing, or perhaps the Ghosts of Failed Projects Past have simply come back to haunt them ... like they say, you can't always run from your past.


Note : If you would like to read an adapted version of this article in Thai you can visit kapitaennem0.wordpress.com

 

Update 4th Jul 2016

Now, almost exactly one year after this article was published, the Thai Navy finally got the Cabinet approval they needed for the purchase of the submarines. The total cost for the 3 Yuan-class S26T will be USD 1 billion and payment will be made over a 10 year period. The first submarine will be purchased out of the 2017 budget. The Defense Minister claimed that there are assets in the Andaman Sea to protect too ....

Who Doesn't Want A$20Billion?

Background

This is an update to my article " Japan's Soryu Class : Collins Replacement Prime Contender ". A quick recap : Australia has a fleet of 6 Collins Class conventional diesel-electric guided missile submarines that needs to be replaced starting from the year 2025. These boats were designed by the Swedish ship builder Kockums AB and built in Australia by a newly formed joint venture the Australian Submarine Corporation. The entire Collins project was riddled with delays and huge cost overruns. Even to this day the submarines still suffer from multiple defects and have serious availability issues.




Digital Image of what Australia's future submarine might look like, as seen on ship builder ASC Pty Ltd's website.



The Royal Australian Navy is looking to replace them with 10 to 12 new submarines by the year 2030 to 2040, at an initially estimated cost of between A$36 to A$44 billion. The ruling Liberal Party came to power promising domestic construction of these future submarines but until recently looks likely to break that promise by buying direct from Japan. That development had prompted German, Swedish and French boat builders to come up with their own unsolicited offers, initiating a submarine bidding war down under, making the Soryu deal less of a certainty.

What's At Stake for Australia

The future of Australia's shipbuilding industry is at stake, as Australia might lose her capability to construct submarines and warships should the contract go to a foreign shipyard there by forcing ship builder ASC to retrench skilled labour or worse, go into receivership. It would be difficult and time consuming to rebuild a new team of professional workers once the existing ones have found work elsewhere.

Jobs could be at stake, as domestic construction at ASC's Adelaide facility could generate and support 3 to 4 thousand jobs.

At least A$20 billion or more is at stake for the winner. This is by far the single most costly defense related procurement by Australia, ever. Even the follow on order of 58 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter announced in April 2014 would "only" cost A$11.5 billion. The Australian Dollar has depreciated significantly in the past 2 or 3 years but is still worth USD0.77 as of today.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott's reputation could be at stake if he reneges on pre-election promises to have the submarines built in Australia, though adept politicians always have ways to wriggle themselves out of such situations.

Gimme Twenty Billion

AUD$20 billion is the magic figure quoted by all the potential submarine makers. Of course everybody wants A$20 billion, who doesn't? SAAB Kockums of Sweden, TKMS of Germany and DCNS of France have all come up with proposals and have indicated their willingness to work with Australia's ASC, giving Japan Inc. a run for their money.

 

SAAB Kockums : The Come Back Kid

Kockums AB of Malmo, Sweden was the original designer of the Collins Class submarines and the Stirling air-independent propulsion engine used in the Soryu Class boats. It was acquired by its German rival Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in 1999. Then HDW was itself bought by the German conglomerate Thyssen Krupp in 2005 and they all became a big dysfunctional family known as ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems ( TKMS ).

While all these mergers and acquisitions was happening, Kockums was working on the next generation submarine for the Swedish Navy with several innovative and advanced features, the A-26 Class with air-independent propulsion. However, the development of the A-26 was derailed by TKMS due to long standing conflict of interests. The Swedes believed that they have a great design on hand and wanted it developed not just for the Royal Swedish Navy but for worldwide export as well. The German masters of Kockums on the other hand are worried about cost escalation on a risky new project and cannot come into agreement with the Swedish Defense Ministry on how such additional costs should be managed between the two parties. Although 2 boats have been approved the Swedish by Parliament in 2010 for completion by 2020, long drawn contract negotiations between the Defense Ministry and TKMS came to nothing before failing completely in Apr 2014. Without any contracts to build Sweden's ( or anybody's ) next generation submarines, Kockums looked likely to have to lay off marine architects, engineers and technicians. And as Kockums go under,  the Swedish Kingdom looked set to lose its sovereign capability of building submarines and warships.



Kockums A-26. Source : SAAB

Added to this mess is the uncertainty as to who actually owns the intellectual property rights to the Collins design, is it Kockums / TKMS or is it the Swedish State ( through the Swedish Defense Materiels Administration or FMV ). This has resulted in Kockums being overlooked by Australia in its initial search for suitable supplier for the Collins replacement project.

The loss of the deal to supply the Republic of Singapore Navy with 2 new submarines in late 2013 and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula earlier last year was a rude wake-up call to the Swedes who realized that they had do something fast to reclaim their ship building industry and to safeguard the defense of their Kingdom.

Negotiations to buy Kockums back began between the Swedish defense conglomerate SAAB and TKMS. Things did not move until Sweden seemingly deployed strong arm tactics, including the FMV's raiding of the Kockums / TKMS office with armed military personnel to forcefully remove highly sensitive materials pertaining to the A-26 and Stirling air-independent propulsion engine designs, taking back what rightfully belonged to the Swedish State. SAAB also embarked on a widely publicised exercise that poached the entire technical management team at Kockums including the manager for the submarine division and more than 200 of Kockums' existing pool of engineers, effectively removing its core workforce. Facing such hostile acts, it is not surprising that TKMS threw in the towel shortly after and agreed to sell Kockums to SAAB.

SAAB has since completed the acquisition of Kockums on 2nd Jul 2014 and the new entity is called SAAB Kockums. This paved the way for the stalled and severely delayed A-26 project to move forward and for SAAB to offer a 4000 tonne version to Australia as the Collins replacement submarine. In the words of the CEO Håkan Bushke " ... the Swedish Kingdom now controls the intellectual property for Australia's currently-serving Collins class submarines. If there is an open competition, SAAB Kockums will be in it."

SAAB Kockums in its last minute declaration of interest on the Collins replacement project has also offered to take Australia's shipbuilder ASC and Royal Australian Navy engineers and technicians to work on the Swedish Navy's 3000 tonne A-26 of which five were to be built, with the first boat due to be operational by the year 2023. CEO Bushke said that SAAB's solution will be affordable and will be able to match the $20 billion price tag of its Japanese and German rivals.

Kockum's resurrection from a moribund subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to becoming part of the Swedish defense giant SAAB within the span of a few months is nothing short of spectacular. It would be even more incredible if they could win this submarine bidding war and become the supplier of Australia's future submarines. Being a completely new design, the A-26 offer carried with it unknown risks of cost escalation and timeline slippages. Add to that volatile mix the uncertainty of ASC's competency as a ship builder and the RAN could end up in a very dangerous situation, third time in a row.

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems : The Old Favourite



TKMS Logo. Source : Wikipedia

TKMS was until Jul 2014 the parent company of Kockums. It used to be the front runner for an evolved-Collins submarine that will see TKMS build on the strengths of the existing Collins Class and rectify known short comings and defects, since the Collins boats were designed with the help of Kockums in the first place.

The main stumbling block for the evolved Collins Class was that the ownership of the intellectual property rights for the Collins submarine as well as the Stirling AIP engine that will be installed in the future submarines, was in dispute as the spat between the Swedish government and TKMS escalated. Australia understandably have no wish to be caught in the crossfires of a patent ownership war and have ultimately looked towards Japan which has a fleet of the world's most advanced non-nuclear submarines, incidentally also using Kockums / TKMS's Stirling air-independent propulsion system.




TKMS Operational Headquarters, Essen, Germany. Wikipedia.

Another deep seated issue was that TKMS has been constantly stifling Kockums all these years after the merger, intending for kockums only to produce small submarines while its German subsidiary HDW will get to build the big submarines for export. It probably was never quite keen for an evolved Collins boat, preferring rather to have a German solution for the Australians. In fact TKMS already had a Collins replacement concept in existence for sometime. It is the HDW Type 216 diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion. Its design is based on the smaller Type 212A and Type 214 submarines current in service with the German and Italian navies, using HDW's proprietary fuel cell AIP system.




HDW's Fuel Cell Air-Independent Propulsion System. Source : TKMS

Now that Kockums had been sold to SAAB, TKMS can no longer be involved in any evolved Collins design. Nonetheless TKMS has still indicated that it can help Australia build her fleet of 10 to 12 next generation submarines domestically and within the budget of A$20 billion, presumably with the HDW Type 216 design.




HDW Type-216 SSK. Source TKMS

The Type 216 looks good on paper, but is again a yet to be built design and with so much uncertainties, nobody, not even TKMS can guarantee that the entire project could be on time and on budget, especially in the hands of an inept shipbuilder like ASC.

DCNS : Non-nuclear SSN?!

The latest to join the fray is the French ship builder DCNS with its SMX-Ocean diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion. First revealed at the Euronaval 2014 exhibition in Paris in October, it is essentially a non-nuclear version of the Barracuda class SSN which DCNS is building for the French Navy. Although DCNS did not officially state that the SMX-Ocean concept was specifically created for the SEA1000 Collins replacement project, we all know what its purpose is. Incidentally DCNS opened a new subsidiary in Australia on 19th Nov 2014, DCNS Australia Pty Ltd, which just shows how badly they wanted a slice of the multi-billion dollar pie.




DCNS's SMX Ocean SSK ( Top ) and Barracuda SSN ( Bottom )

The SMX-Ocean is a huge boat at 4750 tonnes and 100m long. It is powered by conventional diesel-electric power-plants and a second generation air-independent propulsion system. It can carry a load of 34 weapons including torpedoes, mines, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles and anti-air missiles. It will incorporate vertical launchers, a UUV Dock, SDV, dry dock shelter and lock-out chamber for up to 8 divers.

Its maximum diving depth is 350m. Its new generation fuel cell will enable a underwater endurance of 21 days. Maximum submerged speed is 20 knots while its usual transit speed will be 14 knots. Endurance at sea is up to 90 days with a maximum range of 18000 nautical miles ( 29000Km ) at 10 knots.

If Australia is going to buy into this mad French scheme, she might as well request the US to convert their Virginia-class SSN into SSKs, just pluck out the General Electric S9G reactor and replace it with the Stirling AIP engine and you can have the frequently craved for 100% compatibility in operations with the USN. No?

Kawasaki / Mitsubishi : Caveat Emptor?

Although the option of a modified Soryu Class built in Japan looks like the safest bet for Australia's Collins replacement project so far, skeptics have plenty of arguments against taking such an option.

First, Japan's war time past has come back to haunt her as pointed out that as recent as 70 years ago Japan and Australia were enemies at war with each other. The Japanese have even bombed Darwin in 1942, ahead of a land invasion which fortunately never materialized. And Australia had lost more than 300 ships to the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. To me that is at best a weak case against the Japanese because, well, times have changed. Australian skiers form the largest foreign groups at the Japanese ski resorts of Niseko in Hokkaido and Hakuba in Nagano every winter. Try convincing these Aussies to ski elsewhere. If one does not buy Japanese, then the Germans should also be excluded in the deal because they were part of the Axis powers with Japan and Italy during WWII!

Skeptics are also concerned if Japan will remain a staunch American ally throughout the projected life of the future submarines, and whether Japan's constitution will again be changed to prohibit arms export in the future.

Australia's opposition Labour Party has pre-emptively said that they would cancel any deal with the Japanese should they come into power after the next election.

In response to the flurry of unsolicited offers from the European boat builders, the Japanese have indicated that they too are willing to co-operate with the Australians to help the Aussies develop the special steel required for submarine construction. Assembly will still be done in Japan.

ASC Pty Ltd : Can't Be Trusted To Build A Canoe!!

ASC screwed up the entire Collins project. They then went on to mismanage the upgrade and maintenance programme of the Collins boats. Now the same story is repeating itself with the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers.

Late last year Australia's ex-Defence Minister David Johnston was censured by the Senate after saying he wouldn’t trust would-be contender for Australia’s new submarines, the government-owned ASC, to build a canoe. He later expressed regret that his remarks could have offended anyone, that he had expressed frustration over ASC's past performance in what PM Abbott had described as a rhetoric flourish. He further said that he was directing his remarks at a legacy of issues and not at the workers in ASC, whom he considered world class, eventually putting all blame on the former Labour government for mismanaging the troubled Air Warfare Destroyer programme.

Having barely survived a no-confident vote and in a move to save his own career as the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott had given in to political pressure and had promised that the procurement of the future submarines would be subjected to a "competitive evaluation process" and ASC would be allowed to bid for it. It will not be an open tender, meaning not everybody is welcome to bid, certainly not Dear Leader Kim, or Bloodymir Pootin, or Xi Jinping for that matter. So the Japanese are now not guaranteed to win the Collins replacement deal and they are extremely confused and worried at the moment about Australia's sudden change of heart.

What A$20 Billion Can Buy

Should Australia be spending A$20 billion on a dozen super-sized conventionally powered submarines with air-independent propulsion? Would she be better off buying a larger fleet of smaller submarines while at the same time constructing more submarine bases? Something like the HDW Type-218SG SSK might cost "only" 500 million Euros each. Buying fifteen of these smaller SSKs instead of the Soryu-class or similar to populate five submarine bases will probably save Australia enough money to construct the new submarine bases along the eastern, northern and western coastlines. Tony Abbott can then also sort of keep his electoral promise of local construction. You couldn't pre-fabricate submarine pens in Japan and then ship it over to Australia for assembly, or could you?

Update 26th April 2016

The Race is over. DCNS won the A$50 billion contract with its Shortfin Barracuda, aka SMX Ocean.

Singapore Navy's New Submarines - HDW Type 218SG

*** Please read the latest on the Type 218SG here. ***

RSN's Silent Service

The Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) had been operating conventional diesel-electric submarines since 1995. Initially, as it was a completely new capability for a small navy, the RSN opted to purchase 5 decommissioned / used submarines from Sweden. These were the A-11 Sjöormen class submarines first commissioned in the late 1960s. Four of these boats were re-commissioned as the Challenger class and the fifth was to be salvaged for parts. They were extensively refurbished and upgraded by Kockums for use in tropical climate and came with personnel training agreements with the Royal Swedish Navy. They form the 171 Squadron based at Changi Naval Base.

The Challenger class submarines enabled the RSN to learn the trade of undersea warfare in an accelerated timeframe but they had one glaring shortcoming - they were not equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP). AIP is simply an advanced underwater propulsion system in a non-nuclear submarine that did not involve access to atmospheric oxygen, eliminating the periodic need to surface or snorkel to recharge the batteries. ( see my previous blog AIP submarines for RSN )

In 2005 an opportunity to buy another 2 decommissioned submarines from Sweden came in the form of  two A-17 Vastergotland class boats. These were a generation newer than the Challenger class boats, having been launched in 1986 and 1987. They were extensively modified  and had their hulls sliced and lengthened to accommodate a proprietary Stirling AIP engine. They were eventually commissioned as the RSS Archer and RSS Swordsman.


 

RSS Archer during her launching ceremony in Sweden in June 2009. Source : Peter Nilsson Kockums AB.

 

 

The Stirling Conversion : From Vastergotland to Archer. Kockums picture

 

Submarine Shopping

Now that the submariners have honed their skills with AIP, it is time for the RSN to consider buying more potent and newer platforms. On 2nd Dec 2013 MINDEF made public the acquisition of 2 customized AIP capable submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine System GmBH (TKMS). From the MINDEF press release " These submarines, together with the Archer class submarines, will replace the ageing Challenger class submarines. The Challenger class submarines were built in the 1960s and will be progressively retired from service. The replacement submarines will have significantly improved capabilities and be equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems." With some background information, it would not be of too much a surprise that this time it would no longer be a Swedish design.

Boat Supplying Nations

There are not many countries that have the capability to design and build submarines. The United States have not looked back on conventional diesel-electrics ever since they commissioned the world's first operational nuclear submarine the USS Nautilus (SSN-571) in 1954. The Royal Navy similarly disposed off their Upholder class SSKs and are and all-nuclear force. What's left will be Germany, with their U-209s and U-214s, probably the largest exporter of conventional submarines in the free world, France, the supplier of Scorpenes, Spain, exporting their S-80 Scorpene variant, Sweden, with their ill-fated Collins-class project but enjoying better domestic success and in exporting to Singapore, and finally Russia, with the Project 636 improved Kilo class. Japan is just beginning to come online as a potential supplier, after ditching their post WWII pacifist Constitution. South Korea builds U-209s and U-214s under licence and exported a couple to Indonesia, and China builds but hardly exports. All said, if you are buying U-boats ( presumably non-nuclear ), your options are somewhat limited. If you are sourcing for nuke boats then your choice is simple, go to Uncle Putin, but be warned, you can get badly mauled like India did with its yet to be delivered INS Vikramaditya ( ex-Admiral Gorshkov ) carrier.

The Boote Yards

Kockums AB's Karlskrona shipyard has been producing first rate submarines for Sweden since the 1912. Apart from the A-11 Sjöormen class and the A-17 Vastergotland class SSKs already mentioned above, they also constructed three A-19 Gotland class submarines with air-independent propulsion for the Swedish Navy in 1990. Their next generation offering is the A-26 submarine, originally scheduled to replace the Vastergotlands as they are retired in 2020.

In a series of miscalculations by the Swedish government, the fortunes of Kockums began to change around the turn of the century (1999 to be precise) where, in a complicated web of industrial merger and acquisition, Celsius AB sold its subsidiary Kockums AB to German ship builder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft GmBH (HDW) in an all-share swap for 25% of HDW, with an option to exit the business with a lump sum. The following year, SAAB bought over most of Celsius AB and opted to be paid and exited. And so Kockums become a part of HDW and then HDW was itself acquired by ThyssenKrupp Marine System GmBH (TKMS) in 2005.

HDW is of course most famous for submarines - their U-205, U-206 and U-209 series conventional diesel-electric submarines are in active service in many navies all around the globe, not to mention the Dolphin Class variant for the Israeli Navy. Their latest offering is the U-212A and its export version the U-214.

TKMS is a huge German conglomerate and in addition to Kockums which it acquired through HDW, owns several other shipyards in Germany and Greece. It now has two competing lines of submarines to sell in a limited post-cold war global market and the number of submarine exports are just not enough to keep the yards busy. It does not help when many customers also insist on local construction and technology transfer. It just not possible to maintain both the German HDW and Swedish Kockums to compete against its rivals like DCNS of France and Rubin Design Bureau of Russia. Understandably TKMS would favour its German shipyards over the other foreign ones.

So when the time came for Singapore to replace her Challenger class submarines, Kockums, the exclusive supplier of submarines to the Republic of Singapore Navy for the past 18 years saw its monopoly broken and was prevented from submitting a bid by its parent company. Instead, TKMS offered HDW's U-218SG, to be built in its Kiel shipyard in northern Germany.

On a separate note, TKMS had also successfully stalled Kockum's next-gen A-26 AIP offering to the Swedish government which industrial insiders believe is delayed by contract negotiations between Kockums and Sweden's Defence Materiel Administration. The two parties simply cannot come to a price agreement.

Fortunately, this impasse may be about to change as Singapore's HDW purchase had finally whipped the Swedes into action to ( forcefully? ) buy back Kockums and regain control of their submarine building capability and put the A-26 acquisition back on tract. In what has come a full circle, on 29th Jun 2014 SAAB announced that it will buy Kockums back from ThyssenKrupp for SEK 340 million ( about USD 50.5 million) in a deal that is probably subsidized by the Swedish government. Still, the U-218SG purchase is a done deal and the A-26, severely undermined by ThyssenKrupp, will never be ready by 2020 even for its domestic client, the RSwN.





The Kockums next generation submarine the A-26 AIP that the RSN
was never meant to have in a computer generated image showing
 special forces deploy through the Multi-Mission Portal. Source : SAAB Kockums

 

 

The Mysterious U-218SG

All that we know about this submarine is that it is a customized design for Singapore. It is a conventional diesel-electric hunter-killer submarine with air-independent propulsion based on HDW's current designs, due for delivery in 2020. No other information is available in the public domain about this new boat. Unless you have insider information, right now everything is speculation.

Still, there is nothing to stop anyone from making an intelligent guess as to what this new submarine would turn out to be. A good start will be to understand Singapore's operational requirements and the currently available HDW U-boats designs.

The U-218SG will likely be involved in the following :

Anti-surface and anti-submarine operations

Special forces deployment

Unmanned vehicle deployment ( UUV and UAV )

Land attack missions with cruise missiles

Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance ( ISTAR )

Carrier battle group ( CVBG ) escort - future Endurance-160 type large helicopter / F-35B carrier

Singapore's existing Challenger and Archer class SSKs are in the 1200 to 1400 ton range and are really too small to cope with all of the above functions. Even the existing HDW options, the Type 212A built for the Deutsche Marine ( German Navy ) and the Marina Militare ( Italian Navy ), as well as the export version the Type 214 are all in the 1500 to 1700 ton range.

Unlike European navies who operate in the relatively smaller and shallower Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, North Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, those in the Indo-Pacific region including Japan, South Korea, India and Australia would probably require bigger submarines with much longer range. The main role of the U-218SG will surely not be to play cat and mouse with the RMN in the narrow Straits of Malacca. It might have a bigger role in maintaining the SLOC open in the South China Sea and beyond, given the aggressive behavior of China in recent years. So it has to be bigger with a longer range and endurance. It also has to be faster, at least as fast as the carrier task group that it is supposed to protect. A bigger submarine will also have more space for more comfortable crew accommodation.

Fortunately HDW has exactly such a design concept in the form of the Type 216 AIP weighing in at 4000 ton. This is a double hulled two decked ocean-going monster was designed to fulfill the requirements for the Australian SEA 1000 Collins replacement project. However, it would be too big for the RSN if the design is adopted at face value. It would never safely transit the congested waters of the Straits of Singapore without being observed ( or bumped into )! So perhaps 2500 to 3000 tons would be a good compromise. A scaled down U-216 while retaining all the original bells and whistles. There is precedence in the Project Delta frigates - the Formidable class being an improved but smaller version of the La Fayette class stealth frigate.






The HDW U-216 SSK Source : ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems

 

 

This is the original U-216 technical specifications :

Length : approximately 90m

Pressure Hull Diameter : approximately 8.1m

Surface Displacement : about 4000 tons

HDW Fuel-cell Air-Independent Propulsion System

Lithium-Ion Polymer Battery Technology

HABETaS rescue system for personal rescue / free ascent at 300m

Endurance : 80 days at sea. 4 weeks without surfacing.

Range : 10000 nautical miles

Compliment : 33 officers and ratings. Extra capacity for divers and attached personnel

IDAS fibre-optic guided missile system for defense and attack against aerial targets ( ASW helos included )

Weapon Tubes : 6 x 533mm ( torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, mines, UUV? )

Vertical Launch System : Vertical Multi-Purpose Lock for launching cruise missiles

Torpedo Countermeasure System

Special Forces Swimmer Delivery Vehicle ( SDV )

In other words - the works. All that anybody could ask for in a submarine short of SLBM launch capability.

The innovative Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS) is a

lightweight fibre-optic guided missile for submarines against aerial threats.
Photo : ThyssenKrupp Marine Syatems

                                

 

 

The MdCN ( Missile de Croisiere Naval ) or naval cruise missile can be

launched from the torpedo tubes of a submarine. Source : MBDA

 

 

The MdCN, aka naval SCALP, can also be launched from the
A70 Sylver vertical launch system of France's FREMM frigates. Source : MBDA

 

Whatever the final specs are, it will be a huge step forward for the RSN. Retirement of the Challenger class submarines will transform RSN's silent service into an all-AIP force, just like the Swedes and the Germans. No ship lasts forever. If all goes well, tranche one will be followed with a subsequent order to eventually replace the Archer class possibly by the year 2025 - 2028. This article may be updated as more information is forthcoming.