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HMS Prince of Wales and Mitsubishi G4M1 of
the Kanoya Air Group in the Sea Battle off Malaya.
Image : Tamiya |
80 years ago on 10th Dec 1941, a ferocious naval battle took place in the South China Sea off the coast of Kuantan, Malaysia. It was an encounter between the warships of the Royal Navy's Eastern Fleet and the Imperial Japanese Navy's land based attack bombers. The British fleet, comprising of the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and four destroyers had sortied from their main base in Singapore two days earlier without the benefit of air cover or submarine screen. Against them were veteran aviators of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service, battle-hardened by bombing campaigns in China. The outcome was an astounding victory for the Japanese with the sinking of the two British capital ships and the loss of hundreds of their crew.
Known to the Japanese as the Naval Battle off Malaya ( マレー沖海戦 Mare-oki kaisen ), it was the first time in history that air power alone had defeated competent naval units maneuvering in the open ocean. It heralded the rise of aviation as the arbiter of naval engagements and the eventual demise of the battleship.
It is a seldom known fact that so jubilant were the Japanese with their achievements, a wartime song was immediately commissioned and composed on the fly at their national broadcaster NHK's headquarters in Tokyo that very same day, to be released with the evening news. The song would be titled " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet ".
For the British, the loss of The HMS Prince of Wales and the HMS Repulse was an omnious sign of many more bad things to come. It laid the door open for the Imperial Japanese Army's invasion of the Malay Peninsula that would eventaully lead to the fall of Singapore, once thought to be an impregnable fortress.
This article is the second in a series commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore. The first in the series here.
The Eastern Fleet
The British Eastern Fleet was a naval formation that grew out of a flawed empire defence policy dating back to 1919. Financially drained by the First World War and unable to maintain a military force large enough to protect all their empire assets and interests in the Far East against a potential adversary such as Japan, the British formulated a series of war plans which called for the construction of a main fleet base in Singapore which would be used to supply and support a relief force that would be assembled and sent from Europe to the Far East during periods of heightened tensions or hostilities.
This arrangement allowed most of the ever-shrinking Royal Navy's fleet assets to be kept in home waters to protect the British Isles while only a token few vessels would be deployed east of the Suez Canal. It would be known as the Singapore Strategy.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Singapore was transformed into a major military bastion with the construction of the Sembawang Naval Base and its supporting infrastructure. When completed in 1938, it had what was then the largest dry dock and the third largest floating dock in the world. It was protected by two newly completed airfields, RAF Tengah and RAF Sembawang and by 15 inch naval guns in two coastal artillery batteries and numerous fixed gun installations of smaller calibre.
When war with Japan seemed imminent in October 1941, the Admiralty dispatched one of its newest battleship the HMS Prince of Wales with its escorting destroyers to Singapore. The task group was joined by the WWI era fast battlecruiser HMS Repulse in Celon and arrived at the Sembawang wharves on 2nd December. Shortly after, the Eastern Fleet were to be formally constituted on 8th December with the merger of the East Indies Squadron and the China Squadron when the Japanese invaded Malaya and the Pacific War broke out. Admiral Sir Tom Philips, until then Commander-in-Chief China Station, was appointed C-in-C Eastern Fleet.
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Major command areas of the Royal Navy 1939 - 1945.
The Eastern Fleet was formed from the amalgamation
of the East Indies and China Stations.
Image : navalhistoryarchieve.org |
War Comes To Malaya And Singapore
The Japanese invasion of British Malaya had began just after mid-night on 8th Dec 1941 without a formal declaration of war. General Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Army made amphibious landings at Kota Bharu in the north-east of the Malay Peninsula and at Singora and Pattani in southern Thailand. The invasion convoy had already been sighted by Lockheed Hudson bombers of No. 1 Squadron RAAF off Cape Ca Mau, French Indochina, on 6th December. However given the uncertainty of their destination and intentions, Commander-in-Chief Far East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham did not authorise any offensive operations against the convoy until attacks were made against friendly territories. Unfortunately, the convoy could not be located on the following day due to bad weather, but the turn of events prompted C-in-C Eastern Fleet Adm Philips to recall the HMS Repulse which was then enroute to Port Darwin, Australia, back to Singapore.
Shortly after at 0400 hours on 8th December, IJN bombers based in French Indochina also conducted the first of many bombing raids on Singapore City causing destruction and casualties.
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| HMS prince of Wales departing Singapore 8th Dec 1941. Wikipedia. |
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HMS Repulse departing Singapore 8th Dec 1941. Wikipedia
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Departure of Force Z
Hoping to intercept and destroy the Japanese invasion fleet at Kota Bharu and Singora, Admiral Philips ordered the HMS Prince of Wales, the HMS Repulse and the destroyers HMS Electra (H-27), HMS Express (H-61), HMS Tenedos (H-04) and HMAS Vampire (D-68) to sortie north. He believed that as long as adequate fighter support could be provided and if he could achieve surprise, there would be a reasonable chance of destroying Japanese reinforcements and severing their line of supply, bringing reprieve to the hard pressed Commonwealth ground forces. As such, air reconnaissance forward of his intended course and fighter cover over the area of his intended strike was requested. The task force was designated Force Z and departed Singapore at 1735 hours on 8th December, keeping to a north-east course into the South China Sea, thus avoiding the heavily mined coastal waters of the Malay Peninsula.
By 0900 hours on 9th December, the fleet passed to the east of the Anambas Islands and thereafter followed a northerly course. Onboard his flagship the HMS Prince of Wales, Adm Philips would learn from his Chief of Staff Adm Palliser whom he had left in Singapore as his representative and to co-ordinate naval requirements with the other services, that the fighter cover he had requested off Singora on 10th December could not be provided. The RAF had already withdrawn from its Kota Bharu Airfield and most of its Northern Malaya airfileds had sustained damage from Japanese bombing raids. The Brewster Buffalo F2A fighters of No 453 Squadron RAAF on standby at RAF Sembawang were still available though as the dedicated fleet defense squadron. He was also warned of strong Japanese bomber forces that were believed to be stationed in southern Indochina.
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| Naval Battle off Malaya important land marks and sites. |
Detection
Unkown to Adm Philips, the IJN already had several submarines forming a picket line stretching from the eastern end of the Singapore Straits all the way north to the South China Sea off the coast of Trengganu to detect and provide early warning on British fleet movements. At 1345 hours the Japanese submarine I-65 reported the discovery of 2 Repulse-type warships following a course of 340 at 14 knots at a location bearing 196 degrees and 225 nautical miles from Pulo Condore ( modern day Con Son Island, Vietnam ).
I-65 was a Kaidai5-class cruiser submarine assigned to the 5th Submarine Squadron, 30th Submarine Division and was helmed by Commander Harada Hakue ( 原田毫衛 ). For a few hours it shadowed the British fleet on the surface making 18 to 20 knots, taking advantage of the poor weather to avoid being detected itself. It had a temporary lost of contact with the British fleet at 1550 hours but managed to reacquire its quarry at 1652 hours. Subsequently, the submarine was forced to dive because of an unexpected buzzing by a Kawanishi E7K Alf seaplane from the cruiser Kinu. The pilot had mistaken the I-65 for an enemy submarine. When submarine resurfaced, the enemy fleet had disappeared.
By then, the poor weather and squalls that had help conceal the British fleet from the Japanese search planes had cleared. At around 1700 hours three seaplanes had detected the task force and continued to track it until nightfall. For the first time since departing Singapore, Adm Philips realised his fleet had been discovered by the enemy.
Mission Aborted
At 1835 hours, the destroyer HMS Tenedos was low on fuel and was sent back to Singapore. Force Z then maintained a westerly course until an hour after sunset in an attempt to mislead the seaplanes into believing they were bound for Singora. They would later change course under the cover of darkness and head for Singapore.
Submarine I-65's report was received by the cruisers Kinu, Yura and the 81st Naval Communications Unit in Saigon. The reception was poor and it had taken another 90 minutes for the message to be decoded and relayed. The discovery of the British fleet lead Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo ( 小沢冶三郎 ), commander of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, to order the immediate withdrawal of his now empty transports from the east coast of the Malay Peninsula back to their base at Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina. He also ordered all his surface combatants including the heavy cruisers Chokai, Mogami, Kumano, Mikuma, Suzuya and elements of the 3rd Destroyer Squadron to sortie 200 nautical miles south to intercept the enemy fleet and prepare for a night encounter.
Failed Strike
Over at Saigon Airbase, HQ 22nd Air Flotilla only received news of the discovery of the British fleet more than 2 hours after the message was sent, at 1600 hours 9th December. An earlier report from its own reconnaissance plane sent at 0930 hours had erroneously indicated that the capital ships were still in Singapore and bombers of the Kanoya, Genzan and Mihoro Air Groups were being loaded with bombs in preparetion for a raid on Singapore Harbour that very night.
As a result, the Singapore bombing mission was immediately cancelled and the bombers were instead directed to intercept and attack the British fleet. Some were loaded with bombs while the others had their bomb loads swapped out with torpedoes. It was about half an hour before sunset when the bombers took off. Based on the last known location, course and speed, the pilots had hoped to locate the British ships just after dark but the inclement weather off Cape Ca Mau prevented them from finding the fleet. The bombers eventually jettisoned their bombs in the sea and returned to their bases around midnight after hours of fruitless search.
Close Encounter
By 1920 hours, unknown to their respective commanders, the British and the Japanese surface fleets were converging from east to west and were separated by probably 20 nautical miles or less. A reconnaissance flight of 3 medium bombers of the Mihoro Air Group spotted a wake and activated a flare at 2000 hours but it turned out to be Adm Ozawa's flagship the IJNS Chokai. This flare was spotted by the British fleet from an estimated distance of 5 nautical miles but the radar on the HMS Prince of Wales mysteriously failed to detect the Japanese cruiser. The two fleets had sailed past each other in the darkness and the poor weather without being aware of the presence of the other. Moonrise would only be due at 2228 hours that night.
At around 2330 hours, an urgent message from Adm Palliser reported of Japanese landings at Kuantan, located on the east coast of Malaya midway between Kota Bharu and Singapore, not too far away from the fleet's location. Adm Philip decided to investigate and altered course accordingly without signalling Singapore about his intentions. The probable reasons of maintaining radio silence was likely to preserve the element of surprise and also not to give away the fleet's position to the enemy.
Submarine Attack
At 2352 hours IJN submarine I-58 reported having to dive during a close encounter with two destroyers. It later detected the two enemy capital ships and at 0015 hours 10th December fired a spread of five torpedoes at the HMS Repulse without scoring a single hit. The submarine reported its position at 140 nautical miles from Kuantan bearing 57 degrees. The British fleet was blissfully unaware of this contact and torpedo attack and continued to speed towards its objective. I-58 was a Kaidai3A-class cruiser submarine captained by Lt Commander Kitano Soshichi ( 北野惣七 ) and was assigned to the 19th Submarine Division, 4th Submarine Squadron. It had operated out of Samah on Hainan Island. After the unsuccessful torpedo attack, I-58 continued to trail the British fleet until contact was lost before dawn at 0445 hours.
By then, based on the course and speed information from the I-58 sighting, the Japanese had determined that the enemy fleet was keeping to a true bearing of 180 degrees and was in retreat. Due to concerns of fuel shortage, Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake ( 近藤信竹 ), commander of IJN's 2nd Fleet, decided to turn around his surface fleet and terminate the interdiction mission. Vice Admiral Ozawa similarly withdrew his submarine force from the pursue leaving the fate of the British fleet to the hands of Rear Admiral Matsunaga Sadaichi ( 松永貞市 ) with his medium bombers of the 22nd Air Flotilla.
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Mitsubishi G4M Model 11 Type 1 Attack Bomber (Betty) of the Kanoya
Air Group during the Sea Battle off Malaya. Image : Hasegawa Model Co. |
Nell And Betty
Submarine I-58's report was received by HQ 22nd Air Flotilla at 0315 hours and by 0625 hours Genzan Air Group's ( 元山海軍航空隊 ) 4th Squadron comprising of 9 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" twin-engine medium bombers lead by Lieutenant Makino left Saigon Airfield on a search mission for the enemy fleet. Another 26 G3M bombers of the Genzan Air Group would leave at 0755 hours, 17 were carrying torpedoes while the remaining 9 were loaded with bombs.
Next to depart at 0814 hours would be 26 Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" medium bombers of the Kanoya Air Group ( 鹿屋海軍航空隊 ), all armed with torpedoes. They launched from Thu Dau Mot Airfield located 20km north of Saigon. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Squadrons had taken off in sequence and flew in formation at an altitude of 3000m on a course of 187 Degrees.
Finally at 0820 hours, the Mihoro Air Group ( 美幌海軍航空隊 ) would launch 33 Mitsubishi G3M bombers in four squadrons from Saigon Airfield, 8 with torpedoes and 25 with bombs. The last aircraft took off at 0930 hours. Only 1 G3M of the Genzan Group aborted due to engine trouble.
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Mitsubishi G3M2 Model 22 Type 96 Attack Bomber ( Nell ) of the Genzan
Air Group during the Sea Battle off Malaya. Image : Hasegawa Model Co. |
Detour To Kuantan
Meanwhile on the other side of the South China Sea at sunrise which was 0627 hours, the British fleet discovered 4 radar contacts but they turned out to be cargo vessels. A Supermarine Walrus amphibious plane took-off from the HMS Prince of Wales at 0645 hours to investigate the purported Kuantan landings but reported nothing amiss. With the fleet soon to be approaching the coast at 0730 hours, the destroyer HMS Express was sent to investigate the landing site and it too detected no enemy activities. The report about the landing was clearly false and Force Z resumed its home bound journey at 0900 hours, totally ignorant that a large fleet of enemy long range bombers was already actively searching for it. The task force had then intended to go around the eastern side of the Anambas Islands to avoid minefields.
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| Naval Battle Off Malaya Set at 1/700 scale. Image : Tamiya Model Co. |
The Naval Battle Off Malaya
Not anticipating the fleet's westward detour to Kuantan, the Japanese bombers were searching too far south of Force Z's actual location and had began to turn back having found nothing initially when the Number 4 search aircraft discovered the detached destroyer HMS Tenedos some 130 nautical miles east-southeast of the main force. At approximately 1000 hours, it reported the co-ordinates of the destroyer and dropped two 60kg bombs but achieved no hits. Shortly after at 1014 hours, lead by Lieutenant Nikaido Rokuo ( 二階堂麓夫 ), 9 Mitsubishi G3M belonging to the Genzan Air Group's 3rd Squadron arrived on scene, each armed with a single 500kg bomb. They had mistaken the HMS Tenedos for the HMS Repulse and wasted all their ordnance on the destroyer without getting a single hit. Tenedos reported about being attacked and had emerged relatively unscathed, suffering only one casualty. It continued towards Singapore after the air raid.
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Map of the Sea Battle off Malaya.
Image : history.navy.mil |
At 1015 hours, flying in a sector north of most other Japanese aircraft, Ensign Hoashi Masato ( 帆足正音 ) in the Number 3 search aircraft finally spotted Force Z from an altitude of 3000m and reported the exact location as 4 Deg North, 103 Deg 55 Min East. It was welcoming news for the bomber pilots as by that time many were already critically low on fuel. Lieutenant Iki Haruki ( 壹岐春記 ), commander of Kanoya Air Group's 3rd Squadron recalled that moment when he was approaching the limit of the 700 mile combat radius of the Mitsubishi G4M. He was so far south that he could see the island of Singapore below to his far right and thought to himself that the situation was not good. Just then, the co-ordinates of the enemy fleet was received but there was some initial confusion as he tried to plot the location on his aeronautical charts - it turned out to be somewhere on land over the Malay Peninsula! He would later learn that Kanoya Air Group commander Captain Fujiyoshi Naoshiro ( 藤吉直四郎 ) was desparate enough to radio their headquarters to request that they be informed of the enemy's position in plain text.
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Level bombing of the HMS Prince of Wales ( top ) and HMS
Repulse. Ministry of Navy permit number 783. Wikipedia
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Once the deciphered information on the British fleet's location was disseminated by HQ, all bomber squadrons began converging and executed their attacks piece meal without waiting for the rest as they were already low on fuel. First to arrive at 1115 hours were 8 Mitsubishi G3M of the Mihoro Air Group's Shirai Squadron ( 白井中隊 ). They were each armed with two 250kg bombs and carried out level bombing on the HMS Repulse. A total of 14 bombs were dropped, as one aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire shortly after making the first bombing run and was unable to drop the second bomb, while another bomber could not release its second bomb due to a mechanical issue. While there were many near misses, the HMS Repulse was struck by one bomb during the first bombing run close to its starboard rear catapult. It penetrated the hangar and the upper deck and exploded in the marine mess area, causing a few casualties among the damage control team but otherwise relatively minor damage.
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Genzan Air Group's torpedo-armed Mitsubishi G3M bomber.
Image : Hasegawa Model Co. |
Just as the Mihoro bombers were retreating, two squadrons of Mitsubishi G3M bombers belonging to the Genzan Air Group joined the battle. Lead by Lieutenant Ishihara Isao ( 石原薫 ) and Lieutenant Takai Sadao ( 高井貞夫 ), a total of 16 aircrafts, all armed with torpedoes, attacked the two capital ships. 8 torpedoes were launched against the HMS Repulse but it managed to elude all of them with skillful maneuvering. Interestingly, it was said that Takai was initially unsure if the HMS Repulse was a Kongo-class battleship because of the similarity in profile, but his doubts disappeared the moment he saw the British flag and he launched the torpedo attack.
The HMS Prince of Wales on the other hand was not so lucky. Of the 5 torpedoes launched against it, 1 hit the port stern area where the outer propeller shaft emerged from the hull, instantly twisting the shaft and rupturing the seal that prevented seawater from entering the shaft tunnel. It caused flooding of the B engine room and several other compartments aft. The effect of the loss of propulsion and flooding caused the HMS Prince of Wales to list 11.5 degrees to port and its speed to decreased to 16 knots. The listing had meant the starboard 5.25 inch anti-aircraft guns could not be depressed low enough to counter low-flying attackers. The torpedo hit had also taken out most of the ship's auxillary electrical power which was crucial in running the steering gear, the pumps, the internal communications system, the ventilation system and for powering the gun turrets. The battleship was essentially doomed without the ability to steer, to carry out damage control and to defend itself against further waves of air attacks. During that encounter, British anti-aircraft fire accounted for the destruction of 1 bomber.
At 1150 hours, 8 torpedo carrying Mitsubishi G3M bombers of the 4th Squadron, Mihoro Air Group arrived, lead by Lieutenant Takahashi Katsusaku ( 高橋勝作 ). The squadron also had difficulty identifying the HMS Repulse because of the striking resemblance to the IJNS Kongo. They were only convinced the warship was British after receiving anti-aircraft fire. Except for the squadron leader's aircraft which suffered from a malfunction, 7 bombers launched 7 torpedoes against the HMS Repulse but all missed the battlecruiser. 3 bombers suffered minor damage from anti-acraft fire but Takahashi's plane took on significant damage as he had to repeat the torpedo run for a second time. At 1158 hours Captain Tennant, commanding officer of the HMS Repulse, took his own initiative to break radio silence to call for help. " From REPULSE, to any British Man of War, enemy aircraft bombing. My position 134NYTW22X09.". It would be the first and only radio message transmitted by Force Z since its departure from Singapore. At 1216 hours, 11 Brewster Buffalo F2A fighters left Singapore but would not be expected to arrive at the battle site some 240km away until 1300 hours or later.
Trouble for the British fleet was far from over as 26 Mitsubishi G4M of the Kanoya Air Group lead by Lieutenant-Commander Miyauchi Shichizo ( 宮内七三 ) arrived next at 1207 hours. They were all armed with torpedoes. Of the 9 bombers of the 1st Squadron, 4 attacked the HMS Prince of Wales while the other 5 bombers attacked the HMS Repulse. It was followed by 8 bombers of the 2nd Squadron, where 2 attacked the HMS Prince of Wales and 6 attacked the HMS Repulse. Collectively, these two squadrons achieved 3 torpedo hits on the starboard side of the HMS Prince of Wales. One at the bow, one opposite B main gun turret and another at the stern aft of Y turret which punctured the hull and bent the outer starboard propeller shaft inwards and over the inner shaft, jamming it instantly.
The HMS Repulse had so far dodged an amazing 19 torpedoes but her luck was about to run out. Last to have a go were the 9 bombers of Lieutenant Iki Haruki's 3rd Squadron that carried out an anvil attack, bracketing the battlecruiser with torpedoes from both port and starboard from which there was no escape. Iki would recount after the war that descending between the clouds at 300 to 400m altitude during his torpedo approach, he witnessed the 1st Squadron's torpedo attack on the HMS Prince of Wales creating a huge column of water sprout just aft of the bridge. It was like nothing he had seen before, but exactly like the oil paintings depicting the scenes in the Battle of Tsushima Strait during the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Almost immediately, he saw another torpedo strike the stern of the battleship, and he thought to himself - well that's another hit, no more Prince of Wales, I'll go after ship number two ( Repulse ).
As he lead his squadron to attack the HMS Repulse from the starboard side, the battlecruiser made a hard turn to starboard and he soon found himself on the vessel's port side while his fellow squadron mates from flights 2 and 3 responded to the Repulse's maneuvres by turning further to starboard to get a better angle of attack and ended up on the opposite side. Caught in a pincer attack which had formed by coincidence, the Repulse received one torpedo hit on the port side followed by another 3 hits in quick succession.
Lt Iki recalled his torpedo run that day, approaching the warship and listening to the manual range and altitude read out from his chief observer Warrant Officer Yahagi Yuji ( 矢萩友二 ). He released his torpedo when he was 800m away from the Repulse and at an altitude of 30m. Under fire, he immediately steered his aircraft hard to port with the closest approach to the ship at 300m. Then his observer Petty Officer Maekawa Tamotsu ( 前川保 ) screamed " Hit !". Any jubilation from the successful torpedo attack would be short lived as the number 2 bomber in Iki's flight exploded in a ball of fire at a distance of 150m from Repulse just as he was turning away. Shortly, Maekawa would scream a second time " Hit again! " and then " Flight leader has been hit! " as the number 3 bomber also exploded 50m from the ship. The two ill fated bombers were flown by pilots Sakurai Toshimitsu ( 桃井敏光 ) and Taue Yoshikazu ( 田植良和 ). It could be inferred that the second torpedo that struck the Repulse after Iki's own must have been released by either one of the dead pilots. The Repulse listed heavily to port within a matter of minutes and then rolled over and sank at 1233 hours with many casulties.
There were shouts of "Banzai" from the bomber's crew as Iki headed back to Thu Dau Mot Airbase. They celebrated their sucesssful mission with wine taken from the emergency rations. His aircraft was the first to land at Thu Dau Mot after the mission. Later, in his after action report, he would indicate that the two torpedoes that hit the HMS Repulse were released by his two dead squadron mates. He thought it was the least he could do for them.
The final wave of 17 Mitsubishi G3M bombers of the Mihoro Air Group all carrying 500kg bombs arrived at the battle scene at 1230 hours just as the HMS Repulse was sinking. They were the Takeda Squadron ( 武田中隊 ) and the Ohira Squadron ( 大平中隊 ). They carried out level bombing on the already mortally damaged HMS Prince of Wales, without steerage and crawling with the propulsion power from a single propeller shaft. Although most of the bombs missed their target, the Takeda Squadron achieved one hit amidships and that bomb penetrated the upper deck to explode at the Cinema Flat below where the wounded had aggregated, causing an untold number of casualties. The order to abandon ship was given and the destroyer HMS Express came alongside to take off survivors. At 1318 hours, the HMS Prince of Wales rolled over to port and sank, taking with her Admiral Philips and commanding officer Captain John Leach who chose to go down with their ship.
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Last moments of the HMS Prince of Wales with HMS Express taking survivors
Photo : IWM / Wikipedia |
A total of 813 sailors were lost, 513 from the HMS Repulse and 327 from the HMS Prince of Wales. Survivors from the Repulse were picked up by the destroyers HMS Electra and HMAS Vampire. The RAAF Brewster Buffalos arrived on scene at 1318 hours just as the Prince of Wales sank. All of the attackers had already left for their bases save one. Ensign Hoashi, the pilot whom had earlier discovered the British fleet was still loitering in the area in his reconnaissance plane. He managed to evade the Buffalos and returned to confirm the sinking of the two capital ships.
It was a lopsided victory for the Japanese who lost one Mitsubishi G3M of the Genzan Air Group and two Mitsubishi G4M of the Kanoya Air Group to British anti-aircraft fire. 21 airmen in those three aircrafts lost thier lives. In addition, 25 bombers suffered light damage repairable at the unit level, 2 bombers with moderate damage required depot level repairs and another 2 bombers were damage beyond salvage. In total, 85 medium bombers had participated in the battle.
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| Lt. Iki Haruki as a bomber pilot in WWII |
Irei Bouquets
Lt Iki Haruki's squadron did not suffer from too much battle damage apart from the two destroyed bombers. After the mission he counted "only" seventeen bullet holes in his bomber but the other squadrons of the Kanoya Air Group fared worse and had crash landings and they were short of aircrafts. On 11th December, the day after the epic naval battle, Iki was ordered to proceed to the HQ garrison of the Takao Air Group ( 高雄海軍航空隊 ) in Kaohsiung, Taiwan to replenish the planes. For three days he was flight testing the new bombers as they were being readied by the mechanics. He returned to Thu Dau Mot Airfield on 14th December in a nine plane formation. By 16th December all maintenance works on the freshly arrived bombers were completed and the air group received orders to attack a British wireless telegraph station on Siantan Island of the Anambas Archipelago on 18th December. There was a good harbour on the island that the Malaya invasion force would like to use as an advanced base for the coming attack on Singapore Island.
Realising that the mission flight path would bring them near to the site of the sunken warships off Kuantan and that there would be no enemy fighters or anti-aircaft fire to contend with, Iki asked his observer Maekawa to buy two bouquets of flowers from a shop near their base. The bombing mission was successfully completed and on the way back, Iki lead his squadron of nine bombers in a formation flight at an altitude of 30m and dropped a bouquet over the location where the HMS Repulse had rested and then similarly another bouquet over at where the the HMS Prince of Wales had sunken. It was to provide solace and closure to not only their fellow aviators who perished in the three bombers that were shot down but also as a tribute to the courageous British sailors who had fought so gallantly before going down with their ships. The ritual of conducting a memorial service to the deceased is known as irei ( 慰霊 ) in Japanese.
According to Iki, the dark sihouettes of the two sunken ships could be easily seen from an altitude of 300m as they had come to rest in shallow waters of 60 to 70 metres. The weather was good, the waves were calm and the water was very clear that afternoon.
Subsequently, his bouquet dropping act was widely publicised by the various Japanese newspapers. A journalist from Mainichi Shimbun however erroneously reported the event to have taken place a day after the battle and that misinformation had unfortunately perpetuated from then onwards. In 1943, an elementary school textbook had also included a description of Iki's deeds as the heroic story " Chivalry in the Battlefield ", although his name was not mentioned specifically. It had also gotten the date wrong, indicating it as occuring the day after the battle.
Iki would feel embarassed everytime when people asked him about the episode of bouquet dropping. He would simply say that he did not do it in order to be praised. To him, it was just a natural behavior as a warrior to express his sorrow to his comrade-in-arms when they had lost their lives in the line of duty. Even to the enemy wardead, there has to be respect and empathy beyond hostilty. After the War ended, Iki's spontaneous gesture of honouring the fallen airmen and sailors, friend and foe alike, so intrigued the British that he would be interviwed many times by them. He would be blessed with longevity, passing away in 2011, age 99 years old.
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Cover page of music score for the songs
"Annihitaion of the British Eastern Fleet" and "Decisive Victory"
published in April 1942. Image : Kosho.or.jp |
Instant Wartime Song
News of the stunning victory of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service ( IJNAS ) over the British Eastern Fleet in the South China Sea was released by the Ministry of Navy, Imperial General Headquarters at 4pm Tokyo time 10th December 1941, barely an hour after the HMS Prince of Wales had sunken. Japanese national broadcaster NHK ( 日本放送協会 Nippon Hoso Kyokai ) announced the victory at 4:20pm over the radio, and the Japanese people were jubilant and thrilled when they heard the news. None however were more excited about the victory than NHK's producer and later director Maruyama Tetsuo ( 丸山鉄雄 ). He immediately decided that the vanquishing of the British fleet was the perfect subject for the creation of a broadcasting news song ( 放送ニュース歌謡 hoso nyusu kayo ) which is also sometimes referred to as the current affairs song ( 時局歌 jikyokuka ). These are songs commissioned by radio stations to complement their regular news bulletins and they had already existed before World War II but their popularity soared with the progression of the global conflict. The only problem was, he had wanted it to be broadcasted with the 7pm news on NHK Radio 1 ( callsign JOAK ), which was due in about 3 hours!
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Cover of Takahashi Kikutaro's Song Collection
published in 1938. Image : Fusensha.ocnk.net |
With little time to spare, he asked the prolific composer Koseki Yuji ( 古関裕而 ) and lyricist Takahashi Kikutaro ( 高橋掬太郎 ) for help. Normally, the composer would start work on the song only after the lyrics were written, but the extremely short notice had meant that Koseki and Takahashi had to work on the song simultaneously in order to be able to finish it on time. They had consulted each other over the phone as the song had gradually taken shape.
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Koseki Yuji ( centre ) with Fujiyama Ichiro ( right )
and Mari Yoshiko ( left ). Original Photo : Columbia Japan |
The selected performer was the popular Japanese singer Fujiyama Ichiro ( 藤山一郎 ) who was also a well known musician, composer and conductor. He was truely surprised when he arrived at the studio, assuming that the lyrics and the song were already completed and ready for his practising, only to discover that Takahashi was still in the middle of writing the words!
Eventually, the excitement and thrill of receiving the good news on the Japanese victory in the southern oceans pushed Takahashi and Koseki to overcome all technical difficulties and time constrains to complete the song on time. It would be titled " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet " ( 英国東洋艦隊潰滅 Eikoku Toyo Kantai Kaimetsu ). Due to the urgent circumstances which it was composed, a short portion of Setouchi Tokichi's famous Warship March ( 軍艦行進曲 Gunkan Koshinkyoku ) was even interjected between the first and second verses of the original song. This rather plagiaristic interlude would be removed in later versions.
The lyrics writing and composing was done right to the last minute and there was only one rehearsal before the newly completed song was broadcasted. Although its creation was rushed, the song was rhythmic and powerful and conveyed the excitement of war and victory. It was said that Fujiyama sang it beautifully and after the event Maruyama was full of praise for the successful effort by the trio. He would later reflect that from the announcement of the news to the completion of the song was only three hours, a normally impossible technical feat in both lyrics writing and composing, and that it can only be a joyous milestone in the world of news songs.
After that, NHK continued to commission news songs following many significant Imperial Japanese military conquests such as " The Song of the Fall of Singapore " and " The Fall of Manila " but they did not quite create the same impact on the populace at the same magnitude as the " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet " did.
Incidentally, the " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet ", popular as it might have been, was not made into a record during the War. It could be that it was then not NHK's priority to have the song released on vinyl. Perhaps feeling that it would be a business opportunity lost, Columbia Records Japan had poet, writer and lyricist for children's song Sato Hachiro ( サトウハチロー ) write lyrics to Koseki Yuji's original melody and created a new song called " Decisive Victory " ( 断じて勝つぞ Danjite Katsuzo ). Sung again by Fujiyama Ichiro and also the Columbia Choir, it was already recorded on 20th Dec 1941 but was not released in vinyl until Febuarary 1942.
Interestingly, while on a troop entertainment tour of South East Asia in Oct 1942 under the auspices of NHK, the ship that was ferrying Koseki and his delegation of fellow artistes was approaching the Kuantan coast on the Malay Peninsula when out of the blue the " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet " was performed by the spontaneous efforts of those on board. Such was the popularity of the song at that time.
Not long after, the end of World War II and the defeat of Japan in Aug 1945 would bring an end to the golden era of military songs ( 軍歌 gunka ) and news songs. It was not until August 1966, twenty five years after it was composed that the " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet " was finally released on record. It was included in the " Japanese Military Song Collection In Stereo " by Columbia Records Japan. The performer was still Fujiyama Ichiro.
When I first heard the " Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet " being played, I thought it was slightly inferior to the " Song of the Fall of Singapore " and I still hold to that opinion today. But the more I listened to it, the more appealing it became. In fact, for a song created in less than three hours, it should be considered a masterpiece. Besides, Fujiyama's vocals are just awesome.
Note that the IJN did not actually annihilate the entire Eastern Fleet as the title of the song might have suggested. The Eastern Fleet's assets included many other warships stationed from Durban to Hong Kong, but it effectively did so by removing at one fell swoop the two most powerful warships of the fleet. It would be many months into 1942 before the appearance of another British battleship in the Far East theatre.
You may listen to the song below or from this link. The footage I believe has been taken from the 1942 war film " The war at sea from Hawaii to Malaya " ( ハワイ.マレー沖海戦 ) by Toho Eiga.
Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet
英国東洋艦隊潰滅 ( Eikoku Toyokantai Kaimetsu )
Annihilation of the British Eastern Fleet
滅びたり滅びたり Horo bitari horo bitari
Perish! Perish!
敵東洋艦隊は Teki Toyo kantai wa
The enemy's Eastern Fleet,
マレー半島クワンタン沖に Mare Hanto Kuwantan oki ni
Off the coast of Kuantan, Malay Peninsula,
今ぞ沈みゆきぬ Ima zo shizumi yukinu
Is sinking now
勲し赫たり海の荒鷲よ Isaoshi kaku tari umi no ara washi yo
The meritorious storm eagles of the sea
沈むレパルス Shizumu Reparusu
Sink the Repulse
沈むプリンス.オブ.ウェールズ Shizumu Prinsu obu Weruzu
Sink the Prince of Wales
戦えり戦えり Tataka eri tataka eri
To war! To war!
わが強者らは Waga tsuwamono ra wa
Men of great strength.
皇国の興廃を Kokoku no Kohai wo
The fate of the Empire,
今ぞ身に負いぬ Ima zo mi ni oi nu
Now lies in our hands.
傲れるイギリス東洋艦隊を Ogo reru Igirisu toyo kantai wo
The proud English Eastern Fleet,
荒ぶ波に沈め去りぬ Susabu nami ni shizume sarinu
Shall sink beneath the rough seas
記憶せよ記憶せよ Kioku seyo kioku seyo
Remember! Remember!
いざ永遠にこの日を Iza towa ni konohi wo
This day forever!
打ち向う敵艦を一拳屠り去りぬ Uchi muko u tekikan o ikkyo hofuri sarinu
The enemy warship has been slaughtered with a single punch,
開戦三日目に早この戦果ぞ Kaisen mikkame ni haya kono senka zo
Glorious results just three days since the start of the war.
沈むレパルス Shizumu Reparusu
Sink the Repulse!
沈むプリンス.オブ.ウェールズ Shizumu Purinsu obu Weruzu
Sink the Prince of Wales!
万歳ぞ万歳ぞ Banzai zo banzai zo
Banzai! Banzai!
聞けあがる勝鬨 Kike agaru kachidoki
Hear the shout of victory!
マレー半島シンガポール Mare Hanto Shingaporu
The Malay Penisula, Singapore,
はやくも破れ去る Hayaku mo yabu re sa ru
Shall fall rapidly.
無敵の海軍見よこの荒鷲 Muteki no kaigun mi yo kono ara washi
Behold the Storm Eagles of the invincible navy.
勲仰げ仰げ勲 Isao aoge aoge isao
Meritorious services worthy of respect. Revere their exploits.
作詞 高橋掬太郎 Lyrics : Takahashi Kikutaro
作曲 古関裕而 Compser : Koseki Yuji
Version with first 3 verses and Gunkan March interlude from 0:42 to 0:57This incomplete version with only the first three verses uses archival news footage from NHK and contains the Gunkan March interlude between verses 1 and 2.
 |
The Straits Times of Singapore Headlines 11th Dec 1941
Image : Singapore Press Holdings |
How The Japanese Won
The decisive victory of the Japanese in the Naval Battle of Malaya was certainly not a fluke. For years leading to the start of the Pacific War, Japan had progressively build up its military capabilities and had posessed the most powerful navy in the world by 1941, with eleven aircraft carriers and several naval air fleets, all equipped with very modern and advanced aircraft types. In particular, its long range land-based naval bombers ( 海軍陸上攻撃機 kaigun rikujo kogeki ki ), frequently abbreviated to just Rikko ( 陸攻 ), were a formidable force. Not only were these medium bombers designed to have very long range and high speed, though sometimes achieved at the expense of crew protection, the aviators were highly trained and many have gained combat experience through the trans-oceanic bombing campaigns of the Sino-Japanese War.
The affable squadron commander Lieutenant Iki Haruki for example was said to have already completed 200 bombing missions at the beginning of the Pacific War, making him one of the most experienced among the Rikko fraternity. He went through very rigorous and realistic training for torpedo strikes against surface fleets and claimed to have practised executing torpedo attack final approaches at an altitude of 10m in anticipation of the very shallow waters at Pearl Harbor. The altitude for a typical IJNAS torpedo run is 30m, as we have seen during the attack on the British warships off Kuantan. The pilots and bombers of the IJNAS are affectionately given the nickname of Sea Eagles or Storm Eagles ( 荒鷲 arawashi ).
Japan's occupation of airfields in French Indochina from July 1941 onwards was also a crucial factor in its ultimate victory in the Naval Battle of Malaya. Had the medium bomber squadrons been based in Taiwan or even Hainan Island which Japan had also occupied, they would not have the necessary range to strike at British Malaya or the South China Sea.
In addition, the high level of coordination and information sharing between the surface fleet, submarine fleet and the aviation corps also ensured that the British fleet would not escape the entrapment in the South China Sea.
The Japanese Navy also took the threat of the British capital ships against their own cruisers and battleships in the Southern Expeditionary Fleet very seriously and therefore spared no effort in planning and preparing for their elimination, beginning from the moment of the British announcement of the HMS Prince of Wales' deployment to the Far East. In anticipation of the arrival of the British capital ships in Singapore, the IJN began equipping their most elite Rikko bombing group the Kanoya Air Group with a total of 72 of the latest Mitsubishi G4M Betty medium bomber. Originally based in Taichung in central Taiwan and part of the 21st Air Flotilla, half the air group consisting of three squadrons were transferred to French Indochina to reinforce the 22nd Air Flotilla's Genzan and Mihoro Air Groups which operated older Mitsubishi G3M Nell bombers. The Kanoya detachment had arrived at Thu Dau Mot Airfiled only on 6th December 1941. As the turn of events had shown us, they would later have a huge impact on the outcome of the battle.
Six warships against two submarine squadrons, a destroyer squadron, a cruiser division and a reinforced rikko air group, it is easy to predict which side would emerge victorious.
Aftermarth
The loss of the two most powerful warships of the Eastern Fleet had given the IJN full conrol of the seas aound the Malay Peninsula and had reduced Singapore to a land base. Without its battleships, Singapore was no longer capable projecting naval power to the region as the British had hoped when they formulated the Singapore Strategy two decades prior. It would fall to General Yamashita's 25th Army on 15th Feb 1942.
After the disastrous Naval Battle of Malaya, the Eastern Fleet spent the next few months withdrawing to Sumatra and then to Ceylon, after the Dutch East Indies also fell to the Japanese. The shock of defeat from Hawaii to Singapore and Java finally galvanised the Allied Forces to form a joint naval command to fight back against the ever-expanding Japanese Empire in early 1942. It was known as the Ameican-British-Dutch-Australian Command or ABDA. Though short-lived, it was the beginning of an awakening and a long struggle to regain allied supremacy in the Far East / Western Pacific.
The first article of the series commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Fall of Singapore can be found here.
*Time format used in the article is local Singapore time unless otherwise stated. Tokyo time ( then ) is 1 hour 30min ahead.
