Australia Selects Shortfin Barracuda, Hands DCNS A$50 Billion On A Platter



The DCNS Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A SSK. Image : DCNS Australia

SEA1000 Future Submarine Program

Merci! That's the least the French could say. Ouch! That's the pain that would come from parting with A$50 billion, after the initial euphoria is over. And Oh ****! would be the response with the realization of the enormity of the task ahead.

Australia's quest to replace its current fleet of six Collins-class conventional diesel electric attack submarine is officially known as the SEA1000 Future Submarine Program. It aims to provide the Royal Australia Navy with " an affordable, regionally dominant, conventional submarine capability, sustainable into the foreseeable future ", so that it can safeguard its sea lines of communication and its economy which is worth A$1.6 trillion annually.

The Aussies wanted them BIG and they wanted them quick. Twelve boats are needed in total. They have to be constructed locally in Australia and they had to have American combat and weapon systems. As there were no off-the-shelf options that can fulfill Australia's unique operational requirements, they began looking for an international partner to design and build their next generation boats, the details of which can be found here. After a long drawn competitive evaluation process, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced last week that the French Shortfin Barracuda designed by DCNS had been selected, thus ending months of speculation by defense analysts as well as the general public alike.

DCNS Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A

The Shortfin Barracuda is actually a conventionally powered variant of the Barracuda-class nuclear attack submarine ( SSN ), specially customized for Australia. It is brilliantly named after the Australian Barracuda or Shortfin Barracuda whose scientific name is Sphyraena novaehollandiae.

French national ship builder DCNS needs no further introduction. Malaysia's Gowind-class frigates and Scorpene-class SSK, Singapore's Formidable-class stealth frigates, and the Mistral-class BPC so coveted by Mr Putin, were all constructed by this innovative company.

The Barracuda-class submarine currently under construction for the French Navy is France's second generation nuclear attack submarine meant to replace their six Rubis-Amethyste-class SSNs. It displaces 5300 tons submerged and 4765 tons surfaced and measures about 100m in length. Its nuclear reactor provides an unlimited range, requiring refueling and complex overhaul ( RCOH ) only once in ten years. Its endurance is about 70 days, the limiting factor being the amount of food it can carry for its crew. It is extremely stealthy and quiet, featuring pump jet propulsion instead of propellers. It can be armed with a variety of weapons including torpedoes, mines, SM39 block 2 Exocet anti-ship missiles and SCALP Naval land attack cruise missiles. First-in-class FS Suffren is scheduled for launch in 2017 and the six boats cost the French government €9.9billion.


The Shortfin Barracuda debuted as the SMX-Ocean SSK at Euronaval 2014 and quickly evolved into its current form as the world's most advanced conventional submarine customized for Australia's needs. It will be slightly shorter than the Barracuda SSN at 97m and also smaller, displacing some 4500 tons when surfaced and " more than 4000 tons ", probably closer to 5000 tons, submerged. Powered by diesel engines and advanced fuel cell air-independent propulsion system, it can remain underwater for up to 3 weeks and has a range of 18000nm ( 33300km ) at 10 knots and an endurance of 80 days at sea. Maximum diving depth is 350m or deeper and its maximum speed will be 20knots. It will have a complement of 60 officers and ratings, plus it can carry another 20 special forces personnel.

It will have " the most powerful sonar ever produced for a conventional submarine " and the same pump-jet propulsion system and the same enhanced stealth features inherited from its nuclear cousin. Pump-jet technology is said to make propellers obsolete, as they can be a thousand times quieter and achieve much higher speeds before cavitation ( bubbling phenomenon ) occurs. It also allows for high maneuverability with the addition of a steerable nozzle, creating vectored thrust. However, it can be less efficient than propellers at low speeds. Other notable features include an X-rudder like the Japanese Soryu boats where the four blades can twist and turn in different permutations and provides superior maneuverability especially in shallow waters, retractable hydroplanes which reduces drag and noise, non-hull penetrating optronic masts and special hull hatches for easy upgrading in the future.

Its combat system and weapon systems will be American, as the Aussies value interoperability with their closest ally the United States. So we can expect an improved version of the AN/BYG-1 combat system, Mk48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System ( CBASS ) heavy torpedoes jointly developed by the US and Australia, UGM-84 submarine launched harpoon missiles, UGM-109E Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, Mk60 CAPTOR mines, Mk67 submarine launched mobile mines and such. Swimmer delivery hatches, unmanned underwater vehicles ( UUV ) will probably be part of the package as well.

At A$50 billion, it is Australia's single biggest defence procurement to date, though this spending will be spread out over the next thirty years or so. At least two thirds of this money will be allocated for future upgrades, sustainment, operations and in-service support of the submarines which means the initial builds would cost A$20 billion or less.

Here's a video of the Shortfin Barracuda from DCNS.






The Shortfin Barracuda : Australia's Future Submarine. Image : DCNS

The Shortfin Barracuda with tiny hydroplanes extended. Image : DCNS

X-rudders and pump-jet propulsion. Image : DCNS

The original SMX-Ocean SSK and the Barracuda SSN side by side. Image DCNS

Why The French Won

The Swedes were eliminated early in the race, due largely to the fact that they had not built a single submarine independently for the past two decades, and perhaps also because they were the designers of Collins-class submarines which were giving the RAN so much trouble.

Of the three that made it to the competitive evaluation process phase, the Germans were dropped for concerns that they had not built anything more than 2000 tons so far, even though they were the most prolific boat builders, supplying more than 160 modern SSKs to navies worldwide.

The Japanese Soryu-class submarine was not chosen purportedly because it lacked the range that the Aussies desired. The berthing compartment is also too small for the Australian sailor who typically have a taller stature compared with their Japanese counterparts, this even after a 6 to 8m hull lengthening modification.

The French design, on the other hand is not only super stealthy but also technologically the most advanced, and most importantly has the range equal to or exceeding those of the existing Collins-class boats. DCNS had also the expertise in building submarines up to 14000 tons in the form of nuclear ballistic missile submarines ( SSBN ) or boomers, like the four Triomphant-class boats currently in service with the French Navy.

 

You can see for yourself why the Shortfin Barracuda could have been so appealing to the Aussies through the above video made by DCNS on the operational capabilities of the SMX-Ocean some months ago.

Constructing the Shortfin Barracuda

All the construction of the Shortfin Barracuda submarines will be done in Australian naval shipbuilder ASC's Adelaide shipyard with the help of DCNS. The project can generate 2900 jobs locally and will no doubt be a great boost to the South Australian economy for many years to come. Because submarines are among the most complicated machines that humans have ever designed, the task ahead for ASC is huge and they know it, describing the construction of the Collins-class SSK as an unprecedented feat of engineering, design and logistics in Australia. Work had to be co-ordinated with 150 major contractors and hundreds of smaller suppliers and many modules were constructed off-site and then shipped to Australia for integration at ASC. Some 33000 drawings and 5000 work orders had to be issued before work could even begin and each submarine required 250000 man-hours over 60 months to assemble. The Shortfin Barracuda is light-years ahead of the Collins in terms of complexity and the question now is whether ASC is up to the job. DCNS Australia describes the task as mammoth and at least twice as big as the Collins project.

For A$50 billion, France has promised the Australians full transfer of stealth technology utilized in their SSN and SSBN submarines, the crown jewels of their submarine designs that they have never shared with anybody else before. Even though the submarines are to be constructed in Australia, another 4000 jobs will be created in France itself in support of the Shortfin Barracuda project.

Looking ahead, contract signing will probably take place in 2017, construction will start between 2022 to 2024 and the first submarine will probably launched in 2028 and be commissioned by 2030. The Shortfin Barracuda is expected to remain cutting edge in terms of operational capabilities until 2060 and will probably in active service until 2070. If the Collins boats were to be retired starting from 2025 as planned, there will be a capability gap which the RAN has to address. The most likely solution will be to have some sort of life extension program to postpone the decommissioning of the Collins-class, but then again, I'm not sure if that's tantamount to flogging a dead horse.

The Shortfin Barracuda firing a presumably Mk48 Mod 7 CBASS torpedo. Image : DCNS

Winners and Losers

Apart from France, South Australian politicians and the naval shipbuilding industry of Australia are big winners as they successfully canvassed for the submarines to be completely constructed in Australia, never mind the competency of the local work force or the available infrastructure. The construction and more importantly the sustainment of the submarine fleet meant that a constant flow of jobs and money into South Australia will be almost a guarantee for the next fifty years.

The Royal Australian Navy could be big winners with the chance of a lifetime to once and for all rectify all the misgivings of the Collins and acquire an underwater capability way beyond their current level and maintain it that way for decades to come, but only if the submarine construction goes smoothly. Chances of that happening is almost close to zero, if historical events could be used as a gauge. Not only had ASC bungled the Collins construction and their subsequent upgrading and sustainment, they have, as part of a consortium, continued to mess up the until now the most expensive defence procurement - the A$8 billion SEA4000 Air Warfare Destroyer project. The Hobart-class AWD are 3 years late with an estimated A$1.2 billion in cost overruns. Its going to be difficult even just to be cautiously optimistic.

Japan was the early favorite in the race for SEA1000, with Shinzo Abe and Tony Abbott being good pals and the inking of a contact for joint development of submarine technology in 2014. Even the Americans also favoured the Japanese since they too have a direct stake in this mega-project as the provider and integrator of the combat and weapons system and would have to work with whoever the Australian chose. An American-Australian-Japanese alliance would also be a good thing to check Chinese ambition in the South China Sea. However, lack of experience with international arms deals and the subsequent ousting of Tony Abbott as prime minister probably doomed the Japanese effort. Japan did not agree to support full construction of the submarines in Australia until very late in the game, after France and Germany had indicated their willingness to do so. Their team of negotiators sent to Australia was said to be comprising of a mix of business executives and Ministry of Defence bureaucrats who had never worked with each other before. Of course the oriental way of business conduct, where a handshake alone would seal a deal, where trust and honour is valued above all else, might be perceived very differently in western cultures.

It is not surprising that Japan was rather peeved to learn that the deal had gone to their competitor when they had invested so much time and effort and that just slightly more than a year ago, they were the front runners. Turnbull will have a great time trying to pacify them and manage the fallout. While the two countries pledged to continue their co-operation in defence research the relationship will never be the same. Hopefully Japan will learn from this experience and turn failure into success in future deals.

Best Submarine at the Best Price?

That was what Tony Abbott promised the Australians but that's not what they are going to get. The entire project had been hijacked by the politicians who have their own agendas to field and don't give a damn what happens a decade or two in the future when they will probably no longer hold office. Building the submarines in Australia is widely reported to carry with it a 30% to 40% premium as opposed to constructing them in their country of origin. The risk of delays and cost overruns is extremely likely given the size and complexity of the project as well as the quality of the local work force. Even if the French design had been chosen on merits of technological advancement, the Aussies could have at least let the French handle the construction in France. What's the use of the best submarine in the world if it can't be put to sea half the time and the other half of the time is spent combating defects?

A procuring a submarine fleet is a long term investment, a strategic partnership that will bind the two countries, in this case France and Australia, for the next 50 years. Good or bad the Aussies would have been stuck with the deal for the next half a century. These submarines are not disposable if anything goes wrong since they are highly customized for Australia's needs and probably nobody else can afford them anyway. The Australian Navy will really have to keep its fingers crossed. As the quest for better submarines continues, we can only wish the RAN Bon Voyage!





Go Win Something, Anything : Malaysia's Second Generation Patrol Vessels

Second Time Lucky?

In the 1990s, Malaysia perceived the need to replace its ageing Vosper 103ft Type patrol crafts ( PC ), tiny boats with a length of 31m displacing just 96 tons that had been in service since the 1960s. Known as the New Generation Patrol Vessel ( NGPV ) Project, the initial specifications called for a Offshore Patrol Vessel ( OPV ) design which displaced 1300 tons with a length of 80m. However, the winning bid, based on the Blohm + Voss MEKO 100 design, ended up displacing 1850 tons with a length of 91m, a size resembling a corvette rather than an OPV. The NGPV project was plagued by delays caused by quality control issues and cost overruns, and when it was finally concluded in 2010, yielded only six ships of the guns only KD Kedah-class out of the originally intended twenty seven. Given that situation, one may logically presume that the Royal Malaysian Navy ( RMN ) would be fairly desperate in need for new surface combatants to boost the strength of its Fleet.

Indeed in early 2011, Malaysia initiated the Second Generation Patrol Vessel ( SGPV ) Project which aims to provide the RMN with six stealth frigates by the end of the decade, a timely procurement, since by then, not counting the NGPVs, even the newest Lekiu-class frigate would have been in service for more than twenty years. Further more, with the increasingly belligerent stance of China in the South China Sea, many of the surrounding littoral states are locked in an urgent arms race to boost their naval capabilities. Malaysia cannot really afford another fiasco like the NGPV project, or can they?

The SGPV is based on the Gowind 2500 stealth ship. Image : DCNS



CGI : Gowind 2500 with hangar and helicopter in view. Image : DCNS

Second Generation Patrol Vessel - Littoral Combat Ship

Malaysia's next generation frigate programme is known as the Second Generation Patrol Vessel - Littoral Combat Ship ( SGPV-LCS ) Project. The name is somewhat misleading as the ships involved are essentially multi-mission frigates, major ocean-going surface combatants, rather than patrol vessels which generally implies a much smaller and lightly armed warship for close shore duties. The inclusion of the words Littoral Combat Ship may also cause unnecessary confusion with the US Navy's pre-existing Freedom-class and Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships.

The project was announced in early 2011 and originally involved six frigate type warships with stealth features displacing about 2700 tons. The budget for this project was MYR6billion, then worth about US$1.9billion. There were several contenders, including Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine System with their subsidiary Blohm+Voss' MEKO 200 design, Dutch Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding with its Sigma-class 10514 and the French DCNS with the Gowind-class. TKMS being the parent company of Blohm+Voss was of course no stranger to Malaysia as it was closely involved with the NGPV project and was also the supplier of the older Kasturi-class light frigates while Damen had recently been successful in selling Indonesia its scalable Sigma 9113 corvettes and Sigma 10514 frigates. DCNS on the other hand supplied Singapore with its La Fayette-class derived Formidable-class stealth frigates and sold Malaysia their Scorpenes and Agosta-B submarines.

By end 2011, it emerged that the French Gowind based design had been chosen and a contract worth MYR9billion ( then USD2.8billion ) had been awarded to Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd which will team up with DCNS to build the vessels locally at their Lumut yard. Boustead Naval Shipyard is one of many companies under the umbrella of Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation Berhad which is itself part of a bigger, publicly listed, government linked industrial conglomerate known as Boustead Holdings Berhad. So just what is a Gowind-class vessel?

DCNS's Gowind Family

The Gowind is DCNS's solution to littoral warfare. It is not a single vessel but a collection of warships types that spans several classes from entry level OPV types to higher end corvettes and light frigates. Just like the MEKOs and Sigmas, the Gowind's modular design makes it highly scalable. The vessels are all shaped to have a reduced radar cross-section signature and have additional stealth features as an integral part of their design, such as a single integrated mast where all the sensors are mounted. That replaced several sensor masts in older designs which tends to contribute to unnecessary clutter and increased reflection of radar waves. The main guns can be encased in stealth cupolas. The propulsion system is that of combined diesel and diesel ( CODAD ) configuration with no funnel stack to emit infra-red radiation. Instead the engine exhaust is dissipated as waterjets which also served to enhance the maneuverability of the ships especially in shallow waters.




Smoke and fumes from a VL Mica launch obscures the 16 cell vertical launch system
 behind the main gun while chaff has been dispensed aft of the Gowind 2500.
Image : DCNS 

The Gowind 1000 launches an anti-ship missile.
Note the array of 8 vertical launch cells on a raised portion behind the main gun.
Image : DCNS

The Gowind OPV now known as the OPV90 by Kership
serving in the French Navy as the L'Adroit. Image : Kership

The FS L'Adroit of the Marine Nationale at the Singapore Navy Open House in 2013.
Photo via Wikicommons.

Although DCNS's website list only two Gowind variants, the Gowind 1000, a 1500 ton lightly armed version for less demanding missions and the much bigger Gowind 2500, a 2500 ton multi-mission corvette type with significant anti-submarine capabilities, there are more variants including an OPV type now renamed the OPV90 that had been reassigned to Kership, a DCNS subsidiary. In fact DCNS even built one, the OPV L'Adroit, and loaned it to the French Navy for evaluations for a period of three years, seemingly free of charge. You can watch DCNS' video on the L'Adroit here.

All Gowind variants come complete with a helideck for helicopter and UAV operations while the larger vessels also feature a helicopter hangar. In DCNS's original configuration, the Gowind corvettes are armed with a 76mm main gun, two 20mm cannons, vertical launched MICA surface to air missiles and MM-40 Block 3 Exocet anti-ship missiles. In addition, the Gowind 2500 has two triple torpedo launchers as part of its ASW arsenal, though they are listed as only an option in the Gowind 1000.

The Gowind vessels are capable of operating unmanned systems, including unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAV ), unmanned underwater vehicles ( UUV ) and unmanned surface vehicles ( USV ).

Gowind 2500 Specifications and Characteristics. Source : DCNS

As of today, DCNS had already secured orders for 10 Gowind ships. Malaysia's 6 vessel contract was the first commercial success ( paid order ) for the type while the Egyptian Navy became the second customer with 4 vessels on order. All were presumably variants based on the design of the larger and more capable Gowind 2500 ( Malaysia ) or the Gowind 2500 base model itself ( Egypt ).





Malaysia's Gowind SGPV-LCS

Malaysia's finalized SGPV design is a frigate sized derivative of the Gowind 2500 corvette displacing 3100 tons, an increase from the initial proposed displacement of 2700 tons. With that there has also been a 50% increase in the acquisition cost from MYR6billion to MYR9billion. The price includes intellectual property rights and technology transfer, which could mean Malaysia owns the rights to the modified Gowind design and might be able to export it to interested third parties in the future. That is of course provided Boustead Naval Shipyard is able to build them according to specifications in the first place.




Malaysia's Gowind-class Second Generation Patrol Vessel- Littoral Combat Ship. Source : Boustead Naval Shipyard

These are some of the known specifications including sensors and armaments for the Gowind SGPV :

Length                     : 111 meters

Breath                      : 16 meters

Draught                   : 3.85 meters

Displacement          : 3100 tons

Propulsion               : Combined Diesel and Diesel ( CODAD )

Engine                     : 4 x MTU Diesel

Maximum Speed     : 28 knots

Range                      : 5000 nautical miles at 15 knots

Endurance               : 21 days

Complement           :  Up to 138

Combat System      : DCNS SETIS

Search Radar          : Thales Nederland SMART-S Mk 2 3D Multi-beam Radar

Fire Control Radar : Rheinmetall TMX/EO Mk II Fire Control Radar
                                 Rheinmetall TMEO Mk II Electro-Optical Tracking System

ESM                       : Thales VIGILE 100 Electronic Support Measures System
                                
Sonar                      : Thales CAPTAS-2 Variable Depth Sonar
                                  Hull Mounted Sonar ? Thales Bluewatcher

Communications    : Thales TUUM-6 underwater communications equipment
                                  Thales TSB 3520 ATC / IFF Combined Interrogator Transponder

Decoy                     : Wallop/Esterline Super Barricade Decoy System

Main Gun               : 1 x BAE Systems 57mm Mk3 Naval Gun in Stealth Cupola

Cannons                 : 2 x MSI Seahawk 30mm cannons

SAM                      : MBDA VL Mica in 16 Sylver ?A35 launchers

SSM                       : 2 x 4 Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile

Torpedo                 : 2 x J+S ( Now SEA ) 324mm Triple Torpedo Launcher

Helicopter              : EC725 Caracal / AugustaWestland Super Lynx 300 / Eurocopter AS350 Fennac

 

Constructing the SGPV

Unlike Egypt's 4 corvette deal with DCNS where the first-in-class would be constructed in France and the remaining three in Alexandria, Egypt, the Malaysians elected to have the entire batch of six frigates constructed locally at their Boustead Naval Shipbuilding ( BNS ) shipyard at Lumut, Perak. This was a bold decision, given that at that point of time the Lumut facilities were not quite built for the task of constructing the stealth frigates. A major upgrade had to be carried out with the help of DCNS before construction of the vessels could begin.

It was subsequently revealed that although the USD2.8billion contract was awarded to BNS / DCNS in 2011, it only went into effect on 14th July 2014, after the completion of  a massive infrastructure upgrade at the Lumut shipyard - ship lifts, block assembly halls, panel assembly halls and keel laying lines. The Malaysians even planned to have three ships in parallel construction at the yard. The Gowind contracts with Malaysia and Egypt was only confirmed by DCNS later that year.

Aerial view of the Boustead Naval Shipbuilding Lumut Shipyard at the mouth of
Sungai Manjung. Source : Boustead

BNS Lumut yard now seems to have upgraded shiplifts. Source : Boustead Naval Shipbuilding

Another view of BNS Lumut. Source : Boustead Naval Shipbuilding

Not only will the ships be constructed in Malaysia, even the combat system will be assembled and tested at the not too distant Cyberjaya town, part of the ex-ex-Prime Minister Mahathir's grandiose Multimedia Corridor and Malaysia's Silicon Valley wannabe. Potential systems suppliers and integrators are in a way forced to perform as much work on the ships as possible locally in Malaysia. In fact any foreign company who wish to participant in the SGPV project will probably have to agree to set up some joint venture with well connected locals or local companies, a regional headquarters here, a training facility there, some maintenance and servicing company to cater for subsequent repairs and upgrades, and so on and so forth. You get the idea.

To cite specific examples, J+S Ltd, a British company selected to supply the torpedo launch system for the SGPV, had opened an office in the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur to serve the ASEAN region. They also announced that they would be sourcing some products and services locally. Thales, the supplier of the Smart-Ass Mk2 naval surveillance radars will be building the first two systems in the Netherlands but the remaining four would be assembled and tested in Malaysia by a local company Contraves Advanced Devices Sdn Bhd which itself is jointly owned by who else but Boustead Heavy Industries Corporation and Rheinmetall Defence.

All these came as no surprise since Malaysia is a nation obsessed with offsets, technology transfers and industrial joint ventures, even to the extend of dabbling with bartering every once in a blue moon. For example, the €1.035billion scorpene submarine deal with DCN in 2002 obligated France to in return buy €230million worth of Malaysian palm oil, €92million of other commodities and invest  €138million for training and technology transfers to local Malaysian firms. There was allegedly also a spin off deal to increase the landing rights for Malaysia Airlines at the Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris. Then there was the Sukhoi Su-30MKM deal that came with the condition that Russia help train and send a Malaysian astronaut to the International Space Station, which they eventually did as promised, and that happened in 2007. Even earlier, Yeltsin was partially paid in Malaysian palm oil for the MiG-29 deal ....

Construction of the yet to be named lead vessel started in Jun 2015 and would be completed in early 2019. The subsequent five ships would be completed at ten months interval thereafter, which means the last ship would be completed sometime in 2023. The image from Boustead Naval Yard seem to suggest the lead ship will be having the pennant number F177, continuing serially after the six Kedah-class NGPV which have pennant numbers from F171 to F176.

Keel laying signals the official start of the ship construction.
This is probably hull number 2. Image via RMN Tweet.

Strengths and Weaknesses

Malaysia's Gowind-class frigates are great warships with many advanced features and capabilities. Being brand new they also include the latest design trends and incorporate the latest technology in maritime security and naval warfare. At 3100 tons fully loaded, these are fairly large in size and that translates to better sea keeping, higher endurance and a higher level of comfort for the serving ship crew. As a class they should be able to execute their mission of protecting Malaysia's vast maritime interests well and form a credible deterrence against any potential aggression by regional countries. Unfortunately there are certain omissions that could have an adverse impact on the ship's combat capabilities. 

A main gun with a bigger caliber, like the 76mm ( 3 inch ) Oto Melara Super Rapid would be a better choice. Bigger guns have longer reach and make for better shore bombardment should that requirement ever arise, like when some rag tag militia force from some self proclaimed Philippine sultanate come occupying your outlaying islands. Even RMN's newest Kedah-class corvettes are armed with 76mm main guns. Stealth cupola or not 57mm just seem too small for a full fledged frigate. They are more suited for smaller surface combatants like corvettes and FAC.

The BAE Systems / Bofors 57mm Mk3 in stealth cupola on the Swedish Visby-class corvette. Photo : Wikipaedia

A pair of MSI Defence Systems Seahawk remotely controlled 30mm cannons on a gyro-stabilized, electrically operated mount with an electro-optical director is great for force protection against asymmetric threats like hordes of fast boats but it cannot double as a close-in weapon system ( CIWS ) for last line of defence against sea skimming anti-ship missiles and precision guided munitions ( PGM ). Without a dedicated gun-based CIWS, the SGPV in effect relies on the VL-MICA as a missile-based CIWS. No doubt the VL MICA does have anti-missile capabilities, but would you put all your eggs in one basket?


The choice of short ranged VL Mica for the frigates' air defence is also not ideal. Although the VL Mica is an extremely capable and proven design which combines compactness and light weight with a short reaction time, high rate of fire and multi-target capabilities ( including missiles and PGM ), its Achilles Heel is really its relatively short range of up to 20km. Its maneuverability rapidly falls from 50G at 7km to 30G at 12km as kinetic energy is bled off with increasing distance from the point of launch. It is good for point defence but would not be so suitable for area defence. So the VL Mica might be perfect for a smaller vessel like the NGPV but I would expect a frigate to be able to provide task force-wide area defence. Assuming that the Gowind frigate has the shortest Sylver A35 chosen, having a longer vertical launch system ( VLS ) like the A43 or A50 which can accommodate longer ranged surface-to-air missiles like the MBDA Aster 15 or Aster 30 respectively would have been a better choice.


Ditching the MM40 Block III Exocet in favour of the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile ( NSM ) could prove to be a good move. Both have anti-ship, littoral and coastal attack capabilities, both have effective range in excess of 100 nautical miles but the NSM is a much more contemporary design whereas the Exocet could trace its lineage to the 1970s. It is true that compared to even the MM40 Block II, the Block III is like a radically new missile, but the RMN already has in its service the SM39 and the MM40 Block II. So it might not be a bad idea to diversify the SSM inventory with the NSM so as not to be to overly reliant on one supplier. The NSM would give the RMN's surface fleet enhanced land attack capabilities in addition to its anti-ship role.

A model of the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile on display. Photo : Wikipaedia

The Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile successfully being test fired on the
USN Littoral Combat Ship LCS4 USS Coronado in July 2014. Photo : USN 

The selected surveillance radar, the Thales SMART-S Mk2, is a capable radar system that has already been installed on corvettes and frigates of many navies, including Germany's Brandenburg-class frigates and as a future upgrade for New Zealand's ANZAC-class frigate. The acronym stands for Signaal Multibeam Acquisition Radar for Tracking, S-Band. It is a medium to long range air and surface multibeam passive electronically scanned array ( PESA ) 3D radar designed by Thales Nederland ( formally Thomson-CSF Signaal ) and as the name implies, operates in the S-Band ( with frequencies between 2 - 4 GHz, also known as E/F-Band in NATO nomenclature ). Its maximum instrumented range is 250km against air targets and 80km against surface targets. It can automatically detect and track up to a total of 750 air and surface targets simultaneously. Easy to use with only two operational mode and minimal operation system settings, the SMART-S Mk2 also features high operational availability through the use of solid state technology and ease of maintenance with line-replaceable-units that are easy to exchange when defective.


The Thales CAPTAS-2 / UMS 4229 long range low frequency active and passive variable depth sonar ( VDS ) is a compact and versatile detection system for medium ASW platforms 1500 tons and above. CAPTAS is the acronym for Combined Active and Passive Towed Array Sonar and it comes in three versions for vessels of different sizes, CAPTAS-1, -2 and -4. A VDS essentially enables the ASW unit to transmit and receive at the right depth to maximise the detection of very quiet modern diesel-electric submarines such as the Russian Kilo-class or Chinese Type 39A Yuen-class SSK. The CAPTAS-2 is rugged, operational up to sea state 6, and has a maximum operational depth of 250m. The detection performance is listed by Thales as beyond the first oceanic convergence zone which means in excess of 20 to 30 nautical miles. It has embedded torpedo defence capability and multi-platform operation capability with two frigates in the same area. In times of emergency, such as torpedo avoidance, the towed array can withstand towing at 30 knots. Deployment and retrieving of the towed array can be completed in 20 minutes. The CAPTAS family of VDS has already ben installed or selected for more than 40 ships including the FREMM frigates of the French, Italian and Moroccan Navies. You can watch a video of the smaller CAPTAS-1 and BlueWatcher hull-mounted sonar in action here.





Hull-mounted sonar fails to detect enemy submarine hiding beneath
thermal layer but the variable depth sonar's dual-towed
receiver array and transmitting body are deployed at the optimal depth.
Source : Advanced Acoustic Concepts / DRS Thales

The Thales CAPTAS-2 towed body. Image : Thales

The CAPTAS-1 with its winch can be installed in a containerized system
below the helideck. Image : Thales



The transmitting Towed Body attached to the winch cable. Image : Thales

CAPTAS-1 VDS Single Tow : The Body ( seen transmitting ) tows the Receive Array. Image : Thales 

The electronic support measures ( ESM ) suite chosen was the Thales Vigile 100 system. The vigile family is Thales' 4th generation ESM system tailored for naval applications for both surface and sub-surface units. According to the manufacturer, it provides wide band ( C to J Bands ), high sensitivity receptions and pulse analysis with the ability to detect low probability of intercept (LPI) or invisible hostile radars using ultra sensitive search mode. It also supports electronic intelligence (ELINT), precise de-interleaving, and specific emitter identification/platform identification using ESM tasked mode measuring signals frequency, phase and amplitude.

Although the Gowind-class incorporates the latest technology and is purpose-designed to be able to operate unmanned systems, Malaysia seem to have decided not to equip its new frigates with any unmanned aerial vehicles as originally planned, like the VTOL Airbus Tanan. This is puzzling as UAVs can be valuable assets to augment existing capabilities and are a force multiplier for any platform, big or small. Then again, nothing that Malaysia does make much sense to us most of the time. This omission may cost the RMN in the future.

.

The Airbus Tanan VTOL UAS with Gowind 2500. Image : Thales

Airbus Tanan UAS and frigate with variable depth sonar. Image : Airbus

Trail Blazing with the Gowind Stealth Frigate

Malaysia's decision to go with the wind and select the Gowind 2500-class as a basis for its SGPV-LCS future frigate programme could be viewed as a bold trail blazing move. This is because they are the type's first real, paying customer, internationally or otherwise. Even the French Navy does not own any. The OPV FS L'Adroit is not counted as it is on loan to the navy for evaluation and perhaps publicity, and it was for free. So actually till today nobody has built a frigate sized Gowind before. New platforms usually have their fair share of teething problems and the SGPV will no doubt face similar issues. More so if it were to be constructed outside France. The decision to construct everything in Malaysia could represent a good opportunity for local companies to benefit from technology transfers and generate much needed jobs for Malaysian workers. If not implemented properly, it might just lead to the same delays and cost overruns that plague the previous NGPV project. However, with an experienced stealth ship builder like DCNS providing technical expertise and support, such problems might hopefully be minimized.

Questions remain as to why the cost of the six ships was allowed to balloon from the initial budgeted  MYR6billion to MYR9billion. It is puzzling especially considering that the ships' combat systems, though capable, are not all entirely top of the line and many of the systems initially desired by the RMN were eventually scaled down or opted out, like the UAV. Also, why has the tonnage to increase from the originally planned 2700 tons to the finalized 3100 tons? Either RMN doesn't know what it needs or its decision is too easily swayed by the vendor's marketing antics, or both. Could the mere increase in tonnage account for such a vast price rise or is Malaysia also paying so much more because it wanted to retain the intellectual property rights to the frigate's designs? If so is it a wise decision given the current poor economical and political situation in Malaysia? The final bill for the six ships will likely be much higher than MYR9billion due to currency exchange fluctuations in favour of the Euro / US Dollar as the Ringgit had weaken considerably in the past five years since the project had began and it is unlikely to strengthen in the near future. In this scandal prone country, could it be another bribery scam in the making, perhaps even with another murder or two thrown in as well?

Looking at the dilapidated state of the RMN today, with only six semi-equipped OPVs, two barely there post-SLEP corvettes and two ageing frigates forming the core of the surface combatants, the induction of these Gowind frigates into the Fleet will undoubtedly be keenly anticipated by the Malaysians. When that day arrives, the Malaysian Navy can at least claim parity with regional navies like the Indonesian Navy and the Singapore Navy and declare that they also own and operate stealth vessels, in the process Winning back some lost prestige.

Who Doesn't Want A$20Billion?

Background

This is an update to my article " Japan's Soryu Class : Collins Replacement Prime Contender ". A quick recap : Australia has a fleet of 6 Collins Class conventional diesel-electric guided missile submarines that needs to be replaced starting from the year 2025. These boats were designed by the Swedish ship builder Kockums AB and built in Australia by a newly formed joint venture the Australian Submarine Corporation. The entire Collins project was riddled with delays and huge cost overruns. Even to this day the submarines still suffer from multiple defects and have serious availability issues.




Digital Image of what Australia's future submarine might look like, as seen on ship builder ASC Pty Ltd's website.



The Royal Australian Navy is looking to replace them with 10 to 12 new submarines by the year 2030 to 2040, at an initially estimated cost of between A$36 to A$44 billion. The ruling Liberal Party came to power promising domestic construction of these future submarines but until recently looks likely to break that promise by buying direct from Japan. That development had prompted German, Swedish and French boat builders to come up with their own unsolicited offers, initiating a submarine bidding war down under, making the Soryu deal less of a certainty.

What's At Stake for Australia

The future of Australia's shipbuilding industry is at stake, as Australia might lose her capability to construct submarines and warships should the contract go to a foreign shipyard there by forcing ship builder ASC to retrench skilled labour or worse, go into receivership. It would be difficult and time consuming to rebuild a new team of professional workers once the existing ones have found work elsewhere.

Jobs could be at stake, as domestic construction at ASC's Adelaide facility could generate and support 3 to 4 thousand jobs.

At least A$20 billion or more is at stake for the winner. This is by far the single most costly defense related procurement by Australia, ever. Even the follow on order of 58 F-35A Joint Strike Fighter announced in April 2014 would "only" cost A$11.5 billion. The Australian Dollar has depreciated significantly in the past 2 or 3 years but is still worth USD0.77 as of today.

Prime Minister Tony Abbott's reputation could be at stake if he reneges on pre-election promises to have the submarines built in Australia, though adept politicians always have ways to wriggle themselves out of such situations.

Gimme Twenty Billion

AUD$20 billion is the magic figure quoted by all the potential submarine makers. Of course everybody wants A$20 billion, who doesn't? SAAB Kockums of Sweden, TKMS of Germany and DCNS of France have all come up with proposals and have indicated their willingness to work with Australia's ASC, giving Japan Inc. a run for their money.

 

SAAB Kockums : The Come Back Kid

Kockums AB of Malmo, Sweden was the original designer of the Collins Class submarines and the Stirling air-independent propulsion engine used in the Soryu Class boats. It was acquired by its German rival Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) in 1999. Then HDW was itself bought by the German conglomerate Thyssen Krupp in 2005 and they all became a big dysfunctional family known as ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems ( TKMS ).

While all these mergers and acquisitions was happening, Kockums was working on the next generation submarine for the Swedish Navy with several innovative and advanced features, the A-26 Class with air-independent propulsion. However, the development of the A-26 was derailed by TKMS due to long standing conflict of interests. The Swedes believed that they have a great design on hand and wanted it developed not just for the Royal Swedish Navy but for worldwide export as well. The German masters of Kockums on the other hand are worried about cost escalation on a risky new project and cannot come into agreement with the Swedish Defense Ministry on how such additional costs should be managed between the two parties. Although 2 boats have been approved the Swedish by Parliament in 2010 for completion by 2020, long drawn contract negotiations between the Defense Ministry and TKMS came to nothing before failing completely in Apr 2014. Without any contracts to build Sweden's ( or anybody's ) next generation submarines, Kockums looked likely to have to lay off marine architects, engineers and technicians. And as Kockums go under,  the Swedish Kingdom looked set to lose its sovereign capability of building submarines and warships.



Kockums A-26. Source : SAAB

Added to this mess is the uncertainty as to who actually owns the intellectual property rights to the Collins design, is it Kockums / TKMS or is it the Swedish State ( through the Swedish Defense Materiels Administration or FMV ). This has resulted in Kockums being overlooked by Australia in its initial search for suitable supplier for the Collins replacement project.

The loss of the deal to supply the Republic of Singapore Navy with 2 new submarines in late 2013 and the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula earlier last year was a rude wake-up call to the Swedes who realized that they had do something fast to reclaim their ship building industry and to safeguard the defense of their Kingdom.

Negotiations to buy Kockums back began between the Swedish defense conglomerate SAAB and TKMS. Things did not move until Sweden seemingly deployed strong arm tactics, including the FMV's raiding of the Kockums / TKMS office with armed military personnel to forcefully remove highly sensitive materials pertaining to the A-26 and Stirling air-independent propulsion engine designs, taking back what rightfully belonged to the Swedish State. SAAB also embarked on a widely publicised exercise that poached the entire technical management team at Kockums including the manager for the submarine division and more than 200 of Kockums' existing pool of engineers, effectively removing its core workforce. Facing such hostile acts, it is not surprising that TKMS threw in the towel shortly after and agreed to sell Kockums to SAAB.

SAAB has since completed the acquisition of Kockums on 2nd Jul 2014 and the new entity is called SAAB Kockums. This paved the way for the stalled and severely delayed A-26 project to move forward and for SAAB to offer a 4000 tonne version to Australia as the Collins replacement submarine. In the words of the CEO Håkan Bushke " ... the Swedish Kingdom now controls the intellectual property for Australia's currently-serving Collins class submarines. If there is an open competition, SAAB Kockums will be in it."

SAAB Kockums in its last minute declaration of interest on the Collins replacement project has also offered to take Australia's shipbuilder ASC and Royal Australian Navy engineers and technicians to work on the Swedish Navy's 3000 tonne A-26 of which five were to be built, with the first boat due to be operational by the year 2023. CEO Bushke said that SAAB's solution will be affordable and will be able to match the $20 billion price tag of its Japanese and German rivals.

Kockum's resurrection from a moribund subsidiary of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to becoming part of the Swedish defense giant SAAB within the span of a few months is nothing short of spectacular. It would be even more incredible if they could win this submarine bidding war and become the supplier of Australia's future submarines. Being a completely new design, the A-26 offer carried with it unknown risks of cost escalation and timeline slippages. Add to that volatile mix the uncertainty of ASC's competency as a ship builder and the RAN could end up in a very dangerous situation, third time in a row.

ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems : The Old Favourite



TKMS Logo. Source : Wikipedia

TKMS was until Jul 2014 the parent company of Kockums. It used to be the front runner for an evolved-Collins submarine that will see TKMS build on the strengths of the existing Collins Class and rectify known short comings and defects, since the Collins boats were designed with the help of Kockums in the first place.

The main stumbling block for the evolved Collins Class was that the ownership of the intellectual property rights for the Collins submarine as well as the Stirling AIP engine that will be installed in the future submarines, was in dispute as the spat between the Swedish government and TKMS escalated. Australia understandably have no wish to be caught in the crossfires of a patent ownership war and have ultimately looked towards Japan which has a fleet of the world's most advanced non-nuclear submarines, incidentally also using Kockums / TKMS's Stirling air-independent propulsion system.




TKMS Operational Headquarters, Essen, Germany. Wikipedia.

Another deep seated issue was that TKMS has been constantly stifling Kockums all these years after the merger, intending for kockums only to produce small submarines while its German subsidiary HDW will get to build the big submarines for export. It probably was never quite keen for an evolved Collins boat, preferring rather to have a German solution for the Australians. In fact TKMS already had a Collins replacement concept in existence for sometime. It is the HDW Type 216 diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion. Its design is based on the smaller Type 212A and Type 214 submarines current in service with the German and Italian navies, using HDW's proprietary fuel cell AIP system.




HDW's Fuel Cell Air-Independent Propulsion System. Source : TKMS

Now that Kockums had been sold to SAAB, TKMS can no longer be involved in any evolved Collins design. Nonetheless TKMS has still indicated that it can help Australia build her fleet of 10 to 12 next generation submarines domestically and within the budget of A$20 billion, presumably with the HDW Type 216 design.




HDW Type-216 SSK. Source TKMS

The Type 216 looks good on paper, but is again a yet to be built design and with so much uncertainties, nobody, not even TKMS can guarantee that the entire project could be on time and on budget, especially in the hands of an inept shipbuilder like ASC.

DCNS : Non-nuclear SSN?!

The latest to join the fray is the French ship builder DCNS with its SMX-Ocean diesel-electric submarine with air-independent propulsion. First revealed at the Euronaval 2014 exhibition in Paris in October, it is essentially a non-nuclear version of the Barracuda class SSN which DCNS is building for the French Navy. Although DCNS did not officially state that the SMX-Ocean concept was specifically created for the SEA1000 Collins replacement project, we all know what its purpose is. Incidentally DCNS opened a new subsidiary in Australia on 19th Nov 2014, DCNS Australia Pty Ltd, which just shows how badly they wanted a slice of the multi-billion dollar pie.




DCNS's SMX Ocean SSK ( Top ) and Barracuda SSN ( Bottom )

The SMX-Ocean is a huge boat at 4750 tonnes and 100m long. It is powered by conventional diesel-electric power-plants and a second generation air-independent propulsion system. It can carry a load of 34 weapons including torpedoes, mines, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles and anti-air missiles. It will incorporate vertical launchers, a UUV Dock, SDV, dry dock shelter and lock-out chamber for up to 8 divers.

Its maximum diving depth is 350m. Its new generation fuel cell will enable a underwater endurance of 21 days. Maximum submerged speed is 20 knots while its usual transit speed will be 14 knots. Endurance at sea is up to 90 days with a maximum range of 18000 nautical miles ( 29000Km ) at 10 knots.

If Australia is going to buy into this mad French scheme, she might as well request the US to convert their Virginia-class SSN into SSKs, just pluck out the General Electric S9G reactor and replace it with the Stirling AIP engine and you can have the frequently craved for 100% compatibility in operations with the USN. No?

Kawasaki / Mitsubishi : Caveat Emptor?

Although the option of a modified Soryu Class built in Japan looks like the safest bet for Australia's Collins replacement project so far, skeptics have plenty of arguments against taking such an option.

First, Japan's war time past has come back to haunt her as pointed out that as recent as 70 years ago Japan and Australia were enemies at war with each other. The Japanese have even bombed Darwin in 1942, ahead of a land invasion which fortunately never materialized. And Australia had lost more than 300 ships to the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. To me that is at best a weak case against the Japanese because, well, times have changed. Australian skiers form the largest foreign groups at the Japanese ski resorts of Niseko in Hokkaido and Hakuba in Nagano every winter. Try convincing these Aussies to ski elsewhere. If one does not buy Japanese, then the Germans should also be excluded in the deal because they were part of the Axis powers with Japan and Italy during WWII!

Skeptics are also concerned if Japan will remain a staunch American ally throughout the projected life of the future submarines, and whether Japan's constitution will again be changed to prohibit arms export in the future.

Australia's opposition Labour Party has pre-emptively said that they would cancel any deal with the Japanese should they come into power after the next election.

In response to the flurry of unsolicited offers from the European boat builders, the Japanese have indicated that they too are willing to co-operate with the Australians to help the Aussies develop the special steel required for submarine construction. Assembly will still be done in Japan.

ASC Pty Ltd : Can't Be Trusted To Build A Canoe!!

ASC screwed up the entire Collins project. They then went on to mismanage the upgrade and maintenance programme of the Collins boats. Now the same story is repeating itself with the Hobart-class air warfare destroyers.

Late last year Australia's ex-Defence Minister David Johnston was censured by the Senate after saying he wouldn’t trust would-be contender for Australia’s new submarines, the government-owned ASC, to build a canoe. He later expressed regret that his remarks could have offended anyone, that he had expressed frustration over ASC's past performance in what PM Abbott had described as a rhetoric flourish. He further said that he was directing his remarks at a legacy of issues and not at the workers in ASC, whom he considered world class, eventually putting all blame on the former Labour government for mismanaging the troubled Air Warfare Destroyer programme.

Having barely survived a no-confident vote and in a move to save his own career as the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott had given in to political pressure and had promised that the procurement of the future submarines would be subjected to a "competitive evaluation process" and ASC would be allowed to bid for it. It will not be an open tender, meaning not everybody is welcome to bid, certainly not Dear Leader Kim, or Bloodymir Pootin, or Xi Jinping for that matter. So the Japanese are now not guaranteed to win the Collins replacement deal and they are extremely confused and worried at the moment about Australia's sudden change of heart.

What A$20 Billion Can Buy

Should Australia be spending A$20 billion on a dozen super-sized conventionally powered submarines with air-independent propulsion? Would she be better off buying a larger fleet of smaller submarines while at the same time constructing more submarine bases? Something like the HDW Type-218SG SSK might cost "only" 500 million Euros each. Buying fifteen of these smaller SSKs instead of the Soryu-class or similar to populate five submarine bases will probably save Australia enough money to construct the new submarine bases along the eastern, northern and western coastlines. Tony Abbott can then also sort of keep his electoral promise of local construction. You couldn't pre-fabricate submarine pens in Japan and then ship it over to Australia for assembly, or could you?

Update 26th April 2016

The Race is over. DCNS won the A$50 billion contract with its Shortfin Barracuda, aka SMX Ocean.

Can I have Two Mistrals, ... Please? Updated

 

Introduction

 




The French naval ship Tonnerre, a Mistral-class amphibious assault ship. Wikipaedia

The French build pretty good warships. Good enough for the French Navy and evidently also good enough for many other navies of the world to have contracted the French shipyards to have ships built for them. An example would be the six Formidable-class stealth frigates of the Republic of Singapore Navy, a derivative of DCNS's Lafayette-class frigate. The French shipbuilders also churn out other high-end stuff like the Barracuda-class nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines and the conventionally powered and widely exported Scorpene-class SSK.

Of course they can also build aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, like the Mistral-class BPC, for which the French Navy had already acquired three. BPC ( French  bâtiments de projection et de commandement ) means " Projection and Command Ship ", the equivalent of the LHD or Landing Helicopter Dock amphibious assault carriers of the US Navy.

In Dec 2010 under the ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy's watch, the Russians too decided that they would like to have two of these Mistrals to equip their navy and a deal was made to have them delivered by 2014 / 2015. The two Russian ships, the Vladivostok and the Sevastopol was laid down in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The Vladivostok was undergoing sea trials when the Ukraine crisis erupted and Russia decided to annex Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. That prompted French President Francois Hollande to cancel the planned delivery of the Mistrals indefinitely, even though some money had been paid, even as the Rouble became rubble....

Warped Logic

I could never understand why Russia had to buy the Mistrals from France. They had been constructing amphibious assault ships of their own designs in the past like the Project 775 Ropucha-class, Project 1171 Tapir-class large landing ship ( NATO reporting name Alligator ), the Project 1174 Ivan Rogov-class and the most recent and still in production, the Project 11711 Ivan-Gren-class large landing ships. They were also not new to constructing helicopter carriers and aircraft carriers, examples of which includes the Project 1123 Kondor Moskva-class helicopter carriers and the Admiral Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers.





A Project 775M Ropucha III class LST-077 Peresvet of Russia's Pacific Fleet during Ex. Joint Sea 2015 at Vladivostok. Photo : Sputnik



A BTR-80 armoured personnel carrier driving off the ramp of the Project 775M Ropucha III class LST-077 Peresvet of Russia's Pacific Fleet during Ex. Joint Sea 2015 at Vladivostok. Photo : Sputnik



Project 1171 Tapir Large Landing Ship ( Nato reporting name Alligator ) Source : Wikipedia



 

Project 1174 Ivan Rogov class large landing ship. Source : Yantar Shipyard

 

They have the means to design and construct satellites, space rockets and even complete space stations like the Soyuz and the Mir. They were the first to launch a satellite into earth orbit ( the Sputnik ) and the first to put a man in space ( Yuri Gargarin ) but now you tell me Mr Pootin has to beg Mr Hollande to sell him two miserable Mistrals which he could not have built himself?

In today's world of out-sourcing and off-shoring, perhaps Pootin might have thought the French could build the amphibious assault ships more efficiently, given that they had already completed three ships which are currently serving with the French Navy, but it is not like him to admit that his own country is weak or incapable. That man has an ego as big as woolly mammoth's b****.

The truth might be that following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s, the Russian shipyards had been without any military orders for years and their industrial capacity might have deteriorated to such an extend it would not be easy for them to simply produce an amphibious assault ship on short order just like that. Indeed, the Ivan-Gren had been laid down in 2004 and will only be commissioned into the Russian Navy in 2015. A long latent period is not a good sign in ship building. If Pootin urgently needed the ships to invade Ukraine or the Baltic States, he jolly well has to buy them from somewhere.

On the other hand, it might not be inconceivable that Russia really cannot build her own amphibious ships. It has recently come to light of Russia's torpedo troubles, having to halt production because of her undue past reliance on a Ukrainian company. Now if you cannot even produce the parts for torpedoes, what else are you good for?

The Mistral-class Amphibious Assault Ship

 

Aerial view of the Mistral BPC from the official brochure of DCNS, the main systems integrator

These ships don't come cheap. Poor Mr. Pootin had to cough out serious dough, something like €1.37 billion for the first two ships, with a separate option for two more subsequently, if he is satisfied with the first two. The money had been paid in advance, and it seemed that France was more in need of the deal than Russia. As it turned out, the shipyard that was constructing France's third Mistral and the two Russian Mistrals, STX-Europe of Saint-Nazaire, was in dire straits financially and badly needed the Russian contract to keep its work force employed.






The Landing Helicopter Dock Dixmude (L9015) in Jounieh bay, Lebanon May 2012. Source : Wikipedia

The Mistrals displace 21300 tonnes fully loaded, with a length of 199m and a beam of 32m. They are capable of operating any helicopter type flown by the French military, including the NH-90 medium helicopter and the AS-665 Tiger attack helicopter. The flight deck has six helicopter landing spots with the #1 landing spot rated to 33 tonnes for heavy lift helicopters and the hangar can hold 16 medium helicopters. In addition, the Mistrals can transport 450 troops and 70 vehicles, including light and medium tanks. They can carry with them four LCM type landing barges or two LCAC-type medium hovercrafts. The Mistrals can be used as helicopter carriers and amphibious assault transports, with secondary capabilities as command ships and naval hospital ships. However, unlike the American LHDs and those operated by other navies like Australia's Canberra -class LHD, the Mistrals lack a ski-jump and cannot be used for operating fixed-wing aircraft.





The well dock of the Mistral-class BPC with two landing crafts. The well dock can be flooded with sea water to allow the landing crafts to be released or retrieved. Wikipaedia 

They are also lightly armed, with only four 12.7mm heavy machine guns and Mistral surface-to-air missiles in two Simbad launchers and provisions for the installation of two Breda Mauser 30mm naval guns. As such, the Mistral BPC cannot survive in a high threat environment and would require a protective task force of frigates and submarines when deployed.



This Mistral BPC Infographic summaries its specifications and capabilities nicely. Source : Sputnik



 

The Vladivostok-class BPC

The Russian Mistrals differ sufficiently from the French Mistrals to qualify as a variant class. Potential ice hazards in the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet's areas of operation meant that they will have to reinforced the hulls with special alloy metals to protect against damage from sea ice during Artic navigation. The well deck door at the aft portion of the ship will also be modified to close completely for protection during adverse weather conditions common in the extreme northern latitudes, unlike the original design which has an opening at the top even when shut. The height of the ship was also increased to accommodate Russian helicopters that require a bigger overhead clearance due to their intrinsic co-axial / twin-rotor design. The thickness of the flight deck are increased to accommodate the heavier Russian helicopters, a mix of sixteen Ka-52K and Ka-29.
The Vladivostok-class will also be much more heavily armed than the Mistral-class and will have Russian communications equipment and radar installed.




The French Mistral-class have well deck doors that do not close completely, leaving a large gap at the top as seen here in this aft view of the Tonnerre. Wikipaedia

The Air Wing



They will be carrying the Kamov KA-52K co-axial scout / attack helicopters which are navalised versions of the KA-52 Alligator ( NATO reporting name Hokum-B ), with folding rotors and wings to enable them to fit into ship hangars. These rotary crafts pack a serious anti-armour punch and can also carry short-range air-to-air missiles. The naval variant is capable of carrying two Kh-35 anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 300km or two Kh-38 high precision air-to-surface missiles with a 40km range. A total of 32 have been ordered for the Russian Navy in Aug 2014 to equip the Vladivostok and Sevastopol and they are due for delivery between 2017 and 2018.


They will also likely carry the Kamov KA-29TB assault transport helicopters, the KA-27PL Helix in anti-submarine (ASW) and search and rescue (SAR) role and perhaps the KA-31 airborne early warning (AEW) helicopter.  





Kamov KA-52 Alligator attack helicopter. Source : Wikipedia



Kamov KA-31 Airborne Early Warning helicopter. Source : Wikipedia

The Missile Systems


The Russian BPCs will of course also have more teeth compared to their French counterparts, given the Stalinian paranoia that seems to afflict every Russian that I know of. Instead of the Mistral SAM, the Russians would install their Gibka 3M-47 Gimlet naval air defense missile system, NATO reporting name SA-N-10, a navalised version of the SA-24 ( Igla 9K338 / Igla-S ) man portable missile. The missile has an effective range of 5km. Two Gibka systems will be installed.





Gibka 3M-47 Gimlet Naval Air Defense Missile System. Source : Imgur



Having some kind of close-in weapon system (CIWS) like the American Mk15 Phalanx or the Dutch Goalkeeper for last ditch defense against shells and missiles would definitely be better than a quartet of centenarian Ma Deuce type machine guns that the Mistral totes. The Russians go a further step beyond just a gun based solution by selecting their newest Palma CIWS, a combined naval missile and gun system. The Palma is sometimes also referred to as the Palash naval air defense system. It is an all-weather, high precision ship defense system that packs two AO-18KD 6 barrel 30mm rotary autocannons combined with eight Sosna-R hypersonic missiles. According to IHS Jane's, the Sosna-R surface to air missile is a two-stage missile that carries two warheads totaling 7kg and two different fuzes. The first rod-fragmentation warhead has a proximity fuze while the second fragmentation warhead destroys its target on impact. The missile is radio-command guided during its boost phase, after which a laser beam riding guidance system takes over. The optical fire-control system makes the Sosna-R highly survivable, effective in clattered environments and difficult to jam. It has a range of up to 10km, maximum engagement altitude is 5km. The Palma's 30mm cannons which has a rate of fire of 5000 rounds per minute each ( combined 10000 rds per min ) can shred aircraft, UAVs, incoming missiles and shells, small boats etc up to 3km in altitude and up to 4km away. Two Palma naval ADS will be installed on the Vladivostok-class.





Artist rendition of the Palma Naval Air Defense System. Source : Kutejnikov 



The combat module of the Palma Naval ADS. Photo : Nudelman Precison Engineering Design Bureau



Guns


Unlike the Mistral which does not have any large calibre guns at all, the Russians will install the A-220M 57mm automatic rapid fire naval gun mount on the Vladivostok-class BPC. This could be useful against air and surface threats, anything that you would not want to waste a missile on.




The A-220M 57mm Naval Gun Mount. Photo : Burevestnik

The Radar


The Vladivostok-class will be fitted with the Positiv-ME1 3D shipbourne radar that operates in the X-Band. It can simultaneously track up to 50 targets and has a maximum detection range of 250km. The original Mistral-class lacks such powerful radars.




The Positiv-ME1 active 3D radar. Photo : Concern-agat

 

Russian Act of Piracy in Saint-Nazaire



The Vladivostok, presumably on sea trials out of Saint-Nazaire. Photo : MaritimeTraffic.com

Nothing is quite new here. Pootin cometh, Pootin see, Pootin like very much, Pootin take. Count yourself lucky if he didn't hurt or kill you in the process or afterwards.

As the Vladivostok's sea trials were being concluded in the summer of 2014, a group of 400 Russian naval personnel arrived at Saint-Nazaire on their training vessel the Smolny to train on the BPC in groups of 200. They regularly took the BPC out to sea for joy rides and sea maneuvers. As the Ukrainian crisis dragged on and the likelihood of the non-delivery of the Vladivostok became higher and higher, the Russian hooligans attempted a hostile takeover of the ship right under the noses of the somewhat unsuspecting French.

It has been reported that for a brief moment on the original official date of handover which was 14th Nov 2014, the Maritime Mobile Service Identity or MMSI of the Vladivostok was mysteriously changed without authorization, from French (227022600) to Russian (273549920), all this happening while the Russian thugs were trying to move their personal belongings from their training ship the Smolny to the Vladivostok. Then the Automatic Identification System (AIS) for ship tracking was also switched off. It didn't help when the official website of the port of Saint-Nazaire also listed a departure of the Vladivostok on 21st Nov without a return date, unlike the usual sea trial trips around the port.

So the Vladivostok became Russian flagged and the Russians almost got away and underway to St. Petersburg if not for an alert social activist who spotted the change and alerted the French authorities. Thus the Russian crew were prevented from loading their belongings and by the next day the MMSI was again switched to the original French registration and the AIS system came back online as well. Was it a genuine attempt to steal the ship or just to test the reaction of the French? Needless to say DCNS and the French authorities became much more watchful on the BPC after that incident.

The Russian sailors completed their training but without a ship to bring back were finally ordered to sail home in the Smolny on 18th Dec 2014. Bon Vent, or good riddance as we would say it in English. The French always seem to be able to express an unpleasant word so eloquently.

No Mistrals For Putin

You'll be surprised but there is actually a social media campaign group that rejoiced in the denial of the BPCs to Pootin. You can check it out yourself here http://nomistralsforputin.com . They have snippets of news and videos about the BPCs as they were being constructed right up to 18th Dec 2014 when the Russian mafia sailed home. It makes interesting reading.




No Mistral For Putin Logo




No Mistrals For Putin Home Page

The Fate of the BPCs

As the Vladivostok languishes at the docks, the Sevastopol nears completion. Very soon the French government would have two brand new BPCs on their hands with no immediate prospect of delivery to Russia as Pootin is not likely to get his paws of Ukraine anytime soon. They could either integrate them into the French Navy ( which originally wanted to have four by the year 2020 ) or sell them off at a discount to some NATO ally like Canada or Poland, whom we know is interested in getting a smaller version of the Mistral (BPC 140). The original Mistral is BPC 210 (21000 tonnes). The fear is that by reneging on the Mistral delivery, other potential arms mega-deal like the Indian MRCA replacement involving 126 Rafale fighter aircraft might be compromised. They can also choose to keep the money already collected and do not pay any compensation for the broken deal. Give Pootin a taste of his own medicine, just remember to watch your back, especially as you walk across bridges, and do not accept any offers of tea, even from old acquaintances, under ANY circumstances.

Update : Cancellation of the Mistral Deal

As expected, the Ukrainian Crisis continued through the year without any signs of slowing down. Russian backed rebels and Russian military personnel continued to clash with Ukrainian government troops in eastern Ukraine despite ceasefire agreements. Heavy weapons are used in the fighting, violating truce agreements. After protracted talks with the French government failed to secure the release of the two Russian Mistrals, is official that on 5th Aug 2015, Paris and Moscow terminated the contract for the delivery of the Mistrals.

France promised to reimburse Russia all the money it had paid for the Mistrals, and negotiations continued regarding the exact penalty France has to pay.

Three days ago on 27th Aug 2015, Sputnik News Agency reported that France had transferred a sum of € 900 million ( USD 1 billion ) to Russia as compensation for not delivering the ships. One would logically think that the payment would be on condition that France should be free to dispose of the ships as she wished. However, Sputnik quoted a high ranking source in Russia's Federal Service For Military-Technical Cooperation that despite the fact that France had transferred all the funds for failing to deliver the Mistrals, permission has not yet been given by Russia to export the ships.

Things get complicated when we realise that Russian shipyards had been involved with 40% ( as they claimed ) of the construction of the Mistrals. The aft section of the hull being constructed in St Petersburg and then shipped on monster barges to Saint-Narzaire for integration with the forward section. They must also have been involved with some design work, especially those modifications specific to the Vladivostok-class and may have contributed to classified designs meant for the Russian Navy. So who owns which portion of the ship and who owns the intellectual property rights to the Vladivostok-class becomes a complicated issue. Russian equipment already installed on the Mistrals will also have to be removed by Russian engineers and technicians and that will be scheduled in September. In the end, the Vladivostok and the Sevastopol will be empty shells and the French government might as well scrap them.

Looking at the brighter side, all this bickering around the Vladivostok and Sevastopol had probably generated lots of free publicity for DCNS and their Mistral BPC. As news of the termination of contract spreads, potential buyers are queuing up to pick up a good deal. Egypt and Saudi Arabia had expressed interest, and so did China, India, Vietnam and Brazil. The latest enquiry came form Malaysia!


France certainly paid a heavy price for breaking the contract, but that is the only right thing to do in the face of Russia's naked aggression and land grabbing antics in the Black Sea. The Mistrals should never have been sold to Pootin in the first place, as the idiom says, a leopard never changes its spots.

Now the Russians have the blueprints of the Mistral and they must also have had some form of technology transfer from DCNS, one of which is said to be in the form of Large-Block Assembly technology, a shipbuilding process in which parts of a large ship are constructed separately in different places, then erected together in a single dry dock to form the ship's hull. The process is an efficient way of creating large vessels, but is logistically challenging. They could easily construct an amphibious assault ship based on a similar design, just that it would take a slightly longer time. In fact that was just what they claimed they wanted to do - build a helicopter carrier, perhaps even nuclear powered, that is bigger, faster and far more powerful than the original Vladivostok, with air defense and submarine defense systems, without blatantly copying the Mistral's design. So far two designs have surfaced, the 24000 tonne Lavina helicopter carrier and the 14000 tonne Priboy Large Landing Ship, each could embark 16 and 8 helicopters respectively.

I have a feeling this will not be the last we hear about the Russian Mistrals, and this article might be updated further when the time comes.

Second Update


On 23rd Sep 2015 the Office of the French President announced on their website that the two BPCs have been sold to Egypt for EUR950 million ( USD1 billion ), exactly the amount France had agreed to compensate Russia for the cancellation of the contract. IHS Jane's Defence Weekly even had a cover feature on its 30th Sep issue " Sevastosold! France sells Russia's Mistrals to Egypt ".

Before the deal with the Egyptians was finalized, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were all rumoured to be interested in snapping up one or both the Mistrals.

Meanwhile, after splurging on 24 Rafale multi-role combat aircraft, a FREMM frigate and 4 Gowind 2500 corvettes earlier in 2015, Egypt continues its weapons acquisition spree, signing a contract with Russia for 46 Kamov Ka-52K Alligator attack helicopters ( naval variant ). Some of these helicopters will eventually find their way onto the decks of the Mistrals.